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Abstract
ERS sponsored a workshop, Technological and Structural Change in the Transportation Sector:
Effects on U.S. Food and Agricultural Trade, March 17-18, 1999, in Washington, DC. The
program's objectives were to raise awareness within ERS about the role and importance of
transportation in U.S. food and agricultural trade and to discuss the need of an agency research
agenda in this area. More than 60 people attended. Bob Thompson of the World Bank and Jeffrey
Frankel of the Brookings Institution led with discussions about the role of transportation in the
global food system and the importance of integrating geography and transportation in analysis of
international trade. Other panels dealt with transportation technology, past and future, the
changing policy environment for ocean shipping, logistical and technological developments aiding
exports of specific commodities, including the use of supply chain management. Representatives
of the Agricultural Marketing Service discussed the availability of transportation cost data, and
the availability of other shipping data was discussed by representatives of the PIERS database, a
product of the Journal of Commerce. Two ERS research projects were summarized, one using
GTAP and another applying the gravity model to estimate the extent to which distance is less of
an inhibiting factor in exporting certain U.S. agricultural exports. The administrator of the
Agricultural Marketing Service, the ERS associate administrator, and representatives of the
Transportation Research Board, the USDA’s World Board, and the Farm Foundation discussed
potential ways ERS could include the transportation variable in its research. The program was
cosponsored by the Farm Foundation and World Perspectives, Inc.
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Transportation has always been important in agricultural trade, as reflected in the 1940 Yearbook
of Agriculture: "Transportation, whether provided by commercial agencies or by the farmer
himself, is a vital necessity to the economic functioning of agriculture."
Income growth overseas and accompanying changes in food preferences and diets are most often
cited as drivers behind the unmistakable, more than decade-long shift in U.S. agricultural exports
from bulk commodities (e.g., wheat and soybeans) to nonbulk items (e.g., meats and fruit). While
income growth and some policy measures to liberalize trade are key determinants in the rise of
perishable shipments, advances in transportation technology and logistics are equally important.
For U.S. agriculture to benefit from growing overseas demand for, say, fresh fruits and
vegetables, shippers must be able to deliver them to purchasers thousands of miles away with no
substantial loss in freshness and quality.
Perishable agricultural products, many of which U.S. farmers could only have dreamed of selling
abroad just 10 years ago, now account for about 20 percent--a growing share of total U.S. food
and agricultural exports. Moreover, the cost of transporting perishable products is, in many cases,
substantially more than for bulk commodities: 5 to 10 percent of the free on board (fob) value of
grain versus over 30 percent for important horticultural products such as citrus and frozen
potatoes. In part due to declining transportation costs and new technologies for handling and
extending shelf life, perishable products are a rising component of trade in food and agricultural
products.
The dynamic growth in perishable products trade and the role of technology in lowering the costs
for shipping and handling time-sensitive products motivated the ERS-sponsored workshop,
Technological Changes in the Transportation Sector--Effects on U.S. Food and Agricultural
Trade, held March 17-18, 1999. More than 60 people attended the one-and-a-half day program.
The presentations covered a variety of subjects, including the incorporation of transportation and
geography into international trade analysis; innovations in technology, past and future; the impact
of changing U.S. maritime policy; and technological and logistical developments in exporting New
Zealand dairy products and Sunkist citrus.
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The Role of Transportation in the Global Food System
Robert Thompson, World Bank
Transportation and Geography Rediscovered
I’m really delighted to see the general economics profession rediscovering the importance of
transportation costs and geography in international trade considerations. The agricultural
economics profession in the 1960’s and into the 1970’s did an awful lot of spatial equilibrium
modeling. And, of course, the cost of transportation was one of the most fundamental variables in
any spatial equilibrium model. Some of you may be familiar with a survey of world trade modeling
I did that came out as an ERS bulletin in 1982 or 1983, which had a whole section on spatial
equilibrium models and spatial models.
Transportation Costs Are Like Tariffs
Let me just mention one important equation: price in the exporting country multiplied by the
exchange rate, plus the transportation cost times one, plus the tariff rate, equals price in the
importing country. In trade, we always talk about the possibility of having prohibitive tariffs and
what an impediment the tariff wedge can be to international trade. But if you look at this
equation, the transportation cost is just as significant as the import tariff so that high
transportation costs can work against trade flows in exactly the same way as high tariffs. Anything
that brings down transportation costs, whether it’s technological change or structural change in
the industry, can reduce the wedge between the price in the exporting country and the price in the
importing country. Lowered transportation costs can have as positive an effect on promoting
international trade as a reduction in tariffs negotiated over years and years in subsequent rounds
of international trade negotiations in the GATT or the WTO.
The study of transportation and transportation costs was in vogue back in the 1960s and 1970s,
but later we in the agricultural economics profession tended to forget about transportation and
focus much more on trade policy. Trade policy was somehow sexier and more exciting. (Maybe
because it’s easier to get trips to Geneva if you’re working on tariff rates than if you’re working
on transportation costs.) But transportation has always been an important variable and it’s
important that it is coming back into vogue. Transportation is also coming back into vogue in the
international development community. Public works projects, particularly road construction, were
important in foreign aid programs in the 1960s into the 1970s, but infrastructure projects also
went out of vogue in the foreign aid business in the 1970s and only very recently have come back
into vogue.
The World Bank’s Interests in Infrastructure and Transportation
I’ve been asked to make a few comments on what the World Bank is doing in this area right
now. I can speak with the authority of eight months at the World Bank, but I think I have picked
up some sense of the changes that Mr. Wolfensohn is bringing since he came to the Bank. One of
the important things that he has caused the Bank to do is carefully review the appropriate role of
government in the process of development. And, also, how we might change the public/private            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 2
balance in investments in developing countries, particularly investments in things that once were
the domain of the public sector.
In particular, Mr. Wolfensohn has focused our attention on making poverty reduction the most
important mission of the World Bank. Poverty reduction is front and center in the bank’s current
mission statement. Around the world today, about 1.2 billion people live on incomes of less than
$1 per day per capita. About 70 percent of these people live in rural areas that are generally not
integrated into either their national economies or into the international economy. And, as
Wolfensohn has focused our attention on the poor and where they are, it’s drawing into bold
perspective the importance of investments, both public and private, in facilitating economic
development in those rural areas.
Public and Private Roles in Investing in Infrastructure and Human Capital
As we’ve gone through the process of redefining the Bank’s role, one of the things that Mr.
Wolfensohn has asked us to focus very carefully on is being sure that the Bank is not supporting
activities that could be much more efficiently undertaken by the private sector. In particular, we
need to focus on creating jobs and income streams, which are the fundamental forces for reducing
poverty in low-income countries, both through public investments and by creating an environment
conducive to successful economic development.
And as we’ve focused on those important public investments, two areas that jump to the
forefront are infrastructure and human capital formation. Infrastructure includes roads, ports,
telecommunications, and rural electrification. Obviously, some infrastructure can be built by the
private sector, but some will have to remain the responsibility of the public sector. In urban areas
in developing countries, significant progress has been made in the last 20 years in inducing the
private sector to participate in infrastructure investments programs, such as build-operate-transfer
(BOT) systems. Another example is collecting tolls to pay for interstate highways or expressways
around cities. But the further you get from cities into areas where the population density is smaller
and where the density of economic activity is lower, much larger inducements will be required
from the public sector to get the private sector involved.
Historically, most rural roads have been a public sector responsibility. But in rural electrification
and telecommunications, obviously, the private sector plays an important role. Of course, there
too, it may take some public sector inducement to get the private sector involved. So we’re
looking for creative ways to induce the private sector to invest in rural roads and in
telecommunications, as well as in electrification. Investments in rural roads are key, because
we’ve got to get transportation costs down in rural areas.
We’re finding that in many parts of the world, in Africa in particular but not only in Africa, there
are much better agricultural technologies available than have been adopted. These technologies
haven’t been adopted because they don’t pay off for farmers. The cost of transporting fertilizer to
farms is prohibitively high. The cost of moving products from the farm to the cities is prohibitively
high, and there is simply no net profit left for a farmer who adopts new technology. These farmers
need improved transportation to bring down costs before they can adopt improved technologies            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 3
and before rural economies can be integrated into national economies. Then, not only will these
rural communities begin contributing to the GDP, but they will also enjoy lower rates of poverty.
In addition to infrastructure investments, public sector investments are needed in schools, in
health care, and in safe drinking water to improve human capital.
And, finally, the third role of government is to provide the enabling public policy environment,
including:
q  A commercial code that defines the rules of the road for a functioning market economy.
q  A legal structure that defines property rights, particularly in land and intellectual property, and
that permits those property rights to be registered, transferred, or pledged as collateral.
q  Honest weights and measures.
q  The other public policies needed for a functioning market economy.
After securing the necessary infrastructure, human capital, and public policy, the best thing for the
government to do is get out of the way and let the private sector function. That is generally the
philosophy that Mr. Wolfensohn is promoting within the Bank.
Decentralizing the Bank’s Operations
Mr. Wolfensohn is also working to decentralize the bank’s operations and move more of its
human and financial resources out to the countries where we work. The Bank should then be able
to play a more effective catalytic role than it has historically when it lent to governments
substantially in support of public sector activities that could have been much more efficiently
carried out by the private sector. In a nutshell, that’s the changing perspective at the World Bank.
We’re putting a lot higher priority on investments in world infrastructure, both directly through
governments as well as in public/private partnerships to get the private sector to do as much as
possible. The governments of developing countries certainly don’t have the resources to build all
the necessary infrastructure or to build it as fast as it’s needed. Once you’ve induced the private
sector to do as much as possible, the public sector can fill in.
Pacific Food Outlook: Emphasis on Infrastructure
Finally, I would like to mention a project that Bill Coyle and I are involved in together, along with
Carole Brookins, CEO of World Perspectives, Inc., one of our sponsors today. It’s the Pacific
Food Outlook, which is an activity of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). For the
first two issues of this publication, I’ve had the privilege of chairing the forecaster’s group, which
has brought together forecasters from all 21 or so of the Pacific Rim countries that are members
of APEC. I’m pretty proud of the job the forecasters have done in putting together this
document.
But more importantly, I want to point out the emphasis this project is placing on infrastructure. In
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the functioning of the global food system. This year’s Pacific Food Outlook, which will be
released this fall in Auckland at the time of the APEC heads-of-state meeting, includes a more
explicit, fuller treatment of infrastructure and the extent to which it either impedes or facilitates
the functioning of the Pacific food system. This is not just production agriculture, but the whole
food system from production through processing to the consumer, whether that consumer is
within the country or in other parts of the Pacific Rim. I think it’s going to make a major
contribution to the literature. We’re going to be meeting in Tokyo with the authors of this year’s
Pacific Food Outlook in about three weeks and then through the summer the report will be
finalized and come out in the fall. So look forward to the release of the 1999-2000 Pacific Food
Outlook.
Again, thanks a lot for inviting me to open this session and make some prefatory comments.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 5
Integrating Transportation and Geography into Trade Analysis
Jeffrey Frankel, The Brookings Institution
My topic today is the role of transportation costs and geography in patterns of international trade.
One might think that this is an obsolete subject. We hear so much about globalization,
international integration, the death of distance, the triumph over transport costs, the borderless
world, and statements like, “Firms do business across the globe as easily as across town.” It is
not hard to see where all of this comes from. The trend toward increased integration and reduced
costs of transportation and communication has been very strong for a long time. It consists of a
number of parts. There’s technological progress in transport itself. Perhaps, in the 20th century,
the invention of the airplane would be the most dramatic example. And it’s interesting that even
though we think of ocean shipping first, a higher and higher percentage of U.S. trade goes by air
than by sea. Currently, 31 percent of U.S. exports go by air, up from just 14 percent in 1970, and
that increase is at the expense of the share that goes by sea, with land remaining pretty constant.
So the share that goes by air is almost equal to the share that goes by sea, and that’s not including
services and other ways in which air transport matters. I think we have to consider all three modes
of transportation.
Technology and Innovation Bring Down Transportation Costs
It’s not just scientific or technological innovations that matter, but also innovations in
transportation. I think one of the most important events of the post-war period was the invention
of containerized cargo, which was just an idea by a guy named McLean− Malcolm McLean. It’s
sort of an interesting story. Apparently, initially the motivation wasn’t just efficiency, but to cut
down on pilfering by the people handling the cargo in the port. But containers are more efficient
and have had a huge effect on reducing costs. For the share of trade that goes by sea, the average
sea freight charge per short ton has fallen from $95 in 1920 (expressed in 1990 dollars) to $29
currently. In addition to innovation in the private sector, liberalization by governments, reductions
in both tariffs and nontariff barriers have, of course, been very important in the post-war period.
There is danger of overdoing this liberalization. The conventional wisdom, if you’re not careful,
is that borders don’t matter at all anymore. Distance doesn’t matter at all. Geography doesn’t
matter at all. As I said, a producer can do business across the planet as easily as across town. And
just to read you one quote from The Borderless World by Kenichi Omae: “National borders have
effectively disappeared." That’s an exaggeration. We want to pay a lot of attention to the
increased integration, the decreased costs associated with distance. But we don’t want to get
carried away and say that there is no role for geography at all.
Global Integration Far From Complete; Geography Still Matters
Let me mention five different ways in which geography still matters. First, a bit of
macroeconomics. Last year (1998), the U.S. economy grew by 4 percent (third year in a row that
the Council of Economic Advisors grossly underestimated the rate of growth of the U.S.
economy). The rest of the world was in a slump, especially Asia, of course. If the world were
really so perfectly integrated, you would think that the Asian slump would have had a huge effect
on us. It did have some effect. It showed up in our trade deficit, and it created a drag on U.S.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 6
growth of something like 1 percent. But that was relatively minor compared to how big and
strong the domestic economy was, how much momentum it had. That is, at a crude level perhaps,
an indication that maybe international integration is not quite as complete as we’ve gotten into
the habit of saying.
The most common ready estimate of the degree of integration is the ratio of trade to GDP, which
has certainly been increasing throughout the post-war period. The average of exports and imports
of merchandise as a share of GDP in the United States is now at 9.1 percent, which is more than
double what it was as recently as 1971. This is comparable to the trends in other countries. Japan
and the EU, if you consider them as an aggregate, both have openness roughly in this
neighborhood of about 9 percent, which is an important trend. But is international integration
close to complete? I would argue far from it. Here are two other perspectives on that statistic.
First, the ratio of trade to GDP was almost as high before World War I. It was 5.6 percent in
1989 and about 6 percent in 1913 just before World War I. So most of the technological
innovation and liberalization that we have had during the post-war period has merely reversed
what happened between World War I and World War II, especially in the 1930s when many tariff
barriers went up and trade as a share of GDP in the U.S. and other countries fell very sharply. It
took until the mid-1970’s before we had re-attained the degree of openness that the world had
experienced before World War I. So that’s a little sobering.
Second, let’s think what it would mean if it were literally true that a producer could deal with a
customer around the globe as easily as across town. It would mean that there would be no
necessary correlation between customers’ producer relationships, on the one hand, and where
you’re located on the other. The U.S. economy is currently about 26 percent of gross world
product. If geography didn’t matter, an American consumer would buy from an American
producer no more frequently than anybody elsewhere in the world would buy from an American
producer. In other words, 26 percent of the time, 74 percent of our trade would be with other
countries. Instead, it’s only 9 percent. That means even though openness has doubled, it would
have to increase another eight-fold before we’d be at this theoretical perfect world in which
distance no longer mattered, geography no longer mattered; in which you traded with people
around the globe as easily as across town. Maybe that’s a “straw man,” but given how often
those quotes I mentioned come up and given the extent to which distance and geography have
indeed been omitted from most analyses, I think it’s important to make that point.
I promised you five reasons why geography still matters, why integration is not perfect. The third
one uses price data rather than quantity data. If distance didn’t matter, and transportation costs
were zero, we’d have perfect arbitrage. Agricultural products are generally a good area to test
this because there is relatively greater homogeneity, relatively greater reason to think that a bushel
of wheat in one country is a good substitute for a bushel of wheat in another, although even in this
case it may not literally be true. The so-called law of one price which says, adjusting for currency,
prices should be equalized is a very important part of theory, but it just doesn’t hold all that well
in practice. There is a huge volume of empirical literature on this, but I cite one paper that I find
really striking by Froot, Kim, and Rogoff. They obtained data going back to 1273− that’s not a
misprint, every time you put that in a paper, the editor thinks it’s a misprint−
so they got over 700 years of data on prices in England and Holland for eight commodities:            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 7
barley, butter, cheese, eggs, oats, peas, wheat, and silver. Seven out of the eight happen to be
agricultural commodities, and they look at the price differential and see how it has moved over
time and the speed at which a deviation from the law of one price is corrected and the role of
currencies. But the most striking thing is that the average price deviation between Holland and
Britain is no smaller today in most of these commodities than it was seven centuries ago. I
consider that astounding. Presumably, transportation costs were prohibitive for butter and eggs
then and they were high for some of the others. We know that those transportation costs have
fallen a lot, and yet the law of one price doesn’t hold any closer today and the speed with which
deviations are corrected is no higher today than it was 600 or 700 years ago. What’s going on is
that we’ve got serious government trade barriers in the form of the common agricultural policy in
Europe. We’ve got volatile exchange rates, which even for agricultural products create deviations
from the law of one price. And those factors have increased over time by enough to offset
declining transport costs.
Another fascinating piece of research I want to cite is by Charles Engel and John Rogers. They
looked at consumer prices in categories of goods not quite as narrowly defined as butter and such,
but 12 categories of goods among a sample of 23 cities spread throughout Canada and the United
States. They looked at the price differentials and how they were affected by geographical
considerations. They found that distance has a statistically significant effect on relative price
variability. The average city-pair, average pair of cities in North America, has a standard deviation
that is one-fifth higher than it would be if those two cities were right next to each other, say
Minneapolis-St. Paul. Raising the distance to the average within the continent raises the variability
in relative prices by about one-fifth. I’m going to come back to that work a little bit later.
The fourth reason why we know integration has not gone quite as far as we sometimes think is the
literature on the increasing gap between wages paid to skilled workers and unskilled workers. We
seem to be reversing this a bit now, but since the early 1970’s, the gap between wages paid to
skilled and unskilled workers has increased rather sharply. There is a debate about whether this is
due to trade, as a lot of people think, or other causes. Without going into the methodologies,
most people find that a relatively small fraction of the gap is due to trade and more is due to
technological change and the increasing importance of education and skills. Most of these studies
conclude that trade is just not that large a share of the U.S. economy, contrary to all the
globalization talk.
Finally, financial markets. One would think transport costs are essentially zero and that integration
would be complete, and my compatriots in the field of international finance generally assume that.
But, in fact, there are all kinds of ways in which, even in the realm of finance, integration is not
complete− failures of arbitrage, so-called home-country bias in holdings of securities, and so on.
In the rest of my time, I’m going to run through three categories of costs in which distance does
make a difference. Then I will talk about why we should care about transportation costs, and
geography more generally, in trade theory. And then about the famous gravity model-- what it is,
some empirical conclusions one can derive from it, and maybe a few policy implications as well.
The first of the three different kinds of costs of doing business at a distance is what you think of
automatically, namely physical shipping costs. It is hard to get a comprehensive measure. I            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 8
suppose the easiest one is the gap between the cif price, which includes insurance and freight, and
the pre-export price, as a percentage of the total. I’ll call that the cif margin. That average is
about 4 percent for U.S. trade, starting at about 2 percent for trade with Mexico (and about as
low for Canada) and going higher for trade with partners that are farther away. The maximum in
my data sample is 26 percent for Guinea in West Africa− that is, 26 percent of the value of the
trade is accounted for by the insurance and freight margins. Obviously, this varies across
commodities. In the categories I’ve got data on, the lowest margin is for pearls at 0.7 percent.
Obviously pearls are not perishable and have a high ratio of monetary value to weight. So
transport costs are negligible for trade in pearls. At the other end, the cif margin for fruits and
nuts is 19.3 percent, quite a bit higher margin. If you look at cif margins worldwide, they’ve been
falling throughout the post-war period, from roughly 10 percent in 1950 to roughly 6 percent
now. That underestimates the effect that declining transport costs have had. I want to warn
against using the cif numbers as a measure of transport costs, because of composition effects.
Composition with regard to trading partners and with regard to commodities, in part precisely
because transport costs are falling. Regarding composition of trading partners, I’ve seen a
calculation by Michael Ferrantino that the distance of trading partners weighted by how much
trade we undertake with trading partners has increased over time. We trade at a greater distance
on average now than we did in the past. Regarding the composition of commodities, in the 1950’s
no one would have dreamed of trading certain products. Some specific examples in the
agricultural area would be fresh strawberries or cut flowers. But now they are traded. Declining
transport costs allow you to trade at a greater distance in different commodities. The cif margin
reflects declining transport costs, but it also is going to reflect a shift in composition toward
trading partners that are farther away and toward commodities that previously would have been
more expensive to trade in. So, the first way in which doing business at a distance costs money is
the obvious one: physical transport costs, whether the goods go by sea, land, or air.
The second factor that raises the cost of doing business at a distance is the time elapsed in
transportation. Transportation time has three components: interest rate charges, perishability, and
the loss from adapting to changing conditions. We’ve all heard about the importance of just-in-
time inventory methods, which have had a huge effect on the level of inventories that firms have
to hold. Inventories of raw materials, intermediate products, and final products have all hit historic
lows in recent years because of an innovation copied from Japan and some good use of
information technology. But the just-in-time method depends on a pretty short lag. If you have to
wait three months for product to be shipped across the ocean, then you can’t do just-in-time
inventory management.
The third factor that raises the cost of doing business at a distance is a little more general; it is
cultural unfamiliarity. It makes a big difference if you are doing business with a culture that you
understand and are close to. That is in turn correlated with past immigration between the
countries and whether you speak a common language. And it is correlated with distance. I’m
taking these three categories from Linnemann who wrote in the 1960’s. He called this third
category, psychic distance. Drysdale and Garnaut in Australia call it subjective resistance to trade
as opposed to objective resistance, which are the physical costs.
These are the ways in which distance comes in and has an effect.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 9
Transportation Neglected by International Trade Economists
Why do we care about this? Why should geography be part of trade? It is quite remarkable that
most textbooks and most models have almost completely neglected the role of transport costs,
distance, and geography. Generally, I imagine when I tell somebody outside of economics that I
study international trade, they think that geography must be an important part of that. But it isn’t.
(Actually, it’s even more striking for people who study geography and have a hard time
explaining to their families that their work doesn’t actually involve knowing where countries are
located.) I think it should be. The role of geography has been especially absent from international
trade theory since theorists weren’t trying to explain bilateral trade: who trades, how much, or
with what other country. The big questions that trade theorists have tried to explain for 200 years
are: what is the commodity composition of our exports, what is the commodity composition of
our imports? How much do we trade, not who do we trade with. That’s true of Ricardo and
comparative advantage. It’s true of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of factor content.
The idea is the product you’re producing is a perfect substitute for everything else that’s in that
category, regardless of whether you are producing the good or not. You may want to think of
trade in terms of countries or empirical models, but the idea was there’s a world rice market and
all rice is the same. If you produce rice and export rice, you dump it into the world pool of rice.
And if you buy rice, import rice, you take some rice out and you don’t look to see whether this
grain of rice came from the United States, from California, or Thailand, or anywhere else. It’s all
the same. So if you’re not trying to explain the bilateral pattern of trade, then I guess it is
understandable that you wouldn’t look at the role of geography. But I think it is of theoretical
interest and certainly when you get to the empirical models it is of interest. Not withstanding
some work over the years on this side, the majority of empirical work also has left out geography.
Countries are disembodied entities that have no actual location and physical space.
It’s interesting to ask why this has been happened. Paul Krugman has an explanation; it’s the old
phenomenon of looking for your lost quarter under the lamppost because that’s where the light is
bright, even though you lost the quarter the next block over. We didn’t really have the tools until
recently to model bilateral trade. The most relevant model is trade with imperfect substitutes and
increasing returns to scale in order to get a determinate and interesting solution. And I think that
probably is part of it. On the empirical side, computers that made it possible to run regressions on
large data sets are another reason why this has become more popular.
By the way, just parenthetically, the imperfect substitutes assumption, according to the
conventional wisdom, is only applicable to trade in manufactured products among industrialized
countries and, supposedly, is less relevant to trade in agriculture and to trade with developing
countries. That is the conventional wisdom, though I am not sure I buy it. In fact, California rice
is an imperfect substitute for Thai rice, as any Japanese consumer will tell you. Similarly, for
wheat and a lot of other products, you do not have perfect substitutes. Empirical evidence
suggests that the model is as relevant for developing countries as it is for industrialized countries.
Let me give you five reasons why we should care about geography, why we should put distance
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pattern of trade at all. Let me first mention a false reason, which is not on my list. That is bilateral
trade balances. In Washington, we have no choice but to talk about this a lot because people, and
Congress talk about it a lot. What is the bilateral U.S. surplus or deficit with Japan or Mexico or
anybody else, in particular products? I am sure you are all familiar with the economists’ argument
that, for most purposes, it is not wise to focus on bilateral balances. People who focus on bilateral
balances implicitly assume that they should be balanced somehow. This neglects the principle of
comparative advantage, that you want to run a surplus with certain trade partners and in certain
products that you’re good at producing. The money you earn from those products allows you to
run a bilateral deficit with other trading partners or in other commodities. There is no reason why
the bilateral balances should balance.
Here are four reasons why we should care about the geographical pattern of trade, one each for
policymakers, producers, theorists, and econometricians. Why should policymakers care?
Notwithstanding what I just said about bilateral trade imbalances, thinking of the trade policy
questions that I’ve worked on in my two-and-a-half years at CEA, although some of them are
multilateral− WTO, GATT issues− I would say more than half are not. More than half of the issues
are in some way bilateral or regional, particularly regional trading arrangements (RTAs). RTAs
experienced a revival that is correlated with the revival of geography and distance in bilateral
trade that started in the 1960’s. The same thing happened with regional trading arrangements, free
trade areas, and other preferential trading arrangements.  They were tried in the 1960’s and didn’t
work that well for the most part, with the single exception of the European Economic
Community, and then they were revived in the 1980’s and especially the early 1990’s. That’s how
I got into this subject, the geographical dimension, analyzing for regional trading blocks.
Why should producers care? I think that is pretty clear. Producers would have a hard time
understanding or believing that economists ever neglected this dimension. If you’re a producer,
you want to know where your markets are, what markets are going to be expanding in the future,
and, in particular, where you should invest your energies in developing a market. Just to give one
example, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we had a number of countries going from near autarky
to a state of being just like other countries− transitioning to full integration with the West. If
you’d wanted to plan ahead 10 years in 1990, how much was Czechoslovakia going to be trading
with the West? How much was Russia going to be trading with the West? You needed some
model of bilateral trade and geography to answer that, to predict what would be the normal level
of trade for those countries.
Why should geography be of interest to theorists and historians? One reason it should be of
interest to theorists is that doing business at a distance creates a cost that helps explain a
phenomenon that is pretty dominant in the world: agglomeration. Without increasing returns to
scale, producers should be spread evenly if they want to be close to their consumers. But what we
observe is that producers cluster in many fields. Famous examples are Silicon Valley and other
electronics and high-tech clusters. Financial clusters are interesting because in financial markets,
we think of transport costs as being zero, and yet face-to-face contact is important enough that
you have big financial centers in New York, London, and Hong Kong, for example. To examine
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I mentioned historians; why should historians be interested? You have transport costs explaining
agglomeration, and you have agglomeration explaining what we now call path-dependence. The
fact that history matters. An example that Porter and Krugman use is the first carpet manufacturer
in, I think, Dalton, Georgia. Or the beginnings of the high-tech firms in Silicon Valley. Initially,
agglomeration is historical chance− one firm locates in a place, then a second firm chooses to
locate there because the first firm is there because there are spillovers and benefits to being close
by. Then time passes and you get a whole industry, a whole carpet industry in Dalton, Georgia, or
a whole semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley.
Why should geography be of interest to econometricians? It is rare that we have enough data to
answer a question reliably. Usually, standard errors are bigger than we want and significance
levels are lower than we want. A bilateral data set offers a lot of data. If you have 100 countries,
that’s just 100 points. But if you look at bilateral data, that’s 100 times 99 −  9,900. That’s a
huge number of observations, which provide answers to some questions with much greater
confidence and accuracy than would be the case with a smaller data set. Certainly, you’re going
to be interested if you have to take into account geography or if you’re interested in the question
of the role of distance in transport costs. But even if you are interested in some other
question− such as, “Is Japan abnormally closed?” or “What is the effect of a free trade area?” or
“What is the normal level of trade between Czechoslovakia and the West?”− you are going to
want to hold constant for distance and for other geographic factors. This is leading to the gravity
model.
Applying the Gravity Model
To give the originators of the gravity model their due is a bit tricky. There is important work by
Tinbergen and Linnemann in the early 1960’s that, in some sense, is the modern foundation of the
gravity model. But it goes back farther than that and I’ve found references in the urban and
regional geographic literature going back to 1946. I’ve gotten into the habit of saying there’s
always going to be somebody earlier. So let’s take Sir Isaac Newton as the original citation for
the gravity model.
We are trying to explain bilateral trade. How much would we expect Country I and Country J to
trade? The analogy to Newton’s gravitation is a good one. Newton’s theory of gravitation is that
the attraction between two heavenly bodies is proportionate to the product of the mass and is
inversely related to the distance between them. Analogously, the gravity model of trade says that
trade between Country I and Country J is proportionate to some measure of the product of the
size of the two countries and is inversely related to some measure of the distance between them.
In the case of size, that is where you need the models of imperfect substitutes. Or you don’t need
them--actually Alan Deardorf has shown that you can also do it in a Heckscher-Ohlin model. But
we didn’t really feel comfortable with theoretical foundations for the gravity model until we had
gotten them naturally from model-traded imperfect substitutes. To put it very simply, the question
is how much does the United States trade with Belgium versus Great Britain. Great Britain is
twice as big as Belgium: it produces more varieties of goods and consumers everywhere have
taste for variety. They care not just about the quantity of the good consumed, but the number of
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more varieties, all other things being equal. So that predicts that you will trade more with a larger
country than with a smaller country. Now regardless of what you think about that particular set of
theoretical foundations, this is a very strong empirical irregularity. And as soon as you stop and
think about it, it just has to be true.
If you sit down and write a model to try to predict trade with Luxembourg versus trade with
Japan and you don’t have size in there, if you do it solely based on factor content, you are going
to get a pretty foolish result. You are not going to predict that trade with Japan is much bigger
than trade with Luxembourg. And the case for the gravity model all along, by the way, has been
that it does fit the data very well. The empirical case was there before the theoretical case.
There are three different possible measures of size. One is GDP, another is population, and
another is land area. They all matter.
The other set of variables concerns distance. We’ve already discussed how distance creates costs
for doing business. Not just the physical shipping costs, but the other ones that I mentioned. The
effect of cost is immediate. It is like a tariff− it raises the price. Of course, it’s going to reduce
consumption and that’s easy to model. If people hadn’t put distance in before, it’s only because
they hadn’t tried. It wasn’t that there was anything difficult about it. The results I am going to
refer to, unless I say otherwise, measure distance in kilometers between the capitals of the two
countries. There are other measures of “distance” as well. Recall what I said about psychic
distance or cultural unfamiliarity. You’d also want to include other geographic measures and also
social and political measures: the extent of links between Country I and Country J, such as a
common language. The results I’m going to cite are mainly from the work I’ve done with
Shang-Jin Wei that’s summarized in Regional Trading Blocks on a sample of 64 countries, which
works out to 1,953 pairs of countries. I’m also going to draw on work by other people using the
gravity model, because a lot of people out there are doing interesting things.
In a moment, I’ll give you the results for the coefficient on distance, which is relatively robust
across different data sets and different authors. We found that putting distance in log form seems
to be the best simple functional form. And it is consistent, by the way, with something we found
when we looked at the cif margins and tried to relate them to distance. There is a relationship
between a cif margin and distance. Not as tight as you might think, but there is a relationship and
it seems to be less than proportionate. That is not too surprising. There is a certain cost just to
loading the goods onto the ship. Then once they are on the ship, the additional cost for going a
greater distance is not fully proportionate. So maybe that is part of the reason why the log seems
to do better than the actual level of distance.
The coefficient on the log of distance, to explain the log of bilateral trade, is around -0.75. That
says if you increase the distance between Country I and Country J by 1 percent, then trade
between them falls by 0.75 percent. That is, if you don’t have a common border. One of the
variables that has turned out to be the most important and that I always try to put in is a dummy
variable representing when two countries are adjacent, when they share a common border. It is
always very significant statistically. The effect is estimated at 82 percent; two countries that share
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they would otherwise. So Canada and the U.S. trade a lot with each other as compared with,
let’s say, The Netherlands and France, or France and the UK, or Korea and Japan, which are
close together geographically, but don’t share a common border. If you hold constant for that,
then the effect of distance falls a little. Instead of -0.75, it’s roughly -0.6. If you increase the
distance between two countries by 1 percent, trade between them falls by about six-tenths of a
percent.
I’ve tried putting in a dummy variable for whether a country is landlocked. It tends to reduce
trade with all its partners by about one-third. Some people have tried measures for island
countries as well.
There are a number of reasons to think that the distance measure is not capturing just physical
transport costs, but also some other factors I mentioned as well. In particular, there are reasons
for thinking the distance measure doesn’t just cover ocean shipping costs. First, there are a few
papers by Wang and Winters, who have separated out distance by land from distance by sea.
When they calculate distance by sea, they actually figure out the route from one port to another,
going around the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn, and, also, they add on the land distance
from the center of the country to the port. I’m very glad that they did that. It turns out not to
make much difference. There is not that much difference between land and sea costs per mile and
it doesn’t change the coefficient very much on overall distance or other results. That is one hint
that we are not just talking about sea distance. Second, there was an interesting experiment− in
1967 the Suez Canal was closed for eight years. Not as an experiment for econometricians, but
for political reasons. It had a major effect on trade, in that ships had to go the long way around.
So it’s a nice experiment. A paper by Bikker examines what effect that had on trade during that
period within the gravity model. He found that it did have a significant effect. Two countries that
previously would have most naturally traded through the Suez Canal now saw a reduction in
trade. But the effect was only about one-fifth of what one would have expected based on the
additional distance for going around Africa. That illustrates a couple of things, one of which is
that not all trade goes by ocean, by ship.
Parenthetically, another reason why this experiment was significant is that it gave rise to an
innovation in transportation: the land bridge idea. Goods from East Asia shipping from Singapore
to New York or even to Europe, previously would have gone through the Suez Canal. With the
Canal closed, some of them went across the United States in containers transferred by rail from
the West Coast to the East Coast for their final destination, transferring again to ocean shipping to
Europe. This worked out to be quite speedy and has become a permanent innovation that has
been tried in other parts of the world. Maybe that’s part of the reason why closing the Suez
Canal didn’t have quite as much effect on trade as you might have expected. But the other
reason, I think, is that the cost of doing business at a distance is not just the physical shipping
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Let me turn briefly to disaggregated data. Most of what I’ve done with the gravity model, and
most of what other people have done, is trade in all commodities aggregated. But I have tried
breaking it down into agricultural commodities versus other raw materials versus manufactures,
and there are other people who have carried that further. The statistic is that now 8 percent of
goods trade is agricultural, which is one-fifth the level of 100 years ago. A finding that might
surprise you is that when you do this disaggregation, the results are pretty similar, but the distance
coefficient is actually higher for manufactured than for agricultural products. I think I would have
guessed that transportation costs are more important for agricultural products because they are
bulkier. And that may be true, but the coefficient on the longer distance is, if anything, higher for
manufactured than for agricultural products. I’ll say a bit more about that
in a minute.
A related paradox is the fourth on my list of reasons that show we’re not just talking about
physical transport costs. Even more surprising is that the coefficient on distance does not decline
over time. I think before I started doing this, I would have thought that we would see very
tangible evidence of technological progress and innovation in the transportation industry showing
up as the coefficient distance becoming less and less important over time. But it’s not the case at
all. My data set runs from 1965 through the mid-1990’s. There is no tendency at all for the
coefficient on distance to decline during that period. Other people have gone back to the 1950’s.
The coefficient is no higher in the 1950’s than it is now. There are some papers in the 1920’s and
1930’s. Barry Eichengreen has done it; the distance coefficient is again about the same. One fellow
has done a gravity model in the 1860’s and the coefficient was again no higher than it is now.
What’s the explanation for this? Of course, it’s true that transport costs have been declining, but
they’ve been declining at every distance. The costs of transporting to Mexico have been declining
at the same time that the cost of transporting to Pakistan has been declining, maybe for different
reasons− trucking in one case and air and ocean shipping in the other case. But the transportation
costs have declined at every distance. The cross-country coefficient on the distance in my gravity
model is simply the effect of an increase in distance. What is the additional effect of going from
Mexico? If you used to be trading with Mexico and now you’re going to start trading with
Pakistan, the question is what effect that increase in distance has, not the absolute level. So I think
that is the explanation for why the coefficient on distance doesn’t decline over time. It sounds
like a technical point, but there is some real significance there. It says that geography is as
important as it ever was. The difference between trading with Mexico and trading with Pakistan is
as significant today as it was 30 years ago.
This is particularly relevant for regional trading arrangements and the concept that it may be
natural to form a free trade area with your neighbors, with countries that you trade with naturally,
because of low physical transport costs, rather than trading with them because of tariff
preferences themselves. This is an issue of trade diversion versus trade creation, which are handy
terms, but often hard to quantify and parameterize. The notion of natural trading blocks holds that
a country that is in geographic proximity to you is a natural partner. Forming a free trade area
with it is relatively more likely to be trade-creating than trade-diverting.
The last of the variables I want to talk about is the effect of the social and political links, getting at
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Country J speak the same language or had colonial links in the past. There is a very high
correlation between those two variables, so we just put them together− linguistic links or a history
of colonial links. The effect on trade is about a half. Two countries that speak the same language
trade about 50 percent more with each other, again holding constant for size and distance and
borders and all the rest of it, compared with another pair. That tends not to vary much across
languages.
The colonial links are interesting. Here’s a trivia question. What is the Congo’s biggest trading
partner? If size were important, you’d think it would be the United States. Size is important and
the United States is pretty high on the list, but it is not number one. If distance were important,
which it is, you’d think that it would be Zambia or Rwanda or a neighboring country, but it’s not.
It is Belgium, showing how long-lived the relationship with the colonial powers is. One gravity
study by a fellow named Kleiman found that colonial links in 1960, just on the eve of
independence for most of these countries, resulted in trade being two to four times greater. It has
declined since then, but as of 1960, France and a French colony, for example, would trade two to
four times more than France and a British colony located side by side in Africa.
What about the effects of regional trading arrangements? That varies. We found that the
formation of the EC raised trade among European countries by about 65 percent. Other estimates
you’ll see are much higher, but that is because they tend not to hold constant for the distance and
the common border and common languages. Once you hold constant for all those things, you only
get up to about 65 percent and even that doesn’t really kick in until the 1970’s. Some other free
trade areas, customs unions, have bigger effects. Mercosur and the Andean Pact, which carved up
South America, have quite large effects. They promote trade by a factor of about two-and-a-half
among their partners.
Let’s talk about even tighter links. What about a political union? How much difference does it
make if two provinces form a federation if they are literally a member of the same country, as
opposed to being provinces, as opposed to being two different countries. It makes quite a
difference and there are different ways of seeing this. It is hard to get the data set, but for Canada,
there are data on provincial trade. Some papers by Helliwell and McCallum look at trade among
Canadian provinces and between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. Correcting for proximity,
distance, and the rest of it, two Canadian provinces trade 20 times more with each other than they
do with a U.S. state. That is astounding, considering that we think that if there is any border in the
world that has essentially vanished, it is the border between Canada and the United
States− common language, common culture. This was before the free trade era. NAFTA has
brought this number down some, but it is still pretty high. It is also reminiscent of a finding of
Engel and Rogers. I mentioned that Engels and Rogers were the ones who had the data set on
price differentials between pairs of cities in Canada and the United States and showed that if you
increase the distance between two cities, the variability of relative prices goes up because
arbitrage holds less well. The law of one price holds less well. They also asked the question: how
much difference does it make if you have two Canadian cities trading with each other, versus a
Canadian city and a U.S. city, holding constant for distance? They found that it makes a huge
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Does anybody want to make a guess how many miles, in effect, it adds to the transport costs to
cross the border? They conducted a poll, and people way underestimated it. The answer is 2,500
miles. If you have a pair of cities− Windsor, Ontario, and Detroit− they trade as much with each
other as Windsor and Vancouver, assuming that that distance is 2,500 miles. So that’s a huge
effect. It implies there are all kinds of factors that we don’t talk about. The common legal system,
common system of communications, of advertising networks, whether people can take their health
plans with them when they move. And if you think about it, when you go to Canada, there are
many brand names there that aren’t here. Even with our closest neighbor, there is a tendency to
do business within the country, rather than across the border. One factor that is clearly relevant is
the exchange rate between the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar, which has long been variable
and contributes to deviations from the law of one price.
Another way of getting at the effect of political union is to take historical examples where
federations break up into separate units or come together. Sometimes there are data on this. As I
said, there isn’t data in general for trade among U.S. states or French provinces. But we looked
at the case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before and after its breakup. It looks like the
existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire increased trade by roughly eight-fold among the
members while it existed. At the other end is German reunification. When I did this, I only had
data through 1994, only four years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. But already in that span, trade
between East Germany and West Germany was promoted by a factor of four. These are high
numbers. Being in a common political union has more effect than a customs union or most of the
other kind of factors that I mentioned. This is quite relevant for predicting, for example, what is
going to happen to intra-European trade if the EU indeed progresses from customs union to full
political union.
A final way of getting at this point− and again, getting at the point that we don’t live in a
borderless world− is simply to look at the ratio of trade to GDP, the statistic I mentioned at the
outset, which has reached 9 percent for the United States. Look at that for a lot of different
countries and ask, “Why is it that countries tend to trade with themselves more than with each
other?” It is true for every country. A paper by Shang-Jin Wei finds that if the producer and the
consumer are located in the same national political unit, it increases trade by a factor up to 10. If
you then hold lots of things constant, including adjacency and common language, it still has the
effect of doubling trade. The lesson is the same as the lesson I started with, that geography is still
very important. We’re still very far from a borderless world. Even though the trend has clearly
been in the direction of integration, we still have a long way to go.
Conclusion
Let me conclude with one thought on policy, and I hope then we have a couple of minutes for
questions. I’ve been speaking as if transport costs are exogenous. And in most of my
econometrics, I treat them that way. But the point I want to make is one that Bob Thompson
makes: they are not always exogenous. It is not just the state of technology that determines
transport costs, it’s also whether the transportation industry is organized competitively. It
happens that the shipping industry, ocean shipping especially, but also air and to some extent
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protected than your average good or service. My recommendation is that this should be a priority
for policymakers. This means investing in infrastructure and also trying to increase competition
and deregulating some of these highly cartelized sectors. In the case of air, the Clinton
administration has a number of open skies agreements to its credit that reduce the cost of air
transport between countries. But nobody has been able to make much progress or as much
progress on shipping, though we have made a little progress on port services in Japan.
The point is that there is a double payoff. Where any sector is as cartelized, as imperfectly
competitive, as protected as shipping is, there is a high return to trying to liberalize that sector.
But in these sectors, liberalization has a double payoff because in addition to reducing costs in the
sector itself, transportation is an input into international trade. And we all know that there are big
gains from international trade. So you have a double payoff; one by saving expenses in that sector
per se and the other by promoting trade, making it possible for countries to specialize and do
what they do best and reaping the full gains from trade.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: What effect will increasing transnational ownership have on Chrysler, for
example? I saw something yesterday saying that a lot fewer U.S. citizens own Chryslers. That
could be explained by a lot of institutional factors, but with the increasing ownership across
borders and the increasing flow of information via the Internet, how much will that reduce cultural
unfamiliarity and will it make a difference in how we negotiate trade?
MR. FRANKEL: The role of the multinational corporation is tremendously important. We hear
about conflicting cultures and that makes it more difficult to integrate different firms. It is as
important here as elsewhere not to overestimate the extent to which this has happened. Most
companies are still based in a given country and when there are these international alliances or
takeovers, it’s far from a frictionless thing and you can tell the difference in cultures.
Nevertheless, it’s a very major phenomenon. A huge fraction of trade internationally is from an
affiliate of one firm to another. It is a way of reducing transaction costs and this is an important
component of the general phenomenon of integration if we reduce transport costs. Particularly in
what is sometimes called slicing up the value-added chain. A huge amount of trade, particularly
within Asia, for example, consists of intermediate products at various stages of production going
back and forth. You produce a raw material in one country, you ship it to another country for
processing, you ship it to a third country for some more value added and maybe back to the
original one. And so by the time the final product arrives in the hands of the consumers, it has had
contributions of value added from lots of countries and a lot of that takes place within firms that
probably would not be happening if multinational companies did not exist to reduce transaction
costs.
MR. PICK: As a person who put forth a proposal to use gravity models in agriculture, I opened
myself to much criticism on the theoretical foundation of the gravity model. How do you handle
that?
MR. FRANKEL: Now or at some particular date in the past?
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MR. FRANKEL: When I started working on this, which was about 1991, I had to spend a lot of
time (in print or in seminars) apologizing for using the gravity model. Saying, “Yes, I know, it
doesn’t have very good theoretical foundations, but the defense is that it holds up well
empirically.” I don’t feel I have to do that anymore, in part because it now has good theoretical
foundations. My view was that, in the past, nobody had even tried to model bilateral trade. As
Alan Deardorf now says, as soon as you sit down and try to model bilateral trade between
countries, you’re going to end up with something like the gravity model. Fortunately, people
have now done it. So I hope the gravity model can now hold its head up proudly and that it
doesn’t have to apologize for its existence.
MS. DIAO: Okay, so what we learned today is distance still matters in international trade. But in
the meantime, you mentioned that the coefficient for distance has been pretty constant over 30,
40, even 50 years. However, trade has grown more rapidly than GDP in the last 20 to 30 years
and, hence, the trade share of GDP has increased. I’d like to know how you explain this growth
in trade by distance, or how we can use the gravity model to explain the dynamics of trade?
MR. FRANKEL: Looking for evidence of reduced transport costs in the coefficient on distance
declining over time is the wrong place to look. Initially, I thought that would be the place to look.
Once you think about it more, you realize that’s not where it belongs; it belongs in the constant
term. We’ve got this data set of 1,953 pairs of countries and if you want to look at the declining
effect of transport costs over time, it’s that the constant term in that equation in the 1990’s is
higher than it was in the 1980’s, which is higher than it was in the 1970’s. Trade has been
increasing over time. Now, unfortunately, you can’t separate out how much of that effect is
declining transport costs versus declining trade barriers. Presumably, it’s both. I indicated before
that in the inter-war period, you presumably had technological progress continuity. But you had
such a big increase in trade barriers that the constant term fell, the ratio of trade to GDP in every
country decreased. In the post-war period we had the two working together again; separating out
the two is sort of difficult. I suppose you could get direct measures of tariffs, but the problem is
so much of the action has been with nontariff barriers that it is hard to capture.
MR.VOLLRATH: Recently, I took a look at what Linnemann had done and he has three versions
of the gravity model: the basic model and the more complete models. And the one that he clearly
prefers has a variable related to the commodity composition of trade. I was wondering why you
hadn’t included that variable in your models, especially in view of the fact, as you pointed out,
transportation costs vary so widely across commodities. I also was wondering, how, in your view,
the gravity model might be more completely, more fully specified in other ways.
MR. FRANKEL: So what is the commodity composition variable? Remind me, you’re not just
talking about doing it on the disaggregated data?
MR. VOLLRATH: He has a series of what countries export and what they import, and then he
looks at the vector or correlation, basically, between what an exporter exports and what an
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MR. FRANKEL: The gravity model as I’ve done it, and as most other people have done it, in a
sense goes to the opposite extreme from traditional trade theory by not disaggregating.
Traditional trade models look only at trying to predict what goods you import and export and not
at all who you trade with. Most of my work has been aggregated and so you don’t look at all at
what the commodity composition is, you look only at who one trades with. Obviously, the
complete general equilibrium model would include both. That is beyond my model and
capabilities, but is probably something I would encourage others to do. The gravity model is very
stylized. You could start relaxing some of the assumptions of how shares enter. It is quite striking.
I’ve made attempts to disaggregate a bit or to put in factor endowment to try to capture the
Heckscher-Ohlin effects. (You would think two countries having very different capital
endowment labor ratios should trade more. Doing the bilateral version of that theory is tricky, but
the intuition seems to be pretty clear.) The results are very uneven. I’ve tried putting in relative
price terms as well. It didn’t work well and that’s what most other people have found. So I
encourage people to try to do the more disaggregated and more complete version, but it’s tough
going. It’s something you want to do when you’re trying to answer a question that requires that
level of disaggregation.
MR. WANG: You mentioned that the distance elasticity estimation has not changed much over
this century. Is it possible to provide another explanation? For example, most of the information is
in the aggregate level. And, as you say, you have a variable transport cost because the
transportation costs can vary very significantly across sectors. For example, for the computer
chip, basically you see the transportation cost is a very small percent of the product value. But for
some perishable goods, for example fresh fruits, ocean transportation costs may be 30 percent or
40 percent of the product value. So, basically, for the computer chip, there is no effect. But
perhaps there is an effect for other products. In ERS, we are conducting a study in which we
disaggregated food and agricultural products into 110 groups. With our aggregate data, we also
found that the distance elasticity doesn’t change. But, when it is broken down into more specific
categories and products, we found some evidence that the elasticity declined over time.
MR. FRANKEL: My answer to the previous question was incomplete. Theoretically, these
coefficients differ across commodities. Clearly the distance coefficient differs across commodities
and maybe some of the others do as well. Theoretically, the correct thing to do is to estimate on a
disaggregated basis. If the coefficients do differ across commodities and you mistakenly estimate
in aggregate form, then you’ll get the wrong answers. I should have said that right off. My own
personal view as an econometrician is there are some benefits from aggregation, some of the
measurement error washes out. It’s heresy to say it, but sometimes I think I have more faith in
the aggregated estimates than the disaggregated ones. But you have to be aware of aggregation
bias. And it is certainly desirable to disaggregate, not just because you’re interested in the
individual commodities, but also to get a better estimate, provided you don’t put too much
emphasis on individual estimates that may be exposed to estimation error.
MR. ZAHNISER: I work here at ERS, too. Given the importance of distance and all its
manifestations as an obstacle to international trade, to what extent do you think that public
resources should be diverted from reducing certain barriers to trade like tariffs and quotas and
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barriers to trade.
MR.FRANKEL: How do you see those as substitutes? Why is it one or the other?
MR. ZAHNISER: Well, I don’t see them as one or the other, but as a budgeting question, if you
have a finite set of resources that can be put in this effort or that effort or that effort. And if
distance is perhaps more important than people have been thinking previously, then people should
remarshall, redirect resources from one effort to another.
MR. FRANKEL: One of the reasons why I concluded with a pitch for liberalizing the shipping
sector is that unlike infrastructure, which costs real money, this saves money. Governments
currently protect their shipping cartels, their shipping lines. From an economic viewpoint,
liberalization would actually save money if they had the political will to do it. Now, if I were still
in the administration, I couldn’t say what I have already said, I suppose. Political forces, such as
the merchant marine, are fairly irresistible in any administration. But as economists, we have to
recognize the costs. So I would think that it would be good to have that as a priority.
MR. ZAHNISER: So you wouldn’t see any sort of need to reallocate resources. Sort of just
focus on this one issue, but leave the other set of commitments the same?
MR. FRANKEL: I’d have to hear that question raised in a more specific context, maybe we can
talk afterwards. Let me just say, I’m very pleased to hear how many of you are working on the
role of transport costs already. Obviously, that’s the point of the conference. But I do encourage
you and I think that the gravity model and other aspects of geography are now fully respectable.
I’ve tried to do my part to make it so. In any case, there’s a tremendous amount of information
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Innovations in Shipping Food Products, Past and Future
Brian McGregor, Agricultural Marketing Service
Wherever we are transporting product, we want to deliver it in good condition. And the principles
for doing that have been around for decades: maintain temperature using the latest packaging and
other recommendations to get the product from one point to another in good condition. Of
course, the overriding objectives are to maintain quality, reduce handling, reduce time in transit,
increase utilization of the refrigerated transport equipment because of the high capital costs, and
keep overall costs to a minimum. If we did all these things, we’d probably put a lot of farmers
out of business, as well as some people in other parts of the cold chain. So we know that this
perfect world could never be, but it’s still a goal that should be worked toward. Things can go
wrong at many stages in the cold chain. Here’s what was happening in Tokyo back in 1987: the
containers were opened right on the dock and exposed to the elements while the inspectors
looked over the citrus. Now, this is done in a controlled refrigerated environment.
You can go to any market in the United States or any other part of the world and see high-quality
products brought in and then subjected to temperature abuse or you can see poor-quality products
that have had the added expense of transportation and packaging, and you wonder why the
product was shipped that way and why is it being presented that way. And the fact is, with
economics, you can work on the margins. It’s certainly not a goal. Every perishable product,
whether it’s a fruit, vegetable or meat, ice cream, or whatever has a recommended temperature
and a practical storage life. The goal is to get the product to the correct temperature as soon as
possible after it is harvested or produced and maintain it there.
With all the recent food safety scares, I maintain that food has become a relatively low-risk
product. One potential benefit from all this focus on food safety may be big improvements in the
cold chain. This is certainly happening in Europe. Another long-term goal has been reducing the
number and sizes of boxes. This is something ARS worked on back in the 1970’s with fresh fruits
and vegetables and there is still a lot of work to be done. Another area with a lot of problems is
transport equipment quality and maintenance. You can go anywhere and find poorly maintained,
poorly sanitized equipment. This may change with the increased emphasis on food safety. When
making decisions about the cold chain, as I learned from my first boss at USDA, you’ve got to
consider the whole system, not just the transport vehicle or the package or the product, but all the
things that make it possible to get a product safely from one point to another.
An essential issue in shipping is proper documentation. A lot of products are destroyed due to
delays in documentation or improper documentation, so we have a lot of challenges. We do a lot
of field packing, a lot of shed packing, and of course, good packing requires good training and
good technology to reduce the number of times a product is handled. One extreme example is the
company Del Agro in Bogotá, Colombia, which was way ahead of the food safety curve back in
1990 using hospital conditions for packing raspberries. And they took enormous care harvesting
the raspberries under plastic. These people were serious. Of course berries are very susceptible to
microorganisms, Guatemala suffered a lot with this, and Del Agro wanted to do everything
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While all packaging is subject to abuse, poorly designed packaging suffers the most. We still have
lots of problems where the packaging doesn’t match the pallet size, and you quickly lose the
strength of the box. Also, when you cross-stack you lose strength. These are mistakes that
continue to be made every day throughout the world. Hopefully, with digital imaging cameras,
we’ll be able to get more feedback through the Internet about how an exported product looks to
receivers and buyers when it reaches the other end.
We still have to take individual products and mix them together, and there’s a whole science
concerning what products can be put together without causing damage. Here’s another instance
where we could benefit from reducing the number of different packaging sizes and trying to come
to some standardization. Then we have the consumer pack issue, which has really undergone a
revolution, especially with the advent of fresh-cut salads. The plastics and other materials create
an internal atmosphere that gives the product a longer shelf life.
When I was in Japan in 1987, cherries were transported by sea on an experimental basis. But to
my knowledge, the majority of cherries still go by air. So even though things are technically
feasible, other factors are involved, such as the back-haul capacity of air freighters or the fact that
the shipper and receiver are comfortable paying the extra air transport costs to receive the cherries
quickly. Of course the packaging has to be designed for the product, such as using a special
machine to inject broccoli with ice. Wax, of course, is on the way out because of the concern
about recycling and is being replaced by plastic coatings. There’s also a package design called
iceless broccoli, where a plastic film is put inside the fiberboard to provide a controlled or
modified atmosphere. Then maintaining the proper temperature becomes paramount. Broccoli
gives off a lot of heat and needs a high-humidity environment, otherwise the product can be
damaged and lose shelf life rapidly. And a lot of frozen product is moved. For example, slipsheets
of frozen french fries are transported by rail.
Slipsheets are a technology that never took off, however, because of the need for specialized
handling equipment at both origin and destination. Although large-volume shippers have the
necessary equipment, slipsheets never cut into the wood pallet market very much. Without the
necessary equipment, you had to take the load apart box by box and put it on the pallet. And each
product has an ideal method of cooling after harvest.
Another example of new technology is vacuum-cooling lettuce. It’s still hard for me to
understand that after you put the lettuce in the machine and the water boils off the lettuce isn’t
cooked. It’s because lettuce, like most produce, has a very high moisture content. Hardy
products that may not need to be cooled as fast are room-cooled. And that’s another cost that’s
factored in. But my experience is that a lot of people take shortcuts in cooling and never get the
product to the recommended temperature. Therefore, the product is loaded into a vehicle at a
warmer-than-ideal temperature and most refrigerated transport vehicles are not designed to bring
down temperature, just to maintain it.
ARS and the National Bureau of Standards helped the trucking industry come up with a system of
testing trucks for insulation and refrigeration capacity. That takes us into the 1960’s when the
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of containerization, and his employees worked with the ARS on the recommended temperatures
for ocean transport. ARS had been doing research for decades on recommended temperatures for
various products.
In the United States, trucking is still one of the weak links in the transportation system because
it’s a fragmented industry. Truckers are forced to hire people to help unload the trucks. They are
forced to wait with little or no compensation for unloading. The ideal, of course, is the palletized
system of handling, with theoretically less damage to the product. And, of course, there are jokes
about how containerization of trucking has minimized pilferage. In many countries today, whole
containers or trailers are hijacked. This is a big problem in Mexico where two-and-a-half trailers a
day are stolen. Some of the hijackings are inside jobs; some are done by criminal syndicates. So
the industry in Mexico is having to make a big investment in background checks of employees and
in various technical devices to keep track of its containers and trailers.
Modified atmosphere for strawberries, for example, is another packing innovation. Bags are
wrapped around the pallets and a higher level of carbon dioxide is put in. Keeping the product
away from the walls where they can absorb heat is another recommended loading practice, using
either vinyl or kraft air bags. Highway trailers generally have a top air-delivery system so you
need good air circulation around the load. In ocean shipping, air is typically delivered from below.
So in a maritime application, you want to cover all the remaining floor space to try to force the air
up through the load.
The modified/controlled atmosphere work was done in the 1950’s and I’m sure ARS was
involved. Whirlpool Corporation held some of the patents on the modified/controlled atmosphere.
They were looking at higher tech refrigerators. That’s one interesting thing about the technology
that is becoming popular today: the research was done decades ago. Basically, ocean shipping is
now dominated by refrigerated containers with the built-in unit on top powered by electricity and
sometimes with built-in fuel tanks and generator sets. Alternatively, palletized units are loaded as
many as four to eight pallets at a time into a refrigerated vessel, or a clip-on refrigeration system
is used in which the containers have two large holes in the top and bottom where they plug into
the ship’s air supply. On land, the containers need a complete refrigeration and generator set
bolted on for land travel whereas the refrigerated containers only need to bolt on a generator set
or put it underneath the chassis to provide the electricity for refrigeration. And the problem you’ll
find in port areas, including the United States, is the attitude: “We’re pretty close to a
destination. We’re not going to fool with a gen set.” And the insulation on these containers is not
that good, especially during summer or the cold of winter. So that’s a problem that needs to be
managed.
Container operators have invested quite a bit in new technology. Of course, Sea-Land was the
leader and they provided a great labor pool for the other shipping lines, like American President
Lines. But in the United States, Sea-Land and American President Lines used ARS data to
develop their own booklets and guidelines about how to load their equipment. They invested in
test shipments. They provided a lot of funds toward research at the University of California at
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Most containers today are capable of providing a controlled atmosphere. The Transfresh system is
basically a little computer that is inserted above the fan and helps adjust the air composition inside
the container during transit. A vent allows air exchange because some products give off ethylene,
which, if not vented, can cause premature ripening or excessive ripening of the product in transit.
Sea-Land now has a container that adds humidity. While we’ve known for years, that most
products would benefit from constant humidity levels of between 90-98 percent, in reality,
refrigeration withdraws humidity from the air, just like a home air conditioning system. So Sea-
Land and others have introduced a water source in their systems to increase humidity levels.
I don’t know what’s happened with rail. Having worked with a railroad company, I’m always
saddened that the railroads more or less haven’t aggressively pursued getting back market share
from the trucking companies. Probably because they feel it’s a hassle and not worth it. The same
could be said for a lot of the airlines. So we have a dwindling supply of box cars. Most were built
in the 1970’s and only Tropicana, which has a closed system for shipping juices and concentrates,
has invested in new cars. Union Pacific has an experimental fleet of 50 cars and Burlington
Northern (BN) has also experimented with a few cars. But basically, they’ve allowed the number
of cars to go from about 12,000 in the late 1970’s to about 5,000 or 6,000 cars today. Box cars
are primarily used for frozen food, hardy products like apples, some citrus, and potatoes. Without
the proper equipment, cars have to be unloaded box by box, and you end up with some damage.
It was Sea-Land and APL, not the railroads, that really pushed double-stacked containers.
Railroads were too conservative, so ocean shipping companies invested in flat cars. They more or
less rented the use of the locomotives and the track. That has really taken off, but not
refrigeration. That’s been a disappointment, because we could sure use the extra highway
capacity if more products could move by rail. But there’s still a breakdown in service with the
railroads. You still hear horror stories such as a boxcar of potatoes ending up in Florida when it’s
supposed to be in Chicago. So even though the railroads have been deregulated and consolidated,
it seems their attitude towards customer service has not changed.
It’s important throughout the whole transport process to keep good temperature records. And of
course, I’m hoping the food safety scares encourage people to think more about proper cooling
to the recommended temperature and maintaining that temperature. The larger companies,
without government regulation, already require this because of their own concerns about
customer satisfaction and, more importantly, liability. So I think we will see an increase in good
temperature control and more control by electronic means versus intrusive means.
Time and temperature indicators have been around for 20 years, but the science of interpreting
how much temperature abuse has occurred and how the product quality and safety have been
impaired still needs to be developed. Of course we’re not going to be able to keep each product
at its ideal temperature throughout the wholesale/retail chain, so we have to compromise and at
all times make sure that different products are compatible when they are stored together. For a
short period, maybe a day or so, you don’t have to be as concerned. But some products are
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In Europe, they actually regulate the temperatures of meat, poultry, fish, seafood, and frozen
products during transport. There’s been talk of doing this in the United States, but I just don’t see
it happening.  What we may see in the States is regulation requiring proof of sanitation of the
refrigerated vehicle. A law was passed in 1990 in reaction to back-hauling of trash, but no
regulations have ever been developed for that.
Asparagus is a good example of the importance of transportation. The number of marketing days
you get with asparagus depends on how close you get to the recommended temperature during
transport: the range is from 4 to 17 days.  It’s amazing how often this is violated. If you go into
Safeway or Giant or go to Jessup Wholesale Market here in Maryland, you’ll see constant
temperature abuse. Again, the manner in which the product is loaded and temperature control are
key.
You have the same problems in air cargo. Most air cargo moves without refrigeration. Ideally, the
product is cold when it gets to the airport and is kept in a small cold room at the terminal and
quickly put into refrigeration afterwards. There are gel packs and other types of refrigeration,
such as dry ice, but most product goes without refrigeration. In Europe, because of the greater
food safety concerns there, they’ve done a lot with air shipping perishables to make sure the
proper facilities are at the origin and destination.
Another big issue, of course, is recycling. Although we have sufficient landfill space in the United
States, people don’t like landfills, though they are probably one of the safer places to put things.
Concern about landfills has led to a reduction in the amount of packaging used. That’s still the
key. We’re doing a great job of recycling, but from an economic point of view, it’s better to
reduce the amount of packaging. Yet you still need to protect the product because inadequately
protected product results in an environmental cost. There’s a big debate now in the United States
about whether to use plastic returnable crates, which of course have to be cleaned and sanitized
and transported back. The effect on market share of using returnable plastic crates will be
interesting. And, of course, with the plastic crates, you’re going to lose the nice graphics. The
debate is, who really sees the nice graphics? So we are slowly moving toward fewer pallets and
less packaging.
The plastic crate picked by the industry is 600 millimeters by 400 millimeters. The size of the crate
has to be standard for it to work. The same with the pallet. Fortunately, even though we’ve never
adopted the metric system in the United States and probably never will, the 48- by 40-inch pallet
that’s widely used in the United States pretty much matches the 1,200- by 1,000-millimeter one
used in Europe. The Europeans also like a smaller one (1,200 mm by 800 mm) for their smaller
cold chain operations.
Some U.S. inspections now offer digital imaging services to the interested parties. As people get
better feedback about what’s happening to their product at the destination, it should push
responsibility for the poor quality back down the chain.
We have a number of publications. Heidi Reichert has put two of our newer ones on the Internet:
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(see www.ams.usda.gov). The Commercial Storage of Fruits, Vegetables, and Florist and
Nursery Stocks is the so-called bible of the USDA. This book has been put out for many decades
by ARS, with recommended temperatures and handling for a variety of products. Protecting
Perishable Foods During Transport by Truck is our popular trucking handbook. It’s now brown
or purple in color. ThermoKing and Carrier use it to train their employees. A lot of trucking
companies order copies of it. All of our handbooks have similar information written in different
formats for slightly different audiences. Thank you.
William Hall, Seaport Consultants
I would like to talk about the structure of the ocean shipping industry, the broad impact of
technology on the industry in the past 30 years, and how future changes may affect U.S. shippers
and ports. Also, since we are looking at ways of analyzing transportation activity in this seminar, I
would like to share some personal experiences about how these structural changes in ocean
shipping are affecting our ability to analyze the industry. The changes present a challenge to
institutions such as USDA that want to analyze ocean shipping and its impact on U.S. producers
and their foreign competitors.
Containers, for those who may be unfamiliar with them, are based on internationally standardized
modules. They come in two sizes, basically, 8 feet by 8 feet by 20 feet and 8 feet by 8 feet by 40
feet. There’s some variation, especially in U.S. domestic service, but for international service these
two sizes predominate. Containers can be handled equally well on ships, road vehicles, and rail
cars. They can be stacked one atop the other. The idea was to create a simple, rugged,
standardized unit that expedites vehicle loading and unloading, one that can be transferred quickly
from one mode of transportation to another, and one that permits high-density storage of cargo.
The standard unit of capacity measurement is a 20-foot module, the 8- by 8- by 20-foot module,
which is known as a TEU, or a Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit. In the maritime press and
elsewhere, you’ll see references to ship capacity in numbers of TEU. Ship capacities have been
increasing steadily since the 1950’s, starting at about 150 TEU and going up to 2,000- 3,000 TEU
by about 1980. Today we’re up to somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 TEU, with really no end
in sight.
The first impact of containerization and intermodal technology was to radically increase the speed
and reliability of ocean service and thus to drastically increase the effective capacity of general
cargo vessels. Imagine an old freighter--an old-style Marlon Brando On The Waterfront kind of
ship--stuffed with barrels and boxes and crates and everything put together in a hold and
extracted manually at the port of destination. That’s a system of transportation that’s like a
moving van, something that we all have a lot of experience with in our lives. The moving van
shows up in front of your house in the morning and you spend five hours loading it. You have to
make sure that everything is secured and that the floor lamps don’t fall over and that one thing
doesn’t crash into another. You put a great deal of time and energy into very carefully arranging
items in a logical way.
So you spend five hours in the morning packing the van and then you spend about half an hour
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moving van. In a similar way, a conventional ship, an old-style break-bulk ship, would spend
about a third of its operational life in a port, loading and unloading.
The first impact of containerization was to radically reduce the time spent working cargo on each
end of the voyage. With standardized containers, it was simple to develop a system in which ships
could be rapidly loaded and unloaded by large cranes. Since containers could be stacked and
could easily fit on a truck chassis or rail car, loading and unloading became much more efficient.
A vessel now spent about a tenth, rather than a third, of its operational life in port. Which means
in practice that cargo moves between A and B much more reliably and quickly, despite the fact
that the vessel isn’t traveling any faster than its ancestor.
In fact, it might even be going slower. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, when you couldn’t do very much
about the technology on either end , the focus was on the speed of the transoceanic passage.
Shippers would try to squeeze another extra two or three knots out of the vessel perhaps with a
sophisticated, expensive turbine power plant. After containerization, the speed of the vessels
became much less critical, since so much time was being saved in the ports, as well as in newly
efficient inland connections. During the fuel crisis of the 1970’s, container ships actually slowed
down a little bit and today are frequently slower than the vessels of 20 or 30 years ago. But cargo
moves across the ocean at much faster and more reliable transit times.
The versatility of the container, the fact that it can go from a ship to being towed behind a truck
or to being loaded on a specialized rail car, has totally transformed the ways in which these firms
see themselves. The industry progressed from one that focused solely on moving things by water
to becoming an industry that focuses on the reliable movement of boxes around the world by any
one of several modes. The industry is less about ocean shipping per se and more about being
global movers of containers.
The invention of containerization coincided with the massive postwar expansion of Western
economies, culminating with the Asian boom of the 1980’s. This upsurge in activity allowed
container companies to integrate into other complementary forms of transportation. Electronics
from East Asia moving to a chain store in the U.S. Midwest, for example, could be tracked from
the production line to the display shelf. All of this was made possible by the introduction of new
electronic tracking and inventory management systems. Today, these firms have progressed one
more step--not only do they consider themselves global movers of containers by various modes,
but they also see themselves as inventory schedulers and managers, as extensions of the global
production lines of their major customers.
Vessels keep getting larger. As they do, some interesting things may start to happen among ports
and their associated trade routes. The largest container ships afloat now have a capacity of about
8,000 TEU, or the equivalent of 8,000 20-foot boxes. Naval architects are now seriously talking
about even larger vessels. If this happens in a major way, some ports in North America would be
clear winners and others would lose.
For example, a megaship, that is to say, a vessel of 12,000 to 15,000 TEU, now in the conceptual
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eventually become standard in the major U.S. trade lanes. Many ports in America simply couldn’t
accommodate such vessels, except at great expense. And ports are differently endowed through
the vagaries of geography or geology. Gulfport, Mississippi, for example, has about 36 feet of
draft. New Orleans has about 40 feet, with all that sediment coming down the Mississippi. The
Seattle approach channel, on the other hand, was glacier-carved; it averages 175 feet. Halifax,
Nova Scotia, averages about 60 feet, Baltimore and Hampton Roads average about 50 feet, while
New York/New Jersey presently averages 40 to 45 feet.
Thus, some U.S. ports will have an easier time of it when accommodating megaships, with the
consequent potential for some reshuffling of rank among various North American ports. This
would be very similar to another change that happened 40 years ago during the advent of
containerization. Some people could make it--some people couldn't make it. San Francisco
decided it didn't have the room to pursue containerization. It became a tourist waterfront and
gave all of its cargo up to Oakland. Manhattan decided that it couldn't do it and gave it all to New
Jersey.
I hasten to add that megaships face quite a few hurdles. There is the enormous cost of modifying
infrastructure--everything from piers to cranes and the inland infrastructure to handle the
massive increases in road and rail traffic. Dredging a harbor, especially when contaminated
sediment is present, is an enormously costly undertaking. So the widespread adoption of
megaships may be a decade or two away. But, taking the longer view, the increase in vehicle size
seems inexorable; it has been progressing on the ocean since the invention of steam navigation and
shows little sign of reversing.
Container shipping also has a way of bringing new kinds of cargo into its orbit. In large part, it is
due to the increases in vessel size and the need to keep them full in both directions. Remember
that containers were originally designed to transport manufactured goods--Sony TV sets packed
in cardboard boxes all moving in a steel container from Yokohama to Sears in Chicago. What can
they carry back to Yokohama?
The answer is that cargoes that used to go by break-bulk ships or even specialty product tankers
now increasingly travel by container. When I worked for Burlington Northern in the 1980's, we
had quite a healthy trade in containerized auto parts from Japan going to the newly established
Japanese assembly plants in places like Smyrna, Tennessee, and in Ohio, and so forth. And we
would get trains of empty containers coming back. That lasted for about six months to a year.
Then the containers going back to Japan started passing through Seattle full. They contained
several commodities, but primarily eastern hardwood going back to Japan to be transformed into
Yamaha pianos or furniture. Traditionally, such a commodity would have gone by rail or truck
perhaps to Savannah or Charleston, and then have been put on a conventional ship that would
have gone around the Gulf of Mexico and through the Panama Canal and out across the Pacific.
Instead, because the Japanese established an assembly plant for automobiles in Tennessee,
containerized Midwest hardwood started going through Seattle.
New container trade, in this case, auto parts, often will create commercial opportunities in its
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predict, but which are quite important. This movement of new commodities in container ships has
some implications for U.S. agricultural trade. We have done vessel cost and container forecasts
for various ports within the Pacific Basin and have also looked at the possible cargoes that could
be carried in larger container ships--the megaships, if you will. These exercises have been very
interesting. Once you get up past around 11,000 or 12,000 TEU, or about 25 to 30 percent larger
than the largest ships afloat today, you can start moving grain in them, at least in some trades.
This is a very interesting development. Bear in mind that we are predicting the commercial
behavior of ships that have not been fully designed in the theoretical trading environment of the
future. But there’s obviously something in the wind here that has potential implications for U.S.
shippers and may indicate eventual new patterns of movement within the United States.
This ability of containers to attract new cargoes has implications for all sorts of trades--not only
those capable of supporting megaships. In the developing world, where efficient conventional
grain-handling infrastructure often doesn’t exist, but where a reasonably efficient container
terminal may be present, containerized intermodal movements may open up numerous
possibilities.
Let me explain this latter point in more detail. Containerization allows ports throughout the
developing world to leapfrog past a stage of older technology--rather like cell phones in the
telecommunications market. Go to someplace like Jakarta and every other person has a cell phone
growing out of his ear. Well, you see the same kind of thing in the ports of the developing world.
Oftentimes a nation will have a small colonial port in one portion of the harbor, rather ramshackle,
with antiquated technology and very low productivity. But on the other side of the harbor is a
bustling container terminal that is bursting at the seams. This has considerable significance for
how U.S. producers may move small consignments or food aid, for example, in the future. Again,
going back to a port like Dar Es Salaam and looking at the total costs, would I automatically
bring food aid to East Africa on pallets or in bags in a single large shipment aboard a break-bulk
ship, with all of the attendant difficulties of storage and inland distribution? The alternative might
be to bring it in containers on a scheduled service and deliver the aid directly to the point of
consumption in much smaller shipments over a longer period of time. Ten years ago, before that
container terminal existed, there would have been only one answer. Today, well, the answer is not
quite so clear cut.
We have seen that ocean shipping technology has changed radically over the past 30 years. Cargo
handling is more efficient, transit times are lower and more reliable, and there is a greater
emphasis on managing the entire transport chain. Ports have changed, grown or fallen behind,
trade patterns will continue to develop in new ways as a result of the new technology, and there
are various implications for the developing world.
In addition, there have been and will continue to be fundamental institutional changes that have
equally important effects. I am speaking of a continued tendency toward consolidation,
rationalization of services, and oligopoly. This trend has a long history. When steamships were
first introduced in the 19th century, suddenly you could predict how long it would take you to get
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way that you didn’t know in the days of sail. As steamship technology progressed, the danger of
excess capacity grew. The introduction of compound steam engines in the mid-19th century
meant that marine power plants could become smaller--in other words, that the cargo capacity of
a given vessel could increase by perhaps 25 percent. And advances in metallurgy and engineering
meant that hulls were getting larger all the time.
And all of this capacity was very capital intensive. And capacity, once created, is very difficult to
reduce. Before World War I, the problem for the new steamship industry was how to control
losses in a downturn and how to control the effects of predatory pricing by a player seeking a
temporary advantage. The next logical step was to form shipping cartels to regulate capacity and
to fix prices. These cartels existed from the advent of steam, through World War II, and beyond.
When containers were first adopted worldwide, one school of thought, especially in Britain,
maintained that cartels would become more powerful than ever. Containerization would bring a
new round of inevitable and massive capital commitments, creating high barriers to entry and
vastly increased capacity that would lead to a repetition of the situation existing before World
War I.
In fact, in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the traditional shipping cartels more or less fell apart. They are
no longer very powerful at all for several reasons. The first thing that conventional wisdom
overlooked was the rise of the Asian economies; the traditional European and other operators
were undercut by low-cost Asian carriers in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and by the Russians and East
Europeans with their highly subsidized shipping companies. These firms--because of cost
structures or subsidies--could stand outside the cartel structure and still survive. The second
thing that helped to break up the ocean cartels was deregulation of transport in the United States,
which meant that much of the cartels’ price-fixing activity became illegal in U.S. trade. Now,
more than two decades later, we have a very different picture. I would argue, unlike what was
said before, that despite the influence of national governments, which continues, and protectionist
policies, which also continue, cartels don’t amount to very much today.
I suppose the larger question is whether the earlier assessment was simply premature. You might
say that the Asian boom of the 1970’s and 1980’s simply stalled the inevitable by injecting new
entrants into the system. In reality, all of the fundamental factors that people worried about in the
late 1950’s and early 1960’s are still with us--huge capital investments, high barriers to entry, and
large capacity increases, with all of the consequent tendencies to ally, rationalize, and merge.
Since the entry of the East Asians, it is not immediately clear who else is poised to create a large
merchant fleet that could shake the system up once again. In fact, it is a closed club.
So today we see an incipient oligopoly in container shipping. The conventional wisdom is that, in
a few years’ time, the world will have maybe two European carriers, two Japanese carriers, one or
two Chinese, perhaps a Korean, and a Taiwanese. And that’s basically it. It will be rather like oil,
or airline alliances--a small group of very large, global players.
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Sea-Land, a U.S. company founded by the inventor of containerization, Malcolm McLean, is still
a presence, but we don’t know what’s going to happen to this company. It may fold into Maersk, a
Danish firm with which it is tightly allied, in the way that American President Lines has folded into
Neptune Orient, a Singaporean company. But in any event, it seems there will be no Americans on
the list in a few years time (Maersk Line acquired the global shipping operation of Sea-Land
Service, Inc. in July 1999).
All this raises many currently unanswerable questions about the effects of concentrated market
power and the lack of American participation. How effective will the United States be in
regulating a global industry in which it primarily participates only as a very large customer? This
would seem to differ from the airline industry in which, Airbus notwithstanding, U.S. industry
builds the vehicles, its businesses are among the major users of the vehicles, and where the U.S.
government is the major regulator of industry activity. Other national and international aviation
agencies follow its lead, especially in certain technical areas related to aircraft inspections and
airworthiness, for example. In ocean container shipping, the structure of the industry is
fundamentally different.
What happens to the smaller shipping lines, especially those created by developing nations? Do
they become niche players? Or do they become subsidiaries in the way that today’s commuter
airlines are subsidiaries serving the hubs of major air carriers?
If a few seaports turn into hubs for megacarriers and their megaships, in the way that Atlanta and
Dallas-Ft. Worth are airline hubs, what happens to the other, smaller ports? Do we reallocate
public resources to build some ports at the expense of others? How will we decide how this is to
be done?
In a deregulated oligopoly environment--again, think of the airlines--how will the smaller
shipper fare? The one who has no corporate volume travel discount?
In summary, we have seen a continued tendency, stretching back over a century, for ocean
shipping companies to collude in matters of pricing and capacity regulation. This collusion was
spurred initially by the risk inherent in such heavy capital investment and by the excess capacity
caused by technological advances in the early era of steam navigation. It has persisted for over a
century, even though the old cartels weakened with the entry of the Asian newcomers in the
1980’s. Given that entry costs are now so high, capacity so great, and consolidations and alliances
seemingly will continue, what happens next?
There is another aspect we should mention, something subtle and less quantifiable, but important
in the context of a workshop such as this. When a domestic industry loses a critical mass of talent
and when decisionmakers congregate in other parts of the world, you have to work all that much
harder to stay current when you want to analyze the industry.
The kind of analytical work that we do in the U.S. maritime consulting community, and to some
extent in government, is now the kind of analysis done by a culture that’s the passive recipient of
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the Koreans a new terminal over here or over there? It’s an infrastructure-oriented, consulting
engineer’s way of analyzing shipping. And we are rather good at it.
But U.S. consultants, as an industry, are not so good at other kinds of questions, questions that I
think you folks would be very interested in answering, especially given that American agriculture
faces some new competitive challenges overseas. Here are some examples of these kinds of
questions: Will rates for soybeans between Brazil and Malaysia rise or fall next year? How will
capacity increases in Chinese shipyards affect the secondhand price of grain ships and,
consequently, impact future grain rates? These kinds of questions presuppose a different body of
knowledge on the part of the person answering them--a greater knowledge of the industry itself,
as opposed to knowledge of the physical aspects of the technology. And I would argue that this
sort of public knowledge is becoming somewhat more difficult to come by as a result of the
industry consolidating overseas.
As an aside, I want to relate some experiences I had in 1997 in East Africa that illustrate
something about our collective position as a nation in this matter. I was doing a mining logistics
job, looking at getting copper out of Central Africa. One of the ports that I had to study was Dar
es Salaam and I ended up going to a steamship industry party. We were outside, in the middle of
the rainy season, all sitting around in suits under a blue-and-white-striped party tent at the end of
a warehouse in a sea of mud. And the conversation was very interesting. The group was largely
Scandinavian, with some British, and a South African or two. The Danish guy told me about how
his dad had worked for the same company, and how his grandfather had signed on back in the
days of sail. And you had people from different companies who had spent their lives abroad and
who had crossed paths elsewhere in the world. You know, "Remember when we were both in
Chile back in the 1980’s?" In that tent, I realized that this kind of pragmatic knowledge, that depth
of global experience, combined with a training in which ocean transportation is still a subject of
extensive academic analysis, is something that we as a culture no longer possess. When I go to the
Propeller Club dinner in Seattle, the conversation is not the same as it was in that tent in Dar es
Salaam.
Now, don’t misunderstand me - there are some exceptionally bright people in the private sector in
this country as well as in the government spending their lives analyzing the maritime business. At
issue is more the climate in which this analysis is conducted. In the United States, ocean
transportation analysis tends to be highly proprietary and narrowly focused--in the petroleum,
agribusiness, or mining sectors, for example. In contrast, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, they
design and build the ships, finance the ships, insure them, and manage them. The industry is
centered there, in other words, and there is a wider and deeper pool of publicly available maritime
knowledge coupled with strong academic traditions in transportation economics and maritime
business management. And its product is the bright fellows sitting in the tent in Dar es Salaam. So
in the face of a consolidating industry that has largely left the United States, I would argue that
any government institution, such as USDA, wanting to study ocean shipping must focus its
analytical talent overseas. And this would seem doubly important in a climate of increased
competition from foreign agricultural producers. You will somehow have to introduce yourself
into the global nerve centers of the industry, perhaps stationing transport attachés in places like
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change.
The upshot is that we’re seeing a massive consolidation of the industry. There will be larger,
fewer players with their fingers in many pies, active in complementary modes of transportation, all
over the globe. This is an industry that is very capital-intensive and where the barriers to entry
seem to be getting higher; there are no new entrants in this game. And none of the players, the
conventional wisdom goes, will be American in the next few years. And all of these things are
probably of some importance.
Thanks very much for your time.
Richard Parry, Agricultural Research Service
It’s a pleasure indeed for me to be with you today, especially as a biologist invited to speak with
all of these noted economists. I would like to present an overview about the ARS research
program and its impact on transportation technologies of the past, present, and the challenges of
the future. The ARS has developed a very diverse research program with its $8 million annual
budget. Our customers include growers, processors, shippers, and several action agencies of the
Federal Government, all of which identify specific problems requiring innovative solutions.
American agriculture has a long history of rapidly adapting to technology. The ARS technology
that has been mentioned already by Brian McGregor is an indication of the ARS accomplishments
that have significantly improved transportation efficiency. ARS does not identify transportation
research as a separate program; there is no budget cross-cut specifically identifying this sector.
However, many projects within the program portfolio affect the transportation industry.
Measuring the economic impact of these improvements has not been successful.
The innovations in refrigeration engineering that occurred in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s have
had a major impact on commodities traded today. This work led to the creation of the frozen
foods industry. The flash freezing of meat and poultry products has significantly extended shelf
life and enhanced food safety, making our products some of the safest in the world. Foam-mat
drying of processed milk, fruits, and vegetables is another example, which has created new
opportunities for the food industry and new challenges for movement of products nationally and
internationally.
Controlling that process of ripening of fruits and vegetables extends shelf life and methods to limit
food pathogens have increased the diversity and availability of products in retail markets. Also,
controlled atmosphere storage and shipment of commodities such as Washington apples have
expanded markets and created new technical challenges for the transportation industry. New
technologies have also allowed the transportation unit to become part of the commodity
quarantine treatments for citrus, and opened markets overseas for U.S. producers.
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q  Gene expression. Extending the shelf life of commodities through control of gene expression
will be possible as soon as the basic information about gene location and function is known.
The mapping of the plant genome, once viewed as a long-term objective, is now on the
horizon. The primitive plant Arabidopsis will be first, probably in 2000, followed soon
thereafter by rice and other species. This information will rapidly be applied to fresh fruits and
vegetables and would make it possible to turn genes that produce ethylene on and off.
Changing ripening properties will result in major changes for product shipping standards.
q  Edible food films. Using thin films to reduce spoilage and dehydration of fresh fruits and
vegetables has become a common way of extending shelf life. Edible films will be the next
advance in commodity treatments. Films are currently made from a variety of natural materials
such as pectin and starches. Protein polymers are being developed to extend this practice,
which may change shipping parameters for these commodities.
q  Food irradiation. Research done over several decades may soon make irradiation an
acceptable practice for reducing foodborne pathogens. Irradiation may be the method of
choice for the fresh fruit and vegetable market, where pre-harvest contamination from the use
of animal manure for fertilizer may occur. Maintaining food safety is absolutely essential to
maintaining consumer confidence.
q  Product defect detection. Using a variety of different biosensors in processing plants has been
proven to be effective in reducing contaminants and enhancing quality, which reduces
transportation losses. Also, using sensory panels to identify product quality characteristics in a
variety of different commodities has enhanced the ARS variety development programs.
q  Contaminant sampling and testing. Improved methods for sampling and testing for
contaminants have permitted export of commodities to overseas markets with product quality
requirements. Rapid testing for mycotoxins, pesticides, and other environmental contaminates
are extremely important to meet international quality standards.
ARS is developing methods to eliminate food pathogens in production as well as post-harvest for
meat and poultry products. Bulk commodity shipments are expected to continue to decrease while
processed or partially processed food shipments are expected to increase.
Biotechnology is introducing a new era of crops designed for specific end uses, such as wheat
products and animal feed from corn. One example is a new variety of feed designed to
significantly reduce phosphorus in animal waste. Such improved varieties will only have market
value when product identity is preserved, which changes bulk commodity transportation
operations. Other genetically improved crops will also need to preserve product identity
throughout the production, processing, and marketing channels. These new grains may lead to
significant changes in the way grain is handled within the United States and when exported.
Transportation is an important factor within the agricultural system. The impacts of all the new
technologies I have mentioned cannot be measured in aggregate economic transportation models.
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production and enhancing production efficiency. There is a need to measure this economic impact
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Policies in the Shipping Sector
Bob Blair, The Federal Maritime Commission
The bulk of my comments today are going to be about international ocean shipping: industry
organization--the cartels that Bill Hall talked a bit about and the emerging oligopolistic
conditions--and the new legislative provisions of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA). But
before that, I’d like to make a couple of other points about shipping that might fit in with the
economic research interests of this group.
First is the Jones Act. The Jones Act Coalition does have a wonderful website, and it is worth a
visit. The man heading the coalition is a former FMC commissioner named Rob Quartel, for
whom I used to write speeches. He’s a very good speaker and he likes controversy. If you invite
him to come talk about the Jones Act, I’m sure he’d be happy to.
The other topic is the national task force under the Department of Transportation that is currently
assessing the capability of U.S. maritime transportation. I think it’s looking mainly at seaports
and at rail and road infrastructure, and how the infrastructures tie together. That is probably
something of interest to all shippers, including agricultural shippers. You might want to see if you
can get someone from the task force to come and talk about what they’re looking at.
Now, on to international liner shipping.
What we’re talking about, essentially, is regularly scheduled shipping service. The service tends
to be weekly. As Bill Hall mentioned earlier, liner shipping is mainly the shipping of containers.
Not only do these liners no longer see themselves in the “movement of goods” business, these
days they also go beyond the “movement of containers” business to the “we provide
transportation solutions” business. As Bill noted, the lines are involved with rail, involved with
trucking, and at least the major carriers provide additional value-added services.
A point of terminology: “carriers” means the companies running the ships, and “shippers” means
the firms that have cargo moving on the ships.
The carriers who have so far survived the winnowing-out process as their industry becomes
increasingly concentrated see the movement of containers from port to port, or even from inland
point to inland point, as almost a commodity business. From the shipper’s perspective, one ship
or one container is pretty much the same as the next. If the carrier is going to make any real
money, it’s got to provide additional benefits beyond simple transportation. And that’s an
important part of where international shipping is going.
The other important part, as Bill mentioned, is the cartels. Since the late-1800’s, international liner
shipping has been cartelized. That’s what makes it a particularly interesting industry for
economists. There are so few cartels operating in the United States that have antitrust immunity
to collectively set prices. But the government allows cartels in liner shipping and has since 1916.
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continues to grant antitrust immunity. So, the economic consequences of allowing carrier cartels
is still a live policy issue.
When preparing my notes for this workshop, I asked myself, “If I were an agricultural economist,
what would I want to know about international shipping (if anything)?”
First: I’d want to know about shipping cartels and their present incarnation. The traditional
cartels are rapidly dying out. By “traditional” I mean the groups of carriers that formerly sold
themselves as offering a premium level of service and jointly priced their services. In recent years,
these groups have tended to have a collective market share of about 50 percent, but sometimes
higher, in the U.S. trades in which they operate. They agree on the individual rates they offer and
maintain a joint tariff listing the rates they are supposed to be charging. However, these traditional
cartels are now passing from the scene. I don’t expect the few that are still around to continue to
operate beyond the next year or two. But there is a new creation, a new form of cartel, which I’ll
discuss in a few moments.
Second, as an agricultural economist, I’d want to know about key economic and technological
trends--because this industry is strongly driven by technology and by economic conditions.
And, finally, I’d want to know about the recent policy changes in the Ocean Shipping Reform
Act. OSRA officially goes into effect on May 1, 1999. But, as economists, you know that when
people have information about future events, they begin acting on it well before these events
occur. So, it’s not incorrect to say that OSRA has been having an effect for well over a year now
and perhaps longer than that in some respects.
Since I can’t really present any of these topics in great depth in 30 minutes, I’ve decided as an
alternative to present a brief outline of how cartels have changed over the last 20 years in relation
to changes in public policy and technology. And I have broken that history into three eras to make
it easier to comprehend.
From 1961 to 1984 (the year the first deregulatory act was passed), I’ll call the Era of Red Tape.
From 1984 to around 1997, I’ll call the Era of Declining Cartels--because traditional cartels
proved not to work well. And from 1997 onwards, I’ll call the Service Contract Era. Obviously,
it’s hard to predict the essence of an era when you can’t even predict how long it’s going to
last, but it is clear that the key element is going to be service contracting under the new
contracting provisions of OSRA.
In 1961, Congress split the two major maritime functions, regulation and subsidization, between
the Federal Maritime Commission, which got regulatory responsibility for overseeing the cartels,
and the Maritime Administration, first a part of the Department of Commerce and later the
Department of Transportation. Originally the two functions were in an organization called the
Maritime Board, and you had the schizophrenic situation of trying to regulate an industry that you
were also handing out subsidies to on the side. Maybe that’s a familiar situation in agriculture,
I’m not sure. But it didn’t work for shipping. So the FMC became the regulatory body, and the
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The 1960’s, for those of us who are old enough to remember it, was the “big is bad” era of
regulation. And the Federal Maritime Commission, when it was set free to be the regulator, was
encouraged by Congress to be an active regulator. In the 1960’s and onward, when agreements to
form cartels--and operational agreements, but I’ll be talking strictly about cartel agreements--
were filed with the FMC there was no deadline by which the FMC had to approve the agreement.
In fact, the people setting up a cartel, or changing an already existing cartel, had to show there
was a public necessity to do so. And then, of course, their carrier rivals and the shippers who
would be most affected could come to the FMC and protest, demand public hearings and
additional information. These agreement approval proceedings could run as long as two years.
Now, if it’s going to take up to two years to get permission to do something, is it worth
pursuing? That became a problem for the carriers beginning in 1966, because that’s when
containerization was introduced into the international trades. Containerization expanded through
the late 1960’s and into the mid-1970’s. Bill talked earlier about how that affected the industry.
Once you moved to a containerized system for cargo, the process was faster and more efficient.
There was less damage to cargo, to go back to one of Brian McGregor’s points, because there
was less handling. You moved the full box directly onto the ship and onto the train. And there
was less port labor needed to move boxes through a port rather than to load and unload individual
pallets of goods.
Two things happened with the expansion of containerization: first, the per-unit cost to move
goods was reduced. Second, the absolute cost for the new technologies, new ships, specialized
equipment, port technologies, distribution technologies that went along with containerization
went way up. So the capital costs of running a shipping line went up, but the lines could then offer
the customer cheaper rates.
By the time you hit the mid-1970’s, containerization was pretty much complete in the main East-
West U.S. trades. But then the next feature of the 1970’s appeared and Bill alluded to this, too,
with the introduction of new shipping lines by Asian nations like Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
These countries began new containerized shipping services. And it is important to understand the
difference between the Asian view of international shipping and today’s American view. The
Asians consider shipping a strategic industry. Perhaps that’s because many Asian nations have
traditionally been more heavily export-oriented than we have, so their industries and their national
economies are more dependent on liner shipping. The point is that many Asian nations view
international shipping as a strategic industry and their national lines as a strategic asset to be
supported. So when the new Asian carrier services entered the U.S. trades in the 1970’s, they had
governmental support. Sometimes they were owned or controlled by their governments. These
new Asian lines introduced a whole new element of competition from the mid-to late-1970’s
onward.
So what was the state of the conference system at this point? Another point of terminology:
“conference” is ocean shipping jargon for “cartel.”  I don’t mind referring to them as cartels.
Some cartels don’t mind calling themselves cartels. But the traditional jargon, a nice euphemism,
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cartels operating in a given region. In the Pacific, for example, there were at least a dozen and
possibly more individual cartels in the Pacific trades. There would be one from the West Coast to
Korea, another from the West Coast to Taiwan, yet another from the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts--
via the Panama Canal--to Korea. And so forth.
The cartels were also experiencing trouble adjusting because of the inflexibility that existed under
the then-current regulatory scheme. If the cartel wanted to make adjustments to its agreement,
particularly with respect to intermodal shipping, it found that change was nearly impossible.
With the development and expansion of containerization, the ability to amend agreements to fit
new business situations--especially when intermodal transportation ( the linkage of sea and land
transportation) was involved--became increasingly important. Cartel members had traditionally
priced together on the port-to-port movement of goods, but with containerization the game
changed. The business was no longer port-to-port, but from one inland point (in Asia, for
example) to an inland destination point (say, Chicago in the U.S. Midwest). If cartels were going
to continue to function effectively, collective pricing was going to have to cover more than the
ocean movement. It was going to have to cover the through service from one inland point to the
other.
Not only were the lines having difficulty with the red tape of the regulatory process, but the
Department of Justice was also beginning to raise the question of whether point-to-point
collective pricing was an area requiring intervention by its Antitrust Division, and not simply an
FMC issue.
That combination of inflexible regulation, potential Department of Justice intervention, and the
increased competition from the new Asian lines--most of which declined to join the cartels--
created a difficult environment for the cartel lines. The carriers’ solution was to go to Congress
and propose new legislation that would modernize the regulatory scheme and give the cartels
clear authority to collectively price the inland leg of their cargo shipments.
They began in 1978, and it took them until about mid-1983 to get the new legislation passed.
Along the way, they had to do a lot of compromising with shipper interests to achieve their goals.
What the carriers got out of it was: (1) the end of the red tape in the agreement approval process,
and (2) clear intermodal pricing authority. The new agreements establishing cartels were to be
reviewed by the commission within 45 days, after which they went into effect automatically, or
else the commission had to take the parties to court to show that the agreements were so
egregious they should be halted. In any court case, the burden would be on the FMC to establish
that the proposed cartel would have horrendous future economic consequences for the trade. The
new shipping act also made clear that agreements with intermodal pricing authority were outside
the scope of DOJ Antitrust Division oversight.
What did the carriers give up in the compromise leading to the Shipping Act of 1984? Two things.
First, the act introduced contracting, in a limited way, as a new pricing process in ocean shipping.
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shippers. Individual commodity rates were published in public tariffs, and even giant shippers like
DuPont could not contract with their preferred carriers.
Along with contracting, the new act introduced (and here’s another piece of jargon)
“independent action” or IA on tariff rates. Independent action meant that a particular cartel
member could, after a ten-day waiting period, offer a rate other than the previously agreed-upon
rate published in the cartel’s joint tariff--without the other cartel members having authority to
take any adverse action against the member who took “independent action.” Basically, members
were allowed to cheat on their previous rate decisions, but they had to do so publicly. This
introduced an element of potential internal competition among cartel members.
What happened to cartels when the Shipping Act of 1984 went into effect? Structurally, the
number of cartels decreased, and the new cartels had vastly expanded geographic scope. Where
there had been 12 or more cartels operating in the outbound Pacific trades before 1984,
consolidation created a single cartel--the Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement, or TWRA--
covering movements from all points in the United States to all points in Asia. You’ve probably
heard of this cartel because it affected U.S. agricultural exports to Asia. However, I don’t expect
it to exist much longer.
The new contracting provisions turned out to be relatively popular with shippers. For the first
couple of years that the act was in effect, contracting was a bit of a trial-and-error learning
experience. The carriers in TWRA, for example, signed a lot of contracts initially--many of them
containing what were called “Crazy Eddie” clauses (which said, basically, that if the carrier
offered anyone else moving that commodity a lower rate, the contracting shipper was entitled to
the same lower rate). After a couple of years of this, TWRA members simply collectively agreed
to stop offering contracts. And not until 1995 did TWRA lines offer much beyond two or three
contracts to special shippers.
In most other trades, contracts were regulated rather than eliminated (TWRA was a unique case),
and 50 to 60 percent of the volume moving in key trades moved under service contracts.
However, most of the new Asian carriers still did not join the cartels. Initially, there were two
markets--a premium market for shippers with goods that needed especially high-quality,
dependable, frequent service, and a discount market where the shippers’ main concern was low
price. The cartel carriers offered a dependable, well-established quality of service and tended to
attract the premium-market customers. The Asian independent lines, which tended to price 10 to
15 percent below the cartel rate, could compete effectively in the discount market.
Over time the Asian lines improved. They adopted more modern technologies, their level of
experience increased, and the transportation service that they offered became every bit as good as
those offered by the premium lines. With this difference: the Asian lines tended to maintain the
original 10 to15 percent price differential. So, by the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the cartel
carriers discovered that they were losing market share to the Asian independent lines.
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level of service, but the cartels commanded only about 50 percent market share in the various
trades. With only half the market cartelized and half competing on price, it didn’t take long to see
that the cartels were becoming less and less effective.
At the same time, capital costs were increasing as the technologies became more sophisticated
(and expensive), as carriers expanded their service networks to call on more ports, and as
electronic tracking of goods became possible. And the industry concentration that began with
containerization continued to grow. We’ll talk more in a moment about where that’s headed.
From an economist’s point of view, the 1984 act had some very interesting features. One being
that it mandated a 5-year study of changes in the industry. The FMC was to do the study, with a
review of the results by the Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and the Federal
Trade Commission. After that, a Presidential Commission was to be formed, which would have a
year to conduct public hearings on the issue of how the new act was working out and whether it
needed any changes. Not a bad idea.
From the shippers’ point of view, this was seen as a second chance to eliminate the carriers’
antitrust immunity altogether, or failing that, at least an opportunity to expand the new
contracting provision and remove contracting authority from the control of the cartels. Cartels, as
the TWRA example I gave shows, had the authority to regulate their members’ contracts.
In 1989, the FMC published its final report on the 5-year study. The report has lots of good data
on rates and other contract-related issues. So if you get involved in researching, that study is
worth looking at, especially if you like crunching numbers. The figures--originally covering the
period from 1976 through 1988Chave been updated to 1990, and are available on diskette from
our office.
During 1991, the Advisory Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping, or ACCOS, held
hearings and collected lots of additional information. They issued a report in April 1992, and for
my money, that is the best single document that exists on shipping in the U.S. trades. The
advisory committee got input from big shippers and carriers. FMC economists (but not me) and
DOJ economists were involved in putting it together, and it contains their different perspectives.
The final report contains all the industry and government body views, covers all the key issues,
and provides a short but useful history of modern liner shipping. Whenever I run into someone
who’s new to the liner shipping industry, say a reporter who’s been assigned to cover it, I give
them a copy of the advisory commission report and say “If you want to learn about this industry
quickly, start by reading this.” Unfortunately, I’ve given away my last copy--but I’d certainly
advise any new researcher studying this industry to begin with that report.
What shippers wanted to see, but ACCOS did not produce, were recommendations for changing
the 1984 act. And that was pretty much a foregone conclusion since one-third of the advisory
commission was carrier representatives, one-third was shipper representatives, and one-third was
congressmen--a recipe for gridlock. But, from the carriers’ perspective, the absence of any
recommendations for legislative reform of the act was a major plus. The status quo was the best
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very unhappy with the results.
Not only did ACCOS’s early 1992 report offer no prospect for change, but the winter of 1992-93
saw the formation of a new liner conference that demonstrated real market power. The traditional
conference carriers in the North Atlantic brought several formerly independent lines into the new
conference--called the Trans-Atlantic Agreement, or TAA--by setting up a double-tiered rate
system, high market share was achieved. And by establishing internal solidarity and a good
information exchange process, after two years of very severe competitive discounting of rates, the
new conference achieved a remarkable pricing turnaround. The first act of the new conference
was to radically raise rates--and made the increase stick! That demonstration of effective
collective pricing, following by only 9 months the disappointing ACCOS report, got groups like
the National Industrial Transportation League working hard on a political effort to change the
regulatory system.
Skipping ahead a bit, in mid-1997 a second really effective cartel was created. This new
agreement was different from the traditional conference-style cartel. Like TAA, the new
transpacific cartel--called the Transpacific Stabilization Agreement, or TSA--brought in several
formerly independent lines. TSA set up an excellent internal information exchange process and
got the members’ CEOs to exercise tighter control over their marketing divisions as they sold
vessel space. Competitive discounting among TSA members was brought to a halt. So, by the end
of 1997, there were two examples of very effective, nontraditional cartels--TAA and TSA.
Where are we today? OSRA has passed. It was the best deal that shippers were able to negotiate.
Like the carriers in the years before 1984, shippers sought new legislation to get the changes they
wanted in the 1984 act, but ended up having to compromise with the carriers, with U.S. ports,
and with maritime labor. What the shippers got out of the bargain was a reduction in the cartels’
control over their members’ contracts. The cartels no longer have the authority to regulate their
members’ contracts; the members can--and most are expected to--offer their customers
individual contracts.
The shippers also got legal authority for confidential contracts, and contract rates are no longer
publicly available. There are pluses and minuses to confidential contracting, which I’ll discuss if
we have time. However, the shippers who pressed for confidential contracting think that the new
flexibility it introduces will allow them to form partnerships with their preferred carriers--
breaking those carriers’ connections with the other cartel members. The shippers hope to be able
to get customized service, to be able to exchange proprietary business information, and to develop
real commercial partnerships. And that is a real possibility. I don’t want to play that down.
But there is also a potentially anticompetitive side to the new legislation. It was, after all, a
compromise. The carriers retained their antitrust immunity to agree on rates and on capacity
levels--if they can. OSRA also allows carriers to establish what are called confidential “voluntary
service contract guidelines.”  These guidelines have no mandatory requirements--cartels can’t
do anything to a member who doesn’t want to abide by the voluntary guidelines--but carriers
will have the opportunity to voluntarily agree, for example, to restrict the confidentiality of their
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confidentiality clause in their individual contracts that allows them to protect contract information
from other shippers, but share rate information among themselves. That would allow them to
prevent the general shipping public from knowing the rates being negotiated, but still exchange
that information within the cartel so that they can continue to agree on, and support, collective
pricing actions.
Carriers now have a model for effective cartels under OSRACTSA-style agreements. Known as
“discussion agreements,” or “stabilization agreements,” this new form of cartel appears to be the
wave of the future. These discussion agreements are specific to particular geographic regions.
They agree on the common aggregate price increase they’ll implement rather than on thousands
of specific individual commodity rates--say an annual increase of $300, or even $1,000 per
container. And some recent rumblings have suggested that some carrier groups are considering
using their antitrust immunity to establish collective capacity management processes.
Such capacity management schemes could work in two ways: by actually removing vessels during
periods in which the carriers judge that there is likely to be excess capacity, or by regulating the
entry of new vessels into a trade. Capacity regulation could be achieved by the cartel members
agreeing to share forecasts on future demand and information on each company’s plans to bring
additional capacity into the trade. If it looked like new capacity would exceed expected demand,
individual member lines could agree to delay new entry in exchange for the allocation of
additional space on another member’s vessels. Instead of its members bringing in new ships right
away, in anticipation of higher future demand, the cartel could encourage its members to allocate
their available current capacity in a way that satisfied each carrier’s short-term need for space.
That would allow the group to slow the introduction of additional vessels--reducing the scope of
any short-term excess capacity--or even to remove vessels if the demand for current capacity
was judged to be insufficient. The possibility of that kind of collective rationalization of capacity
exists under OSRA.
There’s one other element of the current scene that is worth briefly mentioning because it may
have a significant impact on liner shipping--the existence of multiple national regulatory
authorities. Liner shipping is an international business. The Federal Maritime Commission is the
regulatory authority for the United States. The European Union has it own competition
authority--DG IV--that oversees the European trades, including the U.S.-to-Europe trades.
And most interestingly, China is now in the process of establishing a national regulatory authority
for the China-based trades.
Each of these organizations has its own separate perspective and style. DG IV, for example, tends
to be relatively narrow and legalistic in its perspective and adopts a fairly confrontational style in
its dealings with carrier cartels. Instead of viewing cartel operations as a economic or commercial
issue, DG IV often seems to take the approach that clear legal limits exist with respect to cartel
operations, and those legal limits are decisive (regardless of any arguments about economic
efficiencies that may exist). DG IV seems to be trying to use a narrow interpretation of EU law to
constrain cartel activities to the point that the sheer inflexibility will render liner cartels nearly
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The FMC, in enforcing the 1984 act and now OSRA, has tended to favor flexibility in its
interpretations of legitimate cartel authority--based on what the economic consequences of the
cartels’ activities may be. This approach seems to be to allow significant operational latitude, but
balance that liberality with close monitoring (and attendant requirements for information on cartel
activities) and occasional intimations of possible legal action to limit potential abuse.
China appears to be setting up a system--based, in part at least, on the old 1984 act model--
under which carriers publish binding tariffs, and terms of service contracts are publicly available.
It’s as if China were saying: “We like the way that the FMC was operating before OSRA went
into effect, and we’re going to create a similar system of our own for the China trades.”
How these various, and potentially discordant, regulatory approaches will interact is one of the
questions that make these such interesting times to be engaged in research on liner shipping.
Given the growing oligopoly effect, the development of new cartel structures, the introduction of
more flexible contracting, and China’s new regulatory ambitions, the next few years should prove
fascinating. And given that possible complexity, liner shipping research may have to be conducted
largely on a trade lane by trade lane basis.
That’s a brief overview of where things stand today, and how we got here. If there are any
questions, I’ll try to answer them--always with the caveat that the answers will still be my own
opinions, not the official views of the Federal Maritime Commission.
MS. BALLENGER: What can you tell us about the availability of shipping data?
MR. BLAIR: Getting good information has always been difficult. When the FMC undertook its 5-
year study, the fact that Congress had mandated the study, and was looking at the possibility of
changing the act, helped us get cooperation from both carriers and shippers. The rate study had to
deal with a lot of technical problems. For example, there were many different publicly available
rates for a given commodity. So it was difficult to know under which rates most of the cargo was
moving. You could assume, and we did for awhile, that the majority of a given commodity moved
under the lowest rate. But when you got to post-1983 period, the problem of service contracts
arose. There would be a number of contracts in existence, and it was hard to know how much
moved under each one. We needed a way to weigh the various contract rates to get an average
rate for a commodity. We established various advisory groups to help us--a carrier group, a
shipper group, a port authority group, etc. The advisory groups allowed us to get the information
needed to work out the approximate average rates for the commodities and trades we were
researching. But once the study was finished, and the advisory groups disbanded, the insider
perspective was gone--and doing accurate rate studies became very difficult.
Today you’d have to go to the shippers to get the necessary information. A version of that
approach was tried in the Ferguson study--but was not very well done in my opinion. With
confidential contracting under OSRA, rate studies will be harder than ever. The confidential
contracts are filed with the FMC, so we could do rate studies if there was an interest. The tariffs
will still be out there, and many will now be individual lines’ tariffs. But the expectation in the
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service contracts.
How confidential those contracts will be remains a key question. The term “confidential” wasn’t
defined in the legislation. Some shippers, if they have the power of a 3-M or DuPont, may be able
to say to carriers, “If you want to carry my cargo in the multiple trade lanes I move goods in, you
will share contract information with nobody--including your cartel partners.” That might work
for the biggest shippers. On the other hand, it’s quite possible that the cartels will work out a
system under which they will protect the contract information in Shipper X’s contract from his
competitor Shipper Y, but still share it with the other carriers. If so, the members of the cartel will
know what rates are being charged by the other members for each commodity-type to each port
or inland point, while the shippers with whom they negotiate would not have the same sort of
information. And such asymmetry of information is likely to have economic consequences.
I don’t expect that the lines will offer any of this rate information to outsiders interested in doing
rate studies. Although I tend not to get involved in rate studies myself, there are some people in
our bureau who do. So if you decide that’s an area you want to pursue, please feel free to get in
touch with us and we’ll see if we can work out an arrangement that would be consistent with
OSRA’s confidentiality requirements on service contracts. As a personal opinion, it seems to me
that access to the filed contract rates may be the only way to do an accurate rate survey without
the assistance of the lines themselves.
Finally, I’d say that if this group is interested in studying the effect of liner shipping on
agricultural exports, the most important element is going out and talking with the shippers, going
out and talking with the carriers, going out and talking with those guys in Dar Es Salaam that Bill
was talking about. That face-to-face contact with the players is the best way to find out what’s
going on in this industry. Reading the Journal of Commerce helps. And there are a couple of
excellent monthly magazines. Containerization International is the best, and American Shipper is
the next best, for keeping up with industry news. I recommend both of them. But nothing beats
going out and talking to the people involved.
MS. PRYOR: What is the future of Sea-Land, the remaining U.S. shipping line?
MR. BLAIR: That may be a special case. I think everyone will be waiting with bated breath to see
if the separation of Sea-Land Service into three parts--the very lucrative U.S.-flag-oriented Jones
Act trade, the terminal business (which I hear in also a lucrative part of Sea-Land’s operation),
and Sea-Land, the international ocean carrier, is a prelude to the sale of the international carrier’s
assets.
APL, the other major U.S.-flag line, is now owned by Neptune Orient Lines of Singapore. And
one of the very few other American lines, Lykes, was picked up by a Canadian carrier. It seems to
me that the possibility exists--and I don’t have any inside information on this, just the
speculation I read in the paper--the possibility exists that Sea-Land’s stand alone international
carrier business could be bought by someone. Best guess is Sea-Land’s alliance partner, Maersk.
Which raises a very interesting question. If there comes a time where there are no major U.S.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 46
carriers left, would that change the general perspective on how international shipping policy is
evaluated? From the maritime unions’ point of view, perhaps not. But from other interested
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Technological and Logistical Developments in Shipping:
Case Studies—Shipping U.S. Beef to Japan
Bill Hahn, ERS
One of the reasons that I’ve been asked to talk about beef today is that beef has been one of our
agricultural export success stories. We’ve had substantial growth in both the volume and value of
beef exports since the early 1980’s. In the past couple of years, the value of beef exports has not
grown and has even shrunk while the volume has kept going up. We’ve had some lower beef
prices in the past several years, and that is an important reason why our beef export value has not
grown while the beef export volume has. Another is that we have had more growth in our low-
price markets, like Mexico, than we have had in our higher priced markets.
Focusing specifically on Japan, rather than on beef exports in general, is not a bad idea because
the Japanese beef export situation is very similar to our overall beef situation. Japan is by far our
largest customer. In the mid- to late-1980’s, Japan was our most important beef customer,
accounting for over 70 percent of both our value and our volume. Since the early 1990’s Japan’s
export share has fluctuated and is now around 60 percent. Japan is one of our higher priced
markets; its share of the dollar value of U.S. beef exports is a bit higher than its share of the
tonnage.
The general focus of this conference has been innovations in technology, or specifically, in
transportation technology. And so the question is what have these innovations done for our
exports of beef to Japan? To get to the bottom line in my story, the available technology for
shipping beef overseas from the United States really hasn’t changed much since 1988. Some
minor improvements were discussed earlier, but our technology overall hasn’t changed very much.
The exporters have, over time, selected a different mix of transportation methods. I can’t be very
specific about what was done in the 1980’s because there are no solid, reliable numbers. But
impressionistically, in the 1980’s most of the beef we shipped was frozen and went via ocean
freight in the container systems that others discussed earlier. Also, there was some chilled beef
sent to Japan via airfreight.
One of the curious things about the beef situation in Japan before 1988 is that they had a very
limiting quota. And there was such a huge gap between the value of beef in the United States and
the value of beef once it got to Japan, that you could ship beef by almost any feasible
transportation method and still make money. As is often the case, Japan’s beef quota had a
loophole: live cattle imports did not count. Beef in Japan was so expensive that they would buy
live cattle in the United States, air freight them to Japan, let them sit in a quarantined facility for
30, 40 days, and then slaughter them, and still make scads of money. I can’t imagine a less
efficient way of getting beef from the United States to Japan, but it worked.
Today, we’re still shipping beef to Japan via ocean freight. Much of it is frozen. But we are now
also sending significant amounts of fresh chilled beef to Japan via ocean liner in refrigerated
containers. In the past few years, the Japanese have begun to keep statistics on chilled versus
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frozen beef volume. Since shipping chilled beef is more expensive than shipping frozen beef, what
is really driving this shift is not transportation cost-effectiveness but Japanese preferences. They
prefer chilled beef over frozen beef.
I telephoned a salesman for one of the shipping companies and asked him if there was much
difference between shipping chilled beef and frozen beef. I was surprised to find out that there is a
huge difference. To get chilled beef to Japan, the carrier will deliver a container to the packing
plant. The packing plant fills the container, hitches the container to the truck, and ships it to the
dock where it is loaded on the ship. The frozen procedure is quite a bit different: a freezer boxcar
full of frozen beef is shipped to the cold storage at the dock, then the boxcar is offloaded and put
in a freezer container, which is then loaded onto the ship. All this extra handling should make the
frozen procedure a lot more expensive, but the savings in shipping costs for frozen beef more than
offset the costs of the extra handling.
The big disadvantage in shipping chilled beef is the more complex temperature control
requirements. With frozen beef, temperature control is not that critical. You want to keep frozen
foods around 20 degrees below zero, 10 degrees colder or warmer is okay, too. With chilled beef,
you have much tighter specs on temperature control. You’re only going to get really good shelf
life if you can keep it just above freezing. The other disadvantage to this chilled shipping system is
the cost of getting that container from the dock back to the plant. I’m not sure what kind of back-
haul chances they’ve got with this technology. In some cases, the packers ship the containers from
the dock to the plant using their own trucks. Since packers are not shipping companies, their
back-haul opportunities might be more limited.
In any case, it turns out that it’s much more expensive to do the chilled procedure than to do the
frozen procedure. As other people have said, transportation costs are hard to compare. In this
case, when you buy shipping services for chilled beef, you are buying a plant-to-destination
service. When you buy frozen beef transportation services, one vendor handles the plant-to-dock
shipment and another the dock-to-destination. It turns out that the total cost (plant to destination)
is higher for chilled. It also appears that each leg is higher for chilled as well. The salesman I
spoke to could not give me a breakdown on the cost of each part of the chilled beef shipment
process. I would assume that someone at the shipping company knows that. Either they don’t tell
the salesmen or the salesmen aren’t willing to share with the agricultural economist. But the
salesmen that I talked to figured that the ocean part of shipping chilled beef was about 80 percent
higher than the ocean part of shipping frozen beef. Based on what he told me, and if I understand
him correctly, that works out to be $.04 or $.05 per pound to ship frozen beef from major West
Coast ports to major Japanese ports, and about $.09 or so to ship chilled beef from the same ports
in the United States to those same ports in Japan. There’s also the complicating factor that
whenever you read anything on these shipping rates you always see at the bottom of the
paragraph, “quantity discounts available as well.”
The most important factor in expanding beef markets for the United States has been policy
reform. Policy reform for Japanese markets started in 1988. Before then, as I’ve said, Japan had a
very strict beef quota. In 1988, Japan negotiated the Beef/Citrus Agreement with the United
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specific, all beef-exporting countries that don’t have foot-and-mouth disease or other health
problems. Also in 1988, Japan started to gradually phase out its quota. From 1988 to 1990, Japan
set a higher quota level and in 1991 replaced the quota with a tariff. Even though Japan’s 1991
tariff was 70 percent, it still amounted to a liberalization of the beef market. The tariff was
reduced 10 percent per year until it reached 50 percent in 1993, where it was supposed to stay.
But because of the Uruguay Round in 1995, Japan agreed to further phased-in reductions. Japan
will hit its floor rate, or target in April 2000 when it drops to 38.5 percent. I think policy reform
in Japan has been the big factor driving expansion of our exports there. In fact, policy reform
around the world has been a big help to our beef exports.
Another factor has more to do with shipping. It’s not actually a shipping innovation per se, but
it’s been the problem of improving shelf life. In 1990’s when the Japanese were in the early
stages of trade liberalization--and while we at ERS were getting geared up to do some analysis
of the Uruguay Round of GATTCI was one of the authors of a report called, “The World Beef
Market--Government Intervention and Multilateral Policy Reform.”   I said some things in that
report that may not have been accurate. One potential inaccuracy was that I reported that
Australians were able to ship their beef to Japan and achieve 100-day-plus shelf life after landing it
in the port and that American beef, once it hit the Japanese port, had a 30- to 40-day shelf life.
Later, someone in the meat industry, told me that that was a lie being spread by the Australians;
that the U.S. really had much better shelf life than that. In any case, our packers did get to work
on this problem and made a lot of improvements. There were also some problems with the quality
of our boxes. The boxes used for shipping beef around the United States are not sturdy enough to
handle ocean transport. The beef would arrive in Japan and be just a pile of smashed boxes once
the container was unloaded. So they started using stronger and smaller boxes. The industry also
moved to thicker films and higher vacuum levels on the vacuum bags the meat cuts are put into
before they are boxed. All these small improvements have helped to extend shelf life. Also, just in
the domestic market, we’ve had many food safety problems, or food safety challenges, and
we’ve introduced a lot of innovations in beef packing and meat packing generically to improve
control of food pathogens in the United States, which have also improved shelf life. The pathogen
controls have helped our marketing efforts as well, since improved food safety is a selling point.
Another thing that’s helped increase beef exports to Japan has been a reduction in that third type
of distance that Professor Frankel mentioned this morning: cultural difference. The experience of
shipping beef to Japan has improved communication between U.S. exporters and Japanese buyers.
Some structural changes in Japanese beef institutions also has allowed Japan to take better
advantage of the overseas suppliers. Before the Beef/Citrus Agreement, the Livestock Industry
Promotion Council (LIPC) of Japan had monopoly control over beef imports and was using some
of the money earned from beef imports to subsidize programs for Japanese beef production. The
Beef-Citrus agreement eliminated the LIPC’s monopoly on beef imports and allows more direct
contact between U.S. sellers and Japanese beef buyers, which is helping to bridge some of the
cultural or perceived differences. Also, I said some things in the report I mentioned earlier that are
probably unfair. I said that the Japanese food distribution system was arcane and inefficient, which
is probably not entirely fair. The problem is that the Japanese distribution system is designed to
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resources. Things that would be done in-house in the larger scale American stores have to be
done out-of-house or contracted out because the smaller scale stores don’t have the resources to
do all the things that our stores do. And it’s the Japanese wholesalers who get stuck doing all
those things that would normally be done in American retail stores. Consequently, Japan needs a
fairly complex distribution system because more of the work is being done within the distribution
system and less is being done at the point of sale. The Japanese government has had a policy of
protecting these small scale stores by making it very difficult to construct larger scale stores.
They’ve reformed that law; now it’s merely difficult instead of impossible to put up a Wal-Mart
or the Japanese equivalent. Because of this, Japan has seen some rationalization in the retail
sector. They’ve closed a lot of small scale stores, combined them to make medium scale stores,
and they’re opening more large scale stores. This change has provided more opportunity for
direct contact. U.S. exporters are able to deal with people closer to the final consumer. These
reductions in the cultural and institutional barriers have expanded our beef sales to Japan.
My bottom line conclusion is that rather than shipping technology adopting innovations to meet
the needs of the beef trade, the beef trade has adapted to the shipping technology that exists. So
more of the innovations have come in on the pre- and post-shipment handling phases rather than
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The Sunkist Experience
Michael Wootton, Sunkist Growers
I have been asked to speak about Sunkist’s experience as a world marketer of perishable
commodities--specifically citrus fruit and how the evolution of transportation technologies has
affected our ability to deliver that fruit to market.
In addressing this, I’d like first to talk about the experience of our early growers, the impact of rail
transportation, then trucking, and, finally, ocean shipping on our major markets around the world
and conclude by talking a little bit about some dramatic changes we see in the immediate future
and the effects of deregulation on ocean shipping.
I should preface my remarks with a little bit about who Sunkist is. I assume most of you are
familiar with our brand name, which is found on a number of citrus products: fresh oranges,
lemons, grapefruit, clementines, tangerines, pummelos, orange drink, orange juice, lemon juice,
and a range of other licensed products around the world from fruit roll-ups to vitamin C tablets
to, most recently, fresh-cut flowers found in such retail outlets as Safeway and Giant.
But, Sunkist is not a big corporation. We are a nonprofit, farmer-owned marketing cooperative
that is owned by and serves some 6,500 citrus farmers in California and Arizona. Much to
everybody’s surprise, we do not yet have packing houses and operations in Florida, although that
probably will come within the next year or so.
Sunkist growers produce about 65 percent of the citrus fruit produced in the western United
States, and 30 percent of our fruit is exported to some 33 countries around the world. The export
value of our fruit constitutes about 65 percent of our total return to our growers, so export
markets are indeed a very high-value market for us, critically important to our economic well-
being.
Now, for a little historical perspective: the California citrus industry, where we originated in
southern California, greatly expanded between 1860 and the turn of the century. With the
increased population that flocked to the state during the Gold Rush, there was increased
consumer demand for citrus fruit to ward off scurvy in the gold mines and silver mines and
timbering operations. Initially, the market for citrus fruit was pretty much limited to the perishable
distance it could be transported by wagon, but the advent of the East-West Railroad changed
everything. So the railroad was the first transportation development that really changed our
marketing opportunities.
By 1887, with the advent of the ventilated freight car, upwards of about 2 million cartons of
oranges were shipped east from California to Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia and the
eastern seaboard states. The technology further improved with the development of the ice bunker
car. Then, in April 1883, 1,000 cartons of oranges were shipped by rail to New York and then by
steamer ship to Liverpool, England, with one box even being delivered to Queen Victoria. We
have a letter from Queen Victoria in our headquarters in Sherman Oaks thanking us for the
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During the latter half of the 19th century, a number of mechanical cooling devices and systems
were applied to ocean shipping. Much new technology was devised by the Europeans--things like
ammonia cooling machines and the Coleman cold-air machine, which uses CO2 technology.
Thanks to advances in refrigeration techniques and increases in sailing speeds, exports of
perishable commodities like citrus fruit, and bananas, and meat products to different consumer
markets from production areas in the United States and Argentina, Brazil, and Australia became
more common after 1900, and those products were regularly found on the meal tables of many
European households.
After 1925, forced-air cooling found widespread application in shipping, and thereafter fruit
transport increased exponentially. By the mid-1960’s, reefer ships used automation with
temperature recording devices to monitor cargo-hold temperatures, which assured greater
reliability in transport. By 1972, refrigerated containers were being used for some perishable
commodities aboard ships.
The use of controlled atmosphere has further enhanced the ability to preserve perishable fruit,
both in storage and during transport. Depending on the product, this involves increasing the
carbon dioxide and reducing oxygen. Because of this change in the gas composition of the
atmosphere, the respiration rate of the fruit is greatly reduced, slowing the maturation and
decomposition process. So, in effect, when we store or transport fruit, we basically put it to sleep.
The combination, therefore, of faster transport, shortened delivery times, and refrigeration and
preservative technologies created a marketing environment for perishable food products that
would have been unimaginable just a few decades before. It should be noted, however, that these
changes have taken place over a span of 100 years. The change has been evolutionary,
incrementally affecting our ability to expand our markets. Nevertheless, today only 7 percent of
the world’s fruit production is traded internationally in the form of fresh produce.
Over the past two decades, international trade has increased considerably as a result of growth in
consumer demand for fresh fruit year round. No longer do seasons limit consumer options.
Thanks to improvements in transportation and preservative technologies, producers are able to
meet the demand year round. World imports of fresh fruit have grown in total value to well over
$23 billion annually. In the last 5 years, importation of produce into the U.S. market from abroad
has tripled. Much to the chagrin of the folks at APHIS at USDA, who are overwhelmed with
inspections, and as a result of the import growth, we suffered 26 fruit-fly infestations in California
last year.
EU fruit imports amount to more than $12 billion, half of which is intra-EU trade. For the major
fruit producers; North America has an export share of 32 percent, Europe 31 percent, South
America 23 percent, and Asia 13 percent. Exports of the principal fruit products are valued at
more than $13 billion, with citrus the main product group at $3.8 billion; bananas $3.1 billion; and
apples about $3.5 billion.
After Brazil, the United States is the world’s largest producer of fruit. While the vast majority of
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total production, the United States is still the biggest exporter of fruit.
Until the early 1970’s, our biggest overseas market for citrus fruit was Europe. Then, because of
increased transportation costs and the EU’s imposition of a discriminatory tariff of about 20
percent on our citrus fruit versus an 80 percent discount for citrus from Mediterranean countries,
such as Israel, Algeria, Morocco, and then the inclusion of major citrus producers, Spain and
Portugal, into the EU, we lost out on that market. The transportation cost for delivery of fruit
there combined with the additional duty made us noncompetitive. Today, transportation costs for
us to deliver a carton of oranges or a carton of lemons from California to Europe, dock to dock,
is upwards of about $8 a carton. On the other hand, to move fruit from California to Hong Kong
is less than $2 and to Japan is a little over $3. So, it’s clear where our market has to be, at least
with the current transportation cost parameters and tariffs. Even though we see significantly
higher tariffs in the Asian markets, it still is a better market for us than Europe. The other factor
driving that distinction is that European buyers, particularly the French, are low-cost produce
purchasers. The British and the Germans typically will pay more than the French but not as much
as the Asians, who will pay a premium for high quality.
Sunkist’s market niche is that upper 5 percent in terms of quality and price. We cannot compete
with low-cost producers like Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa.
This kind of successful world market would not be possible, obviously, without the kinds of
technologies that have made it possible to deliver fruit—or for that matter, any perishable
commodity—to consumer markets far from production areas around the world. Today, southern
hemisphere summer production is meeting northern hemisphere winter consumer demands.
Chilean fruit is a good example of a country that has been able to enjoy significant increased
volumes into the U.S. marketplace.
Let me talk briefly here about deregulation. In addition to the technological changes that have
improved transportation and preservation of perishable commodities, the increased economic
efficiency of transportation has played a significant part in market expansion for American
agriculture. With governmental deregulation of rail and trucking, shipping rates have become
much more competitive. With deregulation, the railroads had to take a hard look at their costs. 
Instead of prices set by rate bureaus, which meant monthly examining the docket and setting rules
and rates, predicating them on the most inefficient player, deregulation took away the railroad's
antitrust protection for setting these rates.
To give you an example of California-based transportation, deregulation meant that Santa Fe and
Southern Pacific, lines with parallel track systems, found themselves competing rather than
cooperatively conspiring in a rate bureau to set the charges. Almost overnight, expensive
networks of railroad sales offices around the country disappeared after being identified as
extraneous expense items. Instead of winning over shipping clients by hosting lunches and dinners
and golf outings, since the rates were all predetermined and equal, railroads had to win clients by
beating their competitors with better rates and service, differential pricing to reflect potential loss,
lower shipping rates for easier-to-handle cargo and increased rates for more risky cargo, like
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process. Armies of railroad claims adjustors were replaced by contracts limiting railroads’ liability.
Railroads began sitting down with shippers and working out creative cargo contracts: offering
rebates if shippers met certain volume targets by year's end, devising customized contracts, and
committing to equipment purchases in exchange for volume guarantees by shippers. The
prevailing principle then, as now, is that the big guy gets a better deal than the small guy.
Fortunately for us, Sunkist is the big guy. We're the biggest fresh-fruit, citrus-brand marketer in
the world.
Today, domestically we ship by truck—refrigerated truck. We do not ship by rail anymore. The
trucking industry went through the same kind of transformation after its deregulation. But, rail
delivery for us from West Coast markets to East Coast markets became very unpredictable. Time
for delivery varied from 12 to 16 days. For a perishable commodity, that means significantly
reduced shelf life. It costs more for us to ship by truck, but it means absolutely guaranteed
delivery in not more than 4 days. The reliability factor just far outweighs the added cost. So, we
have dramatically shifted. We ship virtually nothing by rail anymore.
It should also be mentioned that since deregulation, trucking has become all nonunion now. You
don't see teamsters driving trucks anywhere in the country. They're virtually out of that except for
UPS or something like that. But, virtually all of the produce that's shipped around the country
goes by nonunion trucking.
Talking about ocean shipping moves us into the export market. In May of this year, ocean
shipping will be deregulated for the first time. We believe this will result in dramatic changes in
the way business is done in ocean shipping trades. We're expecting to see major cost-cutting,
greater competitiveness, and market-based rates. We anticipate that ocean shipping by common
carriers, such as APL and Sea-Land, will change in some of the same ways that rail shipping did
after deregulation.
Up to now, common carriers in ocean shipping trades have operated with the same kind of
antitrust immunity previously enjoyed by the railroads. Like the old railroad rate bureaus, ocean
shipping firms held conferences where they set prices and terms. Terms and rates were published
and publicly available for all to see through the Federal Maritime Commission. These common
carriers were nondiscriminatory and noncompetitive, offering the same rates to all shippers large
or small.
For the first time, shippers and common carriers will be free to negotiate contracts without having
to make public their essential terms. This confidentiality will enable shippers to keep strategic
information from industry rivals. Carriers will be free to form alliances that make their operations
more efficient and competitive. The rates set by the conference were mandatory. In fact, we are
the only country left with a public tariff regulatory system and that is about to change. Shippers
from other countries already enjoy the ability to negotiate freely confidential contracts with
carriers allowing goods competing with U.S. products to be sold on a CIF-delivered basis. This
has given foreign shippers considerable flexibility and competitive advantage in pricing practices
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On May 1, as I said, all of this changes. Conferences will break up; carriers can enter into
confidential contracts with shippers; and judging by what happened with trucking and rail, rates
will come down and shippers will have more options. At least that’s what we look forward to.
One-on-one negotiations will be a prerogative, along with the ability to enter into long-term
contractual relationships that are custom-designed, capitalizing on carrier expertise and shippers’
specific needs. Alliances will supplant conferences as the dominant forum for rationalizing
services. There is the potential for partnership not only between carriers, but also between carriers
and a host of other players, such as shippers, intermediaries, ports, possibly even labor unions.
Large carriers will likely cannibalize small, less-efficient rivals, and a few culturally compatible
large carriers will probably emerge. Some experts predict that liner shipping will soon consolidate
into three or four major alliances. Common carriage will yield to customized contracts with the
most favorable terms reserved for the larger shippers.
The infrastructure of U.S. ports will also be affected. As ocean carriers work to contain their
costs and remain competitive, the ships themselves will come under scrutiny. With fixed costs, the
same carriers will look to build bigger, more economical and efficient ships. Increased ship size
and draft will limit the number of ports capable of handling them.
Also, the ability to quickly load and unload the vessel will be critical to port competitiveness.
Ports will be played off one another by the big shipping firms. There will be a scramble to land the
big contracts. Ports able to meet these demands may be further away from shippers, imposing
added overland transportation costs.
Port improvement costs will be passed on to shippers and, in turn, to their clients. So, pressure on
prices will operate, really, both ways. Downward pressure will be exerted by cost containment
and rate reductions made for competitive purposes; at the same time, infrastructure changes will
result in passed-through costs that will push prices upward.
The importance of quick turnaround time in the port that a previous speaker talked about is
illustrated in another deregulated industry by the success of Southwest Airlines. Today,
Southwest is the country’s most profitable airline because it has the fastest fleet turnaround time at
an average of 20 minutes versus 90 minutes for the rest of the industry. They enjoy other
economies and efficiencies from flying only one type of plane, the 737. All their pilots can fly all
their planes, eliminating a lot of cross-training. Employees also serve multiple functions. If you’ve
ever flown Southwest, the people that sold you the ticket also unload the luggage and clean up
the airplane and serve the snacks and all the rest. These same realities are likely to confront the
shipping industry. Ships won’t be able to afford to sit in port. They’ll need to be on the water
generating revenue.
Union labor at ports will also be affected significantly, we suspect. Current work rules and pay
scales are very noncompetitive, resulting in high handling costs. It will become necessary to
confront this problem and to rationalize work rules.
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conference, and then go to the government regulating body--in this case, the Federal Maritime
Commission--with their proposal, arguing that while they’re in agreement, there is no way to meet
the higher costs other than raising shipping rates. With deregulation, that is going to change.
Let me note also, from the point of view of a shipper like Sunkist, technological improvements in
transportation are of limited value if the destination of the export doesn’t have handling facilities. I
think the previous speaker talked a little bit about that in terms of having the chain in place to be
able to accommodate these products. We learned that the hard way at Sunkist a few years ago
when we were approached by Russia when it was still the Soviet Union--they wanted to buy three
shiploads of third-grade lemons, which we had an abundance of at that time. The shipments were
to go into what was then Leningrad and is now St. Petersburg.
The first shipment went fine and on the second shipment a few months later in addition to the
third-grade lemons we put 1,000 cartons of top-grade Sunkist lemons in the hold to test the
consumer market in Russia. When it came time for the third shipment, the Russians came to us
and said, We want to be sure that you don’t put those Sunkist lemons in the hold this time. We
thought that was kind of strange since we had just given them 1,000 cartons worth about $40 a
carton, so we asked why and they replied: When we transported all that stuff down to markets in
Moscow, the Sunkist grade lemons were the only ones that people wanted to buy.
From that we discovered that there is a consumer market in Moscow for our lemons if we could
find people there with the money to buy them. We have not shipped to Russia since then, though,
because in the third shipment we ran into real difficulties, and this gets to the infrastructure
question. On that third trip, when our ship reached Leningrad the port was all backed up, and we
had to pay a demurrage fee of $10,000 a day as we sat there for two weeks, which took the fun
out of doing business with the Russians real fast. Until they get their act together and have more
resources, we’re not likely to get back into that market. We just don’t take those kinds of risks
anymore. We sell, typically, all of our export produce fob our dockside.
In conclusion, let me just suggest that given the fact that there is going to be this dramatic change
in ocean shipping with deregulation, I think it would be of value if ERS were interested in
undertaking an analysis of the economic conditions that exist under a regulated environment and
the kind of transition that’s likely to take place, possibly reaching some conclusions here in a year
or two as to where things are after deregulation. It would be educational and I think it would also
benefit public policy to have an understanding of the effects of deregulation in a business
environment.
If there are any questions, I’ll be happy to try to answer them.
MR. BAILEY: Bill Bailey from Massey University, New Zealand. You talked in the beginning
about Sunkist going into fresh-cuts, fresh flowers?
MR. WOOTTON: Fresh-cut flowers.
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MR. WOOTTON: It’s a licensing arrangement.
MR. BAILEY: Okay. I was going to ask, is this driven by your distribution structure, or could
you talk about it?
MR. WOOTTON: It’s driven primarily by the brand name--having such a positive consumer
response to that brand. So, capitalizing upon the brand identity.
MR. McGREGOR: Brian McGregor with Agricultural Marketing Service. How much of the
Sunkist export business goes freight bulk and how much container?
MR. WOOTTON: It’s getting to be more and more container. It used to be very little container; it
used to be mostly into the holds on pallets, cartons on pallets into the holds of reefer ships. But
now we find that some ports like, for example, Singapore, we will go by container. But we still do
both. It’s probably 60 percent container/40 percent pallet.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 58
Supply Chain Management in New Zealand’s Dairy Industry
William Bailey, Massey University, New Zealand
I will talk about how seaports and the New Zealand dairy industry have reacted to technological
and structural changes in their respective industries. I wish to review the role of supply chain
management in adjusting to those changes. My comments will be not just about transportation,
but also about supply chain management. The Dairy Board views supply chain management, and
not price, as key to their worldwide competitiveness. First, I’d like to spend just a couple of
minutes describing the dairy industry in New Zealand.
When most people think of New Zealand agriculture, they think of the Dairy Board and have a
knee-jerk reaction to it as a single-seller, a monopoly, a bad thing with huge government subsidies
involved. Well, there are no subsidies involved. It’s simply a single-desk seller. Anybody can
export dairy products from New Zealand. The Dairy Board has to give them permission to do
that. I think there are around 20 different companies exporting dairy products. But, by and large,
for the products we’re going to talk about, the Dairy Board is the single-seller. The Dairy Board is
a cooperative and as such has a structure with significant implications for its ability to manage the
supply chain. All the milk that is processed is processed by cooperatives just as all of the milk
exported is exported through the cooperatively managed Dairy Board.
Dairy exports constitute 25 percent of the value of the country’s exports. In a country like New
Zealand, the level of milk production is national news. If there is an outbreak of some type of
disease in the dairy industry, it is on the national television news that night. Not necessarily ahead
of rugby, but nevertheless, it’s national news. If you talk with dairy farmers, they are very clued in
about what’s going on internationally. They know the exchange rates, they know all the ins and
outs of the dairy trade internationally. The production formula is low cost, high volume.
Production has increased 45 percent since 1990. While production has increased, the number of
cooperatives has declined. A few years ago there were 15 cooperatives. There are now, at least
there were when I left, nine cooperatives in New Zealand. We have experienced this increase in
milk production and decrease in the number of cooperatives processing the milk. As a
consequence, economies of scale have really begun to drive the industry. Combined with these
factors is the seasonal nature of milk production. There’s a huge variation in production over the
course of the year. Deliveries range from zero during parts of the year to over 4 million gallons in
a single day. Plants have been built to accommodate this huge shift in volume. So, we have
seasonality combined with huge production increases and fewer processing cooperatives. All of
these factors are driving the industry to embrace economies of scale.
Now, just a quick look at the dairy situation in New Zealand. The country is divided into the
North Island and South Island. Most of the milk is produced on the North Island and moved to a
number of facilities. Kiwi, for instance, has trucks moving milk from the west side of the North
Island to its major plant on the east side, a distance of about 400 kilometers one way. Some South
Island milk also feeds into the North Island plants. As I said, during the flush production period,
as much as 4 million gallons of milk per day is delivered to one facility. That’s a lot of milk. In
order to move this, Kiwi uses milk trains. Milk is collected at a number of farms, taken to a rail
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back and forth from one side of the North Island to the other during the peak season. Each train
carries around 800,000 gallons of milk. Again, this volume of milk is required to feed the plant at
Hawera. This is an example of the economies of scale used in the industry.
And what makes all of this a challenge is the export focus of the industry.
There was a question this morning in reference to deregulation in the ocean shipping industry
about what happens when a shipping cartel is done away with. At one time, there was a very tight
cartel between New Zealand and Australia for ocean shipping. But about 5 years ago that cartel
was opened. As a result, ocean-freight rates have come down over 50 percent during the past few
years.
While Australia remains an important destination for dairy exports, the majority of exports are
moving a long way to Europe, Russia, and South America. Exports of nonfat dry milk don’t go
quite as far to Malaysia, The Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand, but these destinations
are still 9-10 days by boat away from New Zealand.
The situation faced by the New Zealand dairy industry includes these givens: 1) it is export driven;
2) it depends on volume and the volume of milk arriving at plants fluctuates enormously over the
course of a year; 3) the milk must be moved a long distance—either to processing facilities or to
export markets.
In addition to the above, the external environment is changing in ways that the Dairy Board has
no ability to influence. Most of these changes we've talked about previously. Shipping lines have
rationalized their services. Today's larger ships and larger containers require larger volumes. As a
consequence, we're seeing hubbing; that is, scheduled carriers are servicing a reduced number of
ports in New Zealand. When the carriers do arrive, they have big boats. They want attention.
They want to arrive on fixed days. They want guaranteed facilities. They want fast turnaround of
their vessels. Those are demands that the Dairy Board must respond to.
The major ports in New Zealand are Auckland on the North Island and Christchurch on the South
Island. Altogether, there are 13 commercial ports throughout the country. But this hubbing is
creating considerable competitive pressure on the smaller ports. The question is how can these
ports survive, and how can the dairy industry work in concert with the ports to remain
competitive?
The ports can't change their location. I mean, where they are is where they are. And so what are
they doing to remain competitive? The ports no longer offer just a facility, just some place for a
boat to stop. They are expanding their range of services so that they can monitor products all the
way through the system. They will work with shippers to make sure that the products are
delivered on time to the various ports and that they have sufficient facilities for a quick turnaround
on the boats that arrive.
A good example is the port of Auckland, which is New Zealand's biggest and busiest port. This is
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long the Cup will need to be in New Zealand before it’s called New Zealand’s Cup, but this is a big
deal for Auckland. It’s creating some problems in Auckland because as the large container ships
arrive, the 12-meter yachts are running back and forth. The port itself is in downtown Auckland,
which creates some intermodal and environmental problems. Unloading empty containers at 3:30
in the morning makes a lot of noise just as trucks moving containers to and from the port during
rush hour creates some issues. Nevertheless, 52 percent of all products brought into New Zealand
by sea come through Auckland.
Now, what is the Port of Auckland doing to become the main competitor, the main hub, in New
Zealand? They’ve improved turnaround times. A boat that arrived during 1989 required 39 hours for
containers to be offloaded and new containers onloaded. As a result, in part, of improved technology,
turnaround time has been reduced to 14.9 hours. I don’t think it’s unique to New Zealand, but when a
vessel arrives, the people at the port of Auckland know exactly where the containers are in the vessel.
This means that when a boat arrives the cargo is quickly moved off, stacked at the appropriate place,
and new cargo positioned for export is loaded onto the vessel. The intention is to minimize the
movement of containers that don’t generate revenue. As a consequence of the new technology, the
vessel can be turned around more quickly, and more importantly, the liner companies can be kept
happy. The improved handling procedures have resulted in a 30 percent increase in container traffic in
4 years and a reduction in the number of employees.
The major port or hub for the South Island is Lyttleton near Christchurch. One of the important
operational things Lyttleton has been working on is truck turnaround time. When a truck arrives at
the port with a container, the container is offloaded and the truck is out of there in 11 minutes. The
focus of the port is on the paperwork. Lyttleton uses technology to make sure documentation is
handled as quickly and efficiently as possible. Lyttleton sees the use of technology to speed and
improve documentation as their competitive advantage.
How has the Dairy Board responded to these controllable and uncontrollable events? For dairy
products exported from New Zealand, ocean shipping is 30 percent of the total marketing bill, so
any opportunity to reduce the cost of ocean freight will significantly benefit the industry. What
can the Dairy Board do so that it can return more money to the dairy farmers of New Zealand? In
the past, the response has been to go out and sell more cheese, or more butter, or more nonfat dry
milk, to increase sales. But over the past year or two, the industry seems to have changed its
attitude. While increasing sales is still good, it doesn't necessarily mean increasing profits.
Furthermore, while ocean freight is an important cost component, if the industry focuses just on
the cost of shipping, that won't be enough. What happens, for example, if the cost of shipping is
reduced considerably but the products don't arrive on time, or they're damaged, or there's some
delay in the handling of documents? The industry has significantly improved documentation. Each
exported container of dairy product requires approximately 10 documents. During the past 3
years, there's been an 80 percent increase in the number of containers exported. At the same time,
the Dairy Board has reduced by 50 percent the number of employees working on documentation.
We cut costs, but it may not help at all.
True story: I was flying from Auckland to Singapore to meet Bill Coyle and some of his friends.
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board a large styrofoam container and put it down in the seat next to me and strapped it in.
Naturally I was curious and I asked what it was. It’s some chocolate, I was told. There is a
company in New Zealand that makes fine chocolate and this was a very large block of chocolate
carved into an intricate design. It was going somewhere to become part of a big celebration. So,
we have this exquisite chocolate, carved up in I don’t what sort of design, sitting next to me on
the airplane. We arrive in Bali and it was a 100+ degrees, 110 percent humidity. This box of fine
chocolate, which was sitting next to me very calmly all the way up, then disappeared. I don’t
know what happened to it, but I had visions of someone taking the box off the plane and putting it
on the tarmac next to the airplane to wait for someone else to come pick it up. I imagined that it
sat there in the sun and heat and humidity for maybe four or five hours, and that the finely crafted,
carved piece of chocolate turned back into a block of chocolate. And it wasn’t because it wasn’t
well handled between Auckland and Bali. Something happened in the supply chain. And that’s
why the Dairy Board says if we just look at the cost, it doesn’t mean we’re going to become more
competitive. Instead it said, let’s improve the whole supply chain. If we reduce the total cost of
delivering a product from our factories to the end-user overseas, the money saved goes straight to
the bottom line. It’s not like sales where you have to take some out for cost of goods sold, some
out for marketing, some out for overhead. These savings go straight to the bottom line. The first
six months that the Dairy Board focused on improving the supply chain, it saved millions of
dollars. Those savings went straight to the farmers’ pockets, which made the Dairy Board very
popular.
Improvements in the supply chain put money directly into farmers’ pockets. In addition, the
improvements will increase the ability of the Dairy Board to compete, not on price but on service.
Because the Dairy Board can deliver products at guaranteed times to specific places and at
specific quality standards. The challenge of improving the supply chain is that it requires
participation by everybody in the chain. We’ve talked about ocean shippers, we’ve talked about
ports, we’ve talked about a number of things today that affect the New Zealand dairy industry.
The Dairy Board says we can’t look at those in isolation. For the chain to improve, all parts of the
chain must improve.
Now, let us turn to some conclusions. The New Zealand Dairy Board is a single-seller
organization. I don’t know if having a single seller is necessary in order to have an efficient supply
chain in agriculture. But I do know that the single-seller status of the Dairy Board enhances its
ability to be competitive by improving the supply chain. While exports drive the industry,
domestic movement of milk remains critical and very costly. Product movement is high-volume,
low-value. While such a relationship is great for ships, it’s tough with trucks. As competition
between the seaports increases, as the drive for hubbing increases, and as scale requirements
increase, the demand for movement of huge product volumes through ports will increase. The
industry has responded to these challenges. The industry has embraced innovative ways to pick
milk up at the farm, it uses global satellite positioning on the trucks that go to the individual dairy
farms; it uses milk trains that carry nothing but milk from outlying areas to processing facilities.
The Dairy Board looks at all the links in the chain, not just at facilities or at a particular mode of
transportation, but at the whole chain. While distribution costs may go up, overall revenue will
increase as overall costs go down. In my view, however, the most important improvement is
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two containers up at a time instead of one, but if the documents aren’t there, it doesn’t do any
good. If we’ve lost a container, if potatoes go to Albany, Georgia, instead of Albany, New York,
we have problems. Information technology permits us to keep track of the containers--makes sure
that we have maximum container loads. We know how much is required, how much we have
available in various inventories to assure maximum payloads for the containers. Information
technology makes sure the necessary documents precede the containers so that those documents
are there when the containers arrive. Product flows throughout the system are much better
managed, and the time in port for the containers and the ships is reduced dramatically.
So, that is how the Dairy Board looks to technology to become more competitive in the world
marketplace. It doesn't look just at the transportation costs, but at the whole chain. As you do
your research, I think that's something you have to keep in mind. Simply reducing your
transportation costs does not mean that service will increase, that market share will increase, or
that customers will be happy. The Dairy Board has said the supply chain is where the action is and
it is developing that supply chain to meet consumer needs.
Thank you very much. If anybody has any questions or suggestions, I'll be more than happy to
entertain them.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Walt Armbruster, Farm Foundation. Could you give us a couple of
examples of exactly how the New Zealand Dairy Board has dealt with the supply chain
phenomena?
MR. BAILEY: For example, the Dairy Board was working with maybe 60 different companies
that provide packaging. It said, “60 companies, come on, that’s too many, how complicated is a
cardboard box?” And part of the Board said, “Now, hold it. If we want the lowest possible
prices, we have to have this bid-and-offer system. We have to have a situation where companies
compete against each other to give us the lowest possible price for cardboard boxes.” Fair
enough. The other half, the supply chain management people said, “It’s not the price, it’s the
service. If we get the service right, if we get the products right, if we get the containers right, if
we get the packages right, it will reduce our overall costs.” So, the board went from working
with 60 packaging people to two and, as a result, forged a much closer linkage between the
packaging people and the processing plant so that the packages are designed and delivered when
they’re needed. It’s reduced the inventory costs of both the suppliers and the processors, reducing
total cost in the chain.
Another example is working with containers. What do you do with a container? I mean with these
packaging/processing plants in the middle of New Zealand there aren’t any back hauls. I guarantee
you, going to Harewa, there are very few back-haul opportunities. So, what do you do with the
containers? Well, maybe, if the containers were pre-positioned at the ports, shipments could be
consolidated at the ports rather than at the factory and maybe you could save some money instead
of moving around empty containers. When working with the supply chain, you probably won’t
find one place that saves $1 million, but you’ll find a lot of places where $1 can be saved. The key
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MR. SPINELLI: I’m Phil Spinelli at GPSA (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration). I was wondering if you see the same kinds of structural changes that you
identified in the dairy industry in other big export commodities from New Zealand, like beef?
MR. BAILEY: There are marketing boards for several commodities--apples, kiwi fruit--and
these industries are moving quickly toward the supply chain management approach. When we
look at the beef side, that’s not necessarily true. The beef industry is fragmented. It doesn’t take
as full advantage of supply chain management as these vertically integrated industries do. Now,
from a research perspective, do you have to have that vertical integration? Does it have to be a
cooperative? Can these linkages take place strictly because it benefits everybody? It’s a lot more
difficult that way. It’s great in theory, but the implementation is very difficult. So, the boards are
doing well in the supply chain area, but the beef industry is not doing well at all.
MR. [INAUDIBLE]: Do you see the success of the New Zealand Dairy Board as a single-desk
seller acting as a role model for other entities in New Zealand? I mean, is this the wave of the
future? Is it going to be more moving backward toward other more broken up or disaggregated
industries?
MR. BAILEY: Someone will provide the services provided by the Dairy Board. That is
Marketing 101. The middleman adds value in some way. And so the services provided by the
Dairy Board will be provided by someone even if the Dairy Board disappears tomorrow. But, the
Dairy Board remains a model for other industries in New Zealand, because it’s doing a good job.
It’s selling the products and taking care of the markets; it’s looking at the whole chain and
returning good value to the farmer. The farmer controls the product all the way through. The
Dairy Board may change its name, but I think the idea of a single seller will remain in New
Zealand for a number of years, at least for dairy products.
MR. [INAUDIBLE]: My question was: Can you see other industries emulating the Dairy Board?
MR. BAILEY: The success of the Dairy Board is due in part to the statutory basis for its
existence. If a company wants to export a product, it goes to the Dairy Board for permission. I do
not see the beef industry doing that. I don’t see other industries in New Zealand requiring that
permission. And so, while people look with envious eyes at the Dairy Board, I don’t see that its
statutory powers will be extended to any other industry in New Zealand.
MR. [INAUDIBLE]: Doesn’t the New Zealand Dairy Board have established subsidiaries in
several countries?
MR. BAILEY: That’s a good question. The Dairy Board has maybe 50 subsidiaries in a 100 or
so countries around the world. The challenge with supply chain management is that it takes
communication. If the Dairy Board has 50 subsidiaries around the world, it has to be
communicating with them. An offshoot of this has been that the Dairy Board had to bring
responsibility and authority back into New Zealand and away from the subsidiaries, and that is
creating some tensions. This is a little bit counter to some of the theory we read about in the
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lowest level. The responsibility will remain with the subsidiaries, but the authority is coming back
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Incorporating Transportation Costs into International Trade Models:
Theory and Application
Mark Gehlhar, ERS
Is transportation a relevant variable? That’s probably not a relevant question for this audience,
but certainly if you’ve taken a number of theory courses, like I have, you’ll recall that
transportation didn’t come up very often. I recall in one of my early courses as an undergraduate,
the professor, as usual, assumed zero transportation cost. A student asked how could that be true
and what was meant by that. The professor replied that he meant exactly what he said,
transportation costs are assumed to be zero. The student got up and walked out of the classroom
and was never heard from again. We can sometimes get away by assuming transportation costs do
not exist, but it depends on the context in which we make the assumption. Although I’ve spent a
lot of time on transportation data for modeling purposes, because I think it’s important, if I were
to go back to the classroom and teach trade, I don’t think I would dwell too much on
transportation costs. It’s not necessary when trying to teach the essence of comparative
advantage in trade. In fact, it can unnecessarily complicate things. In the classroom, we can teach
a lot of good trade theory without real world complications regarding international transactions
cost. Of course transportation is important; that’s why we are here today. The problem is that
some teachers assume too often students will recognize why it’s not important in some
circumstances but important in others.
Various trade models are used to explain or predict trade. When it comes to applied trade models,
transportation can be an important variable. But I would say that just taking into account
transportation costs in a model will not necessarily enable us to better predict evolving trade
patterns. I’m not completely convinced that transport costs add much in explaining overall trade
pattern changes, which can be very complex. But where I think the transportation variable is
important is in policy simulation models, and that’s how we use a lot of our trade models in ERS.
This year we have a large modeling project working on upcoming WTO issues. For these models,
we take trade as a given without having to explain why it occurs. We then simulate outcomes by
changing policy variables, such as tariffs or other policy variables. Now, if we introduce the
transportation variable, we can get different outcomes than if it were excluded. Transport costs
affect how prices are transmitted between countries. So the transportation variable, I think, is
important in that type of application.
This afternoon Zhi Wang and I are giving a briefing at the International Trade Commission. Not
all of their staff are trained as economists, and they ask different questions than might be asked in
a university seminar. They’re going to be grilling us on the model for a project we are working
on for the Commission. If we’re asked about transportation costs we can look them in the eye
and say, “Yes, we’ve taken into account transportation costs in this model.” For some this is
important and makes a model more realistic. Having realistic assumptions and detailed data raises
the confidence level for people who are the end consumers of model results. Sometimes what
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Let’s start by defining how we measure transportation costs. For any transaction involving
transport cost, there’s obviously a quantity or physical unit of trade. Then we have an exporter’s
price valued at fob prices, and an importer’s price valued at cif prices. The difference between the
two prices is the unit transport cost. Another measure of transportation costs is the transportation
margin. A transport margin is the share of transport cost in the total cost of the good. So the two
cost measures do not measure the same thing. The change in the margin across time can be
confusing because if the cost of the good falls relative to the unit transport cost, the margin
increases even while the transportation cost falls. We can observe changes in the margin over time
but they do not directly reflect transport cost changes.
Next I’ll try to walk you through some theory as painlessly as possible. In a spatial equilibrium
model, we can represent two regions and clearly see that there’s a higher price in region B than in
A (figure 1). In the diagram, we see that the excess supply from region A and the excess demand
from region B determine an equilibrium price and quantity in the world market. So, if there are
transportation costs, clearly there’s going to be less trade. Transportation costs act like a tariff.
Now that we see how transport cost fits into the world market, I’m going to derive the demand
for shipping services. If you’re good with geometry, you can see graphically that there’s a
relationship between transport costs and the quantity shipped in the world market. If the shipper
or carrier decides to raise the transportation costs above a certain level, they can at some point
choke off world trade. If they want to provide a free service, then trade expands out to the
maximum equilibrium level of trade, the intersection of the excess supply and excess demand
curve. The derived demand for services relates volume of traded goods with the price of the
shipping service. It is an inverse relationship like all demand curves (fig. 2).
We can now link the derived demand for shipping services with the market for shipping services. 
Now to illustrate some things we’ve been talking about in the workshop, like technological
change, I want to perform some experiments using this framework. A technological change in the
shipping services industry is represented by a shift to the right in the supply curve for services (fig.
3). In other words, a higher level of services is supplied at the same unit cost. How might that
occur?  Well just as Bill Hall was describing, you now have faster turnaround times in ports. This
is what I was thinking when he was talking about that. Lower rates and higher volumes of trade
are the result. We see here this will increase world trade, decrease cif prices and increase fob
prices. Unit transport costs fall and the margin falls. As shown here, if the fob price increases but
the transport costs fall, then unequivocally we can say that the transportation margin falls.
We can do another experiment. Let’s say if we liberalize trade, the excess demand curve shifts to
the right as consumers in the protected region increase the quantity demanded, but at the same
time, the demand for services increases, which then bids up unit transport costs (figure 4). Both
unit transportation costs and fob prices increase. In that case, the change in the margin is
ambiguous. The change in the margin depends on the supply response of services. We don’t
really know very much about the supply of services. We can’t estimate it very easily. Perhaps if
we had some detailed data we might be able to do so. In the model, a simple assumption is just to
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Madeleine is going to talk about a single-commodity model, and I’m going to talk about the
transport services in an economy-wide CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model. In the
single-commodity model, unit transport costs are determined outside the model. In the CGE
model, there is a price in the model representing transportation services.
The model I’m referring to here is known as GTAP, which stands for Global Trade Analysis
Project. It’s a project that I became actively involved with at Purdue University and that is now
being used throughout the world for performing trade policy simulations and other applications.
In this model, we have a shipping industry where there’s both a supply and demand for shipping
services and what is assumed is that goods and transport services are in fixed proportion when
trade occurs. You have to have a fixed quantity of services for each unit of traded goods. We can
see from the equation that if there’s a zero transport margin, a given percentage change in the cif
price will give you exactly the same percentage change in the fob price. The higher the margin, the
less of a percent change in the cif-fob price differential. This is why the relative size of the margin
is important in a simulation.
Transport margins in the model vary by partner and by sector. So next we’ll look at some
estimates of margins. There’s no complete source for global transport margins. Some of them
have to be estimated. One thing I’ve taken into account is a problem associated with aggregation
bias that I avoid by using very detailed margin data before aggregating to the sector level.
You might think the margins would increase with greater distances. Well, here are some margins
from the GTAP model for an aggregate sector (table 1). The transportation margin for shipping
from Mexico to the United States is higher than the margin for shipping from India to the United
States. For this particular aggregate--fruits, vegetables, and nuts--the shipping margin is very
low. The reason for this can only be understood after examining the detailed data and noting what
the United States is actually importing from India. The trade consists primarily of cashew nuts,
which have less than a 4 percent transportation margin, whereas fresh fruit has a margin of closer
to 25 percent. When I was doing some econometric work, I would get frustrated working with
aggregate data because many times the margins are not positively related to distance. It is
common to find low margins on long-distance routes because of compositional shifts in the trade.
It becomes prohibitively expensive to ship certain fresh products long distances. Having detailed
data is important in this area of work.
If we look at U.S. trade with the same partners shipping to and from the United States, you’ll
notice that the margins are different. Margins for imports from Central America are higher than
for exports to these countries. The distance is exactly the same and possibly the same ports are
being used, so why are the margins different? Again, the answer lies in the type of product being
shipped. Exports to these countries consist primarily of dried goods such as beans and legumes,
whereas imports are fresh products requiring high per unit transport costs.
This next figure (table 2), which shows trade in fresh tomatoes, gives you an idea how unit costs
and transportation margins vary. Comparing Mexico with Canada, we see that there is a higher
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from Canada not because it costs more to ship to Canada than Mexico. So, there’s not always a
positive correlation between the high unit transport cost and the transport margin for the same
product. This illustrates the importance of the unit cost of goods and how it varies by trading
partner.
Something now being explored for this model is incorporating different types of shipping services.
The market for transportation is becoming more fragmented by type of service. Basically there are
three modes of transportation--ocean, ground, and air. The next figure (figure 5) shows the
share of fresh fruits and vegetables shipped by air. Tomatoes are coming by air from the
Netherlands and this share is rising. A greater share of fresh stone fruits are flown from Chile. So,
we are seeing growth in air shipments for fresh produce.
So far, we have examined transportation margins in the model. In the next experiment, I ask what
the impact is if these margins were reduced as a result of technical change in the shipping industry.
In this case specifically, I’m asking what would happen if we had a 20 percent reduction in all
transport margins. It turns out that this would have an effect nearly equivalent to complete trade
liberalization in world trade. In other words, reducing barriers to trade would provide welfare
gains of the same magnitude as reducing transport costs by 20 percent. The question came up
yesterday, “How should we allocate our resources: to reducing transportation costs or to
reducing levels of protection?”  Well, if you can get a 20 percent reduction in transport costs, it is
equivalent to complete worldwide trade liberalization and U.S. households would be better off by
about $9 billion (tables 3 and 4). However, I’m not sure if anyone knows exactly how we might
achieve this kind of transport cost reduction.  We know how to support and negotiate trade
agreements, but as economists we are less sure about how to achieve a 20 percent reduction in
transportation margins. This is at least one way to put trade barriers, which include transport
costs, into broader perspective.
It turns out that because U.S. food imports have a higher margin than exports, imports would
grow more than exports from a reduction in transport costs. The margins are actually higher for
U.S. imports than U.S. exports. The reverse is true, by removing tariff barriers, food exports
would increase more than imports since the United States is a relatively more open market than
the rest of the world.
In summary, both producer and consumer welfare need to be considered when it comes to the
problem of transportation costs. U.S. consumers stand to gain from cost reducing technologies.
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Transaction Costs in Applied Trade Models
Madeleine Gauthier, ERS
To add to Mark Gehlhar’s presentation on the role and importance of transportation costs in
economy-wide models, I would like to briefly illustrate how to incorporate transportation costs
into an applied trade model. I have recently looked at trade patterns in the market for fresh apples,
so this will be the subject of my illustration.
Theory suggests that price differences between trading regions cannot exceed transport costs,  but
much empirical evidence shows that this theory is too constraining. Trade patterns can very rarely
be explained by price competition alone. Applied trade analysts are increasingly looking at other
factors to explain the direction and volume of trade between regions. These factors include formal
and informal regional trade agreements, similarities in demand preferences and in business
practices (what O. North refers to as cultural homogeneity), and a whole array of transaction
costs. Transaction costs include not only transportation costs, as measured by freight rates, but
also many other costs such as those associated with obtaining information about trading partners
and foreign regulations and for coordinating and monitoring contractual arrangements.  It is costly
to do business with a country with a different legal system, to verify the credibility of new trading
partners, and to ensure yourself against socalled sovereign risk, since property rights cannot be
easily enforced in the international arena.
In the market for fruits and vegetables in particular, transaction costs include costs associated
with complying with phytosanitary procedures, such as treatment, inspection, or storage costs
during quarantine. Food safety and environmental regulations in general also add costs to bringing
a product from the point of production to the point of consumption.
The data available, as other presenters have shown us, is rarely detailed enough to allow a
breakdown of the different types of costs. Also difficult to figure out from available data, but
crucial in policy analysis, is who bears these costs, that is, how are costs distributed between
agents along the trading route.
Let me turn to my study of U.S. imports of fresh apples by country of origin to illustrate my point.
Thanks to Mark’s careful work, I was able to compare unit value at customs (the fob value) and
at the port of entry (the cif value) for the same shipment. The difference between the two can thus
be attributed to transaction costs. This information is presented in the following graph and table
(figure 6 and table 5).
We note first that although the United States is one of the world’s top producers and exporters
of  fresh apples, it does not import many apples and there are very few foreign suppliers to the
U.S. market.  Secondly, the value of shipments to the United States can vary a lot from year to
year and the selection of 1995 is arbitrary.
The graph shows large differences in both the value of the shipments and the margin between fob
and cif prices. The case of Canada stands out. Both the product value and the transport margins
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Ontario and are shipped to New York and Michigan for processing, which typically commands a
much lower price than apples destined for the fresh market. Canadian producers are so close to
U.S. processors that apples can be shipped rapidly and economically. The low value of processing
apples would not warrant long-distance shipping and high transport costs.
Japan is known for its high-value, high-quality apples. This is reflected on the graph where
shipments from Japan show the highest fob value. Transport costs, however, are about equal to
the world average. Supplies from South American producers, conversely, have average values but
high transport costs.
From this empirical example, we can see that there is no simple relationship between distance and
transport costs. In applied trade models, where the aim is to analyze trade patterns and  policies, it
may be crucial to look at trade flows and to explicitly model transaction costs. One approach to
analyzing trade flows is to construct an Armington-type model, which is an import demand model
where the traded good (like fresh apples) is differentiated by country of origin. That means, for
example, that apples imported to the U.S. market from Japan are not treated as perfect substitutes
for apples imported from New Zealand and price differences can occur. Here is a simple
illustration of this modeling approach (figure 7).
In conclusion, I would like to add that transaction costs are likely to impact the time dimension of
trade flows as much as they impact the spatial dimension. For instance, transaction costs may act
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The Impact of Distance on U.S. Agricultural Exports:
An Econometric Analysis
Zhi Wang, William T. Coyle,  Mark Gehlhar, Tom Vollrath
(Note: This paper is an edited, expanded version of the paper presented at the workshop by Zhi Wang.)
Introduction
Overcoming distance has always been an important issue in marketing agricultural products.
Agricultural economists have examined the role of distance intermittently (Thompson, 1981).
International trade economists have long ignored distance until recently as described by Paul
Krugman:
[T]he analysis of international trade makes virtually no use of insights from economic
geography or location theory. We normally model countries as dimensionless points within
which factors of production can be instantly and costlessly moved from one activity to
another, and even trade among countries is usually given a sort of spaceless representation
in which transport costs are zero for all goods that can be traded.
(Paul Krugman, Geography of Trade, 1996)
There are three types of costs in shipping agricultural products: physical shipping costs, time-
related costs, and the costs of unfamiliarity (Linnemann, 1966). Collectively, these costs represent
a natural tariff that limits trade. The removal or reduction of these costs would have an impact on
trade similar to the impact of the removal or reduction of a tariff.
While income growth and trade liberalization around the world are generally believed to be key
determinants in the expansion of global food and agricultural trade, advances in technology that
have lowered transportation and communication costs have also contributed to this expansion.
One way of measuring the trade effects of distance is the distance elasticity, which describes the
change in trade with respect to a change in distance. The expectation is the greater the distance,
the more inhibiting effect it has on trade, all other variables constant. A larger elasticity implies
that distance has a greater impact on the trade of a particular item than would be the case with a
smaller elasticity. A declining distance elasticity over time implies that distance is having less
impact on trade with the passage of time. According to the literature, however, the estimated
trade effects of distance, a proxy for transportation costs, are not diminishing over time. Using a
gravity model, Leamer (1993) estimated a distance elasticity in 1985 not dramatically smaller than
one estimated for 1970. Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) generated similar findings for their year-by-
year estimates between 1950 and 1988. Eichengreen and Irwin (1997) showed that the effects of
distance on trade did not diminish during the inter-war period, nor in 1949, 1954, and 1964.
Frankel (1997) concluded from a survey of gravity model results that there was no statistical
evidence of a decline in the distance elasticity for trade in the past century.
Most of the above results, however, were obtained from aggregated data, often total bilateral
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agricultural products. Recent developments in transportation and communication technology  may
have played an important role in reducing shipping costs, particularly for perishable products and
possibly for other food products. We believe it is, therefore, important to let the empirical analysis
inform us about the impact that distance has had on specific agricultural goods.
A key distinguishing characteristic of many food and agricultural products is perishability, which
requires refrigeration and prompt delivery to the consumer to assure quality. Marketing prime-
quality perishable products abroad was either prohibitively expensive or simply not feasible until
30 years ago. The adoption of modern technologies has facilitated trade of many high-value
agricultural products in recent years. Examples of such technologies include:
q  Improved communication systems allowing for better monitoring of quality, tracking of
shipments, and coordinating of steps through the marketing chain of time-sensitive food
products.
q  Greater use of intermodal systems and the reefer box, a mobile refrigerated warehouse, from
the point of production to the point of consumption combined with modern container
terminals, allowing for quicker turnaround in ports and faster delivery of product over greater
distances.
q  Developments in refrigeration, controlled atmosphere (CA) and humidity control that reduce
spoilage and allow the substitution of cheaper ocean shipping for air transport for some of the
more perishable items.
q  Packaging innovations, fruit and vegetable coatings, bioengineering, and other techniques that
reduce deterioration of food products and help shippers extend the marketing reach of U.S.
perishable products.
q  Development of infrastructure linkages for making ocean shipping of perishable products not
only technologically feasible but also profitable for all players. Providing sufficient crane
capacity, adequate storage space, and ready access to highway and rail connections.
Developing efficient inspection and customs services by government agencies, as well as port-
to-market distribution systems, critical for fresh produce that often must arrive quickly on
store shelves.
To assess the role of distance on the performance of exports of U.S. food and agricultural
products and evaluate how that role has changed over time with new transportation technologies
and logistical systems, we use a simple gravity model to estimate distance elasticities and their
time trends for both aggregate categories and specific food and agricultural products, using
pooled cross-section and time-series data for more than 100 destinations over 30 years. The
results for the aggregate categories were similar to previous research. But we often found
statistical evidence of a declining effect of distance when disaggregated data were used. Examples
include most meats, eggs, and certain processed foods.
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To benefit from growing overseas demand, U.S. agriculture has had to meet the challenge of
delivering food products to purchasers thousands of miles away with no substantial loss in
freshness and quality. Two of the largest U.S. markets, Japan and the European Union, are
thousands of miles beyond the shores of the United States (figure 8).
It is evident from the trade data that U.S. food and agricultural products are traveling greater and
greater distances. East Asia, which surpassed the EU in the 1980’s as the most important regional
market for U.S. food and agricultural products, is about 50 percent further away than the EU
(from Chicago, Tokyo is 10,200 kilometers and The Netherlands is 6,660 kilometers) (figure 9).
Until recently, East Asia was even larger than the combined nearby markets of Canada and
Mexico. It is also evident that non-bulk and perishable products are coming to dominant U.S.
agricultural exports in recent years.
Over time, the mean distance traveled by many commodities has risen. U.S. bulk exports traveled
an average of 8,000 kilometers in 1962 to 1964; roughly the distance from the United States to
Brazil. This distance rose to 8,700 kilometers in 1993 to 1995, an increase of 9 percent. In the
case of U.S. horticultural exports the rise was greater, from 4,400 kilometers in 1962 to 1964 to
6,300 in 1993-95, an increase of more than 40 percent (figure 10). This occurred despite
relatively high transportation costs, accounting for 30 to 40 percent of fob values for a variety of
horticultural products (figure 11).
U.S. meat exports, with the exception of poultry meat (whose production is not bound the way
beef and pork are to space and land resources), are also traveling greater distances now compared
with 1979 to 1981. U.S. beef exports, for example, averaged 8,200 kilometers in 1993 to 1995,
compared with 7,500 kilometers in 1979-81, thanks to market-opening measures in East Asia and
advances in logistics and transportation technology. A larger share of Japanese beef imports is
chilled rather than frozen, reflecting greater sophistication in shipping technology and handling
techniques. Meats are one of the fastest growing components of U.S. food and agricultural
exports, traveling as far or further than more storable products like corn.
What are the underlying reasons for such differential growth in trade for U.S. bulk versus
perishable food products?
Part of the explanation is attributable to the unevenness in technological innovation as it applies to
specific food and agricultural commodities. For example, transport costs may have declined more
rapidly for meats than for feed grains with the advent of and increased sophistication and speed of
containerized versus bulk shipping.
Another reason is that more significant cuts in protection may have taken place for perishable
products than for bulk commodities in the last 10 to 15 years. In Japan, for example, liberalization
of meats has been far more dramatic in recent decades than for feed grain, which has been
relatively freely traded for some time.
Finally, unbalanced economic growth across countries may be an explanation. The economic and
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of gravity to East Asia,  Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,  may account for a larger share of
our meat and horticultural exports traveling a longer distance than before.
Since there are several possible explanations, we need an analytical model to determine the
relative importance of transportation costs as one possible factor in explaining the bulk-to-
perishable shift in U.S. agricultural exports.
Model Specification and Data Sources
The gravity model is a commonly used empirical tool to assess the role of distance (a proxy for
transportation costs) in international trade that has gained growing theoretical acceptance in
recent years (Hummels and Levisohn, 1995, and Deardorff, 1995). In this study, we apply a
simple double logarithmic version of the gravity equation as follows:
Where Xirst is the value of exports of commodity i from country s (the United States) to country r
at time t, measured at country r’s cif price. GDPst and GDPrt stand for real GDP (in 1987 U.S
dollars) of the United States and the importing country, respectively, and measures the size effect
of the two economies. The next two items in the equation are per capita real GNP for the United
States and for the importing country, respectively. Importer per capita income gauges the income
effect on imports. The variable LANr is an index ranging from 0 to 10,000, which measures the
percentage of people that speak English in both the United States and the importing country.
AGLANDrt and RCArt are arable land and Balassa’s Revealed Comparative Advantage index
(Balassa, 1965), respectively. EXCrt is a real exchange rate variable measured by the units of the
importing country’s home currency per U.S. dollar. The variable ADJr is an adjacent dummy
variable equal to one when the importing country shares a common border with the United States
and zero when it does not. Tt is a time trend variable, µ isrt represents the error terms (their
structure will be discussed later), and α isr and β 0i - β 9i are parameters that need to be estimated.
Since only exports from the United States to its trading partners are considered in this study, the
coefficient of U.S. real GDP acts as a time-varying shift parameter measuring the impact of
economic growth in the United States on its agricultural exports. This is expected to be positive
because the United States has a strong comparative advantage in agriculture. Since growth in
U.S. food demand generally is slower than growth in demand for other products and services, the
export market for agricultural products becomes relatively more important over time. The
coefficient of real GDP for the importing country reflects the size effects and is expected to have a
positive effect on U.S. agricultural exports. The coefficient of per capita real GNP is an income
elasticity for the importing country: its sign depends on whether the commodity is a necessity or
luxury. By using real GDP variables, we have taken aggregate price changes over time into
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account. Since data on real, effective exchange rates are not available for all countries and years in
our sample, the price-level-deflated exchange rate is used, which is the yearly average market
exchange rate deflated by the CPI in the importing country. An increase in the dollar value of an
importing country’s currency implies an appreciation of the U.S dollar and is expected to have a
negative impact on U.S agricultural exports. The coefficient of the exchange variable β 6i,
therefore, should have a negative sign. The distance variable (DIS) is a proxy for the
transportation cost and expects to be negatively correlated with U.S. exports.
There are a number of theoretical justifications for the above specification. Bergstrand (1989), for
example, derives a similar specification from a microeconomic model of differentiated products,
incorporating factor endowment variables of the Heckscher-Ohlin type and nonhomothetic tastes
along the lines of Linder (1961). In his derivation, the importing countries’ per capita GDP enters
directly while the exporting countries’ per capita GDP is a proxy for the exporting countries’
capital-labor ratio. In such an explanation, the coefficient of U.S. per capita GDP measures the
impact of capital intensity in the United States on U.S. agricultural exports.
The physical distance measure used in this study is the great-circle route measured in kilometers
between Chicago and the most populous cities in the importing countries as calculated in
Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986). It does not change with time and therefore only varies across
export destinations. Because of the progressive decline in international transportation and
communication costs due to advances in technology, we expect the effect of distance on U.S.
exports to decline over time. To formally test this hypothesis statistically, a linear time trend is
used to capture the change in the distance elasticity over the sample period. Since the elasticity of
distance is expected to be negative, a positive γ  indicates a declining trend in the effect of distance
on U.S. agricultural exports.
The measure of linguistic similarity we use was generated by Boisso and Ferrantino (1997). They
first calculated the percentage of people in each country who speak each individual language as
their preferred language and then constructed a linguistic similarity index for the two trading
countries by multiplying together their language shares. The index has a maximum value of
10,000 when everyone in the two countries speaks the same language and zero when the native
languages are totally dissimilar. It is superior to the linguistic dummies typically used. The
language similarity index takes into account linguistic diversity within countries. In theory, as
more and more people in the importing country speak the same language as in the exporting
country, communication costs decline, thus facilitating trade. A positive coefficient is expected for
this variable.
The gravity model specified in the equation is estimated by pooling time series and cross-sectional
data. We use U.S. agricultural export data for more than 100 trading partners over 30 years (1966
to 1995). The export data are taken from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics database
and are based on cif prices. We first aggregate agricultural trade data into five broad categories:
1) bulk commodities; 2) intermediate processed goods; 3) horticultural products; 4) consumer-
ready processed goods; and 5) other agricultural products.
1  The first four categories add up to
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the official USDA definition for total agriculture (FATUS). The fifth category includes distilled
spirits, fish and marine products, and forestry products. In order to assess the role of distance on
specific agricultural products and more narrowly grouped commodities, the data were further
disaggregated into more detailed commodities based on the International Bilateral Agricultural
Trade (IBAT) classification, an international classification scheme designed by ERS specifically
for agricultural trade. The IBAT classification condenses over 250 SITC four-digit commodities
into 110 commodity groups. The data for real GDP, real GNP, and population are from the World
Development Indicators 1998 CD-ROM (The World Bank, 1998), while the nominal exchange
rates and CPI are from the IMF International Financial Statistical online database.
Since we estimate the gravity model at a very disaggregated level, there may be a fairly strong
Coals to Newcastle effect.
2 This effect biases upward the distance parameters. It occurs when
region’s exports of commodity i to region r are negatively correlated with region r’s comparative
advantage in commodity i, because of geographical clustering of comparative advantages. For
example, a gravity model of Saudi Arabia’s export in oil would find that it does not export much
to other nearby Persian Gulf countries because their neighboring countries also export oil. To
circumvent the possible bias from a geographic clustering of comparative advantage, we introduce
arable land area and Balassa’s RCA index
3 as an alternative explanatory variables into our gravity
equation specification focusing on U.S. exports of agricultural goods. The Balassa index captures
not only the comparative advantage associated with land but also other factors. We expect the
coefficient estimates for both of these two variables to have a negative sign, the more arable land
the importing country has (or the stronger the comparative advantage they have), the less its
demand for U.S. agricultural exports. The data on arable land was downloaded from the FAO
                                                                                                                                                          
cotton, raw rubber and unmanufactured tobacco. These commodities are usually directly linked with extensive
use of arable land for production. Processed intermediate goods are derived from bulk commodities and need
further processing for human consumption, such as flour, feed, live animals, and animal fats and oils.
Horticultural products are consumer-ready, unprocessed fresh commodities such as fresh fruit, vegetables, and
flowers. They often require special handling such as containerization and refrigeration. Consumer-ready
processed products are commodities that have been significantly transformed such as prepared and preserved
vegetables, fruits and nuts, chilled and frozen meats, eggs, dairy products, processed meats and beverages.  
2 We are very grateful to Michael Ferrantino for his comments in this regard and his suggestion to
use Balassa’s RCA index as a repressor.
3 RCA is the share of each commodity group in an economy’s total exports divided by that
commodity group’s share of world exports (See Balassa, 1965). If the economy’s export specialization has not
been distorted by government policies, the ranking of RCA values indicates comparative advantage relative to
the rest of the world. Formally, denoting Eij to be the export of good i of country j, and assuming that there
are n commodities and m countries engaged in trade, then the RCA can be defined as:
RCAjr =  (Σ jr / Σ
n
j?1 Σ jr)  /  (Σ
m





Share of good j Good j’s share
in country r's in world exports
total exports
In practice, the ranking of the RCA index usually not only reflects fundamental comparative advantage, but
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Website, while the RCA indices were calculated from the United Nations Commodity Trade
Statistics database. Data on total agricultural exports were used in calculating the RCA indices for
the 110 disaggregated food and agricultural commodities, and data on total merchandise exports
were used in the indices for the five aggregated agricultural commodities.
Econometric Issues
In pooling cross-section and time series data, we have to take into account variations (i) across
time, (ii) across export destinations, and (iii) joint disturbance in both dimensions. Therefore, the
error term in the equation can be decomposed as follows:
Where σ ir is the importing country effect, λ it is the time effect, and ν isrt is a white-noise
disturbance term. Such an error structure leads to the use of a two-way error component model.
In such models, both the importing country’s specific error σ ir and time error λ it is assumed to be
normally distributed random effects. An estimated generalized least square (EGLS) procedure will
be used to estimate such models. It involves estimating each of the variance components in the
first stage and applying generalized least squares (GLS) to the data in the second stage by
incorporating the estimated variance-covariance matrix obtained in the first stage.
There are three reasons to make such an assumption on the error structure. First, both the
physical distance and the linguistic similarity index are time-invariant measures.
4 Assuming σ ir to
be fixed would make it impossible to estimate their coefficients. Second, some computational
advantages accrue from using a random-effect model rather than a fixed-effect specification when
the number of importing countries is as large as in our sample. Finally, since there is incomplete
data on real GDP and exchange rates for importing countries, our sample does not include all
trading partners of the United States (only about two-thirds). Thus, σ ir should be considered as
being randomly distributed when making inferences about parameters of the population.
Another econometric issue is how to deal with those countries with which the United States has
zero exports. There are a large number of such observations, especially in the detailed commodity
data. Alternative methods have been proposed (Frankel, 1997). An observation with zero export
value can be simply omitted, which may lead to selectivity bias. Arbitrary small numbers may be
used in place of zeros. A semi-logarithmic formulation and Tobit estimator can be used with the
loss of interpreting the estimated coefficients as elasticities (Havrylyshyn and Pritchett, 1991). The
approach used in this study is based on Eichengreen and Irwin (1995). It preserves the double-log
form, and yields results similar to the Tobit model.
In such an approach, the dependent variable is transformed as Ln (1+ exports). When the value of
                                                
4 The linguistic index is invariant because it changes slowly and because of serious data
constraints in constructing a time series of such an index.
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exports is large, the dependent variable is roughly equal to Ln (exports) and the constant elasticity
relationship is preserved. For small export values, the dependent variable is roughly equal to
exports itself, approximating the semi-log Tobit relationship. After the data transformation, the
equation is estimated by a scaled OLS estimator in which the least squares estimates are divided
by the share of observations of U.S. exports not equal to zero (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995), and
the Tobit method, which allows simultaneous modeling of the threshold effect of zero versus
positive trade and estimation of the elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to the
various regressors (Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997).
Major Estimation Results
1) Estimation results at aggregate level
The estimation results from the three methods are quite similar, especially for the scaled OLS and
Tobit models. The estimated coefficients for major explanatory variables such as distance, United
States and importing country’s GDP, the real exchange rate, and arable land endowment in the
importing country, all have the expected sign and most are statistically significant.
The estimated coefficients of U.S. GDP are highly significant regardless of the estimation
procedure. This shows that economic growth in the United Sates has a strong impact on U.S.
agricultural exports. Bulk, intermediate and horticultural products have elasticities greater than
one while consumer-ready and other agricultural products have elasticities less than one. This
indicates that the exports of bulk and intermediate products expanded at a more rapid rate relative
to U.S. GDP growth than exports of consumer-ready products, with the latter having relied more
heavily on the domestic market. However, U.S. aggregate agricultural exports grew faster than
GDP, indicating that the international food and agricultural market is an important source of
growth for the U.S. economy.
The elasticity of the importer’s GDP is also significant (with consumer-ready products in the
error-component model the only exception) and greater than one for U.S. bulk, intermediates, and
total agricultural exports, but less than one for horticultural, consumer-ready and other
agricultural commodities. The estimated elasticity of the importer’s per capita income indicates
U.S. bulk and intermediate exports are necessities for the importing country while horticultural,
consumer-ready and other agricultural products are luxuries, consistent with our a priori
expectations.
The elasticities of real exchange rates are all negative and statistically significant (except other
agriculture in the error component model). The magnitude of these estimates shows that U.S.
exports of horticultural and consumer-ready products are more sensitive to changes in exchange
rates than bulk products since the former are relatively more elastic with respect to price than the
latter.
All the coefficient estimates of arable land in importing countries have the expected negative sign
and are statistically significant, indicating a strong negative correlation between U.S. agricultural
exports and importing countries agricultural land endowment. The Balassa index is not used in the
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advantage for the broad commodity aggregates. The elasticities of agricultural land in importing
countries are relatively larger for bulk commodities than other products, indicating land
endowment in the importing countries has a stronger impact on U.S. bulk exports than other
commodities. This is consistent with intuition. However, the coefficients of the adjacency dummy
are all negative, which contradicts the conventional wisdom that a common border will boost
trade. The negative coefficient may be explained by the fact that the NAFTA countries are all net
agricultural exporters. The use of land as an explanatory variable to represent comparative
advantage in the model may not be sufficient to fully isolate the geographic effects from the Coals
to Newcastle effects we discussed earlier.
The impacts of language similarity are all positive and statistically significant for horticultural,
consumer-ready, and other agricultural products but insignificant for bulk and intermediate
products in the scaled OLS and Tobit models. This may be explained by the notion that marketing
horticultural and consumer-ready products demands more language proficiency than bulk
products. Possessing a common language enables U.S. suppliers to be more effective with
promotional activities and enables them to better understand how to differentiate products that
suit the tastes of foreign consumers. Note, that all estimates for the effect of language similarity in
the random effect model are statistically insignificant. However, their signs being positive conform
with our expectations.
The estimated distance elasticities are always negative and statistically significant in each of our
estimated models. The estimated coefficients on the log of distance for the five major categories
of U.S. agricultural exports range from -1.5 to -2, which means that when the distance between
the United States and the importing country increases by 1 percent, U.S. total agricultural exports
will decline by 1.5 to 2 percent. The negative impacts of distance on horticultural products and
bulk commodities are relatively larger than for the other agricultural commodity groupings. The
stronger negative effect of distance on horticultural products is consistent with the fact that
horticultural products are the most expensive to transport because of their bulkiness relative to
value and the higher handling costs given their high degree of perishability. However, the larger
distance elasticity for bulk commodities is somewhat surprising. Perhaps this can be explained by
differences in the rate of technological change characterizing the various agricultural subsectors.
In recent years, rapid technological innovations have taken place in the way agricultural
perishables are shipped. By contrast, little has changed in the way in which bulk commodities are
transported.
The coefficients for the time trend of the distance elasticity at the aggregate commodity level are
generally not statistically significant. However, the estimates for bulk exports have significant
negative signs from the scaled OLS model and the estimates for horticultural exports have
significant positive signs from the error component model. These results are consistent with
findings elsewhere in the empirical literature, which found no clear-cut statistical evidence of a
declining role for distance in aggregate trade (Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997, Frankel, 1997).
The significant variation in the proportion of transportation-costs-to-export-value for different
U.S. agricultural exports, with ratios rising for some products but falling for others, tend to
average or cancel out in the broad aggregate categories. The desire to explore the role of distance
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analysis.
2) Estimation results at detailed commodity level
Among the 104 commodities whose distance elasticity have the expected negative sign, 43 have a
statistically significant positive sign for the time trend, indicating that distance may have had a
declining effect on U.S. exports. Thirty-five of the categories have a statistically significant
negative sign, indicating that distance has become more of an impediment to trade with time.
Finally, the other 26 are statistically insignificant, implying that the effect of distance has not
changed over the sample period.
To construct the three tables, we first ran two regressions for each detailed product using two
different measures of comparative advantage, one that used the importing country’s arable land as
a proxy and the other that used the RCA index to represent comparative advantage. All the
regressions with a wrong sign for the variable representing comparative advantage were deleted.
For those commodities with a statistically significant negative sign for both arable land and the
RCA index, reported estimates were selected on the basis of adjusted R squares, the sign and t-
statistics of other explanatory variable such as common border and language similarity index, as
well as intuition. For those commodities that did not have a statistically significant coefficient
estimate for either variable, additional regressions were run without any comparative advantage
variables.
Many of the commodities for which distance has become less of an impediment to trade over time
includes such perishable products as fresh and chilled meat, fresh eggs, flowers, fruit, vegetables
and other processed products. Only a couple of bulk commodities, namely cotton seed and sugar,
show diminishing effects for distance.
Commodities in the second group for which distance may have had an increasing effect are mixed.
This group includes important bulk products such as wheat, soybeans, tobacco, natural rubber,
barley and oats, but also quite a few processed commodities. Seventeen of the 35 commodities in
this group still have a negative sign for their adjacent dummy variable, 12 of which are statistically
significant, indicating that Coals to Newcastle effects may have biased the empirical estimates
(compared with the first group of commodities, their estimated coefficients of the adjacent
dummy are positive with only four exceptions). The adjacency variable should be positive,
reflecting lower costs of doing business in a familiar, nearby market. When it is negative, it may
indicate that the strong effects from comparative advantage are not being fully isolated.
The empirical results support the notion that the cost of shipping processed products such as
various meats may have declined faster than the cost of shipping feed grains such as corn. The
distance elasticities for most meats have a statistically significant declining trend, while the
coefficient for corn is not significantly different from zero. In addition to income growth and trade
liberalizing measures, transportation costs for meat may have declined relatively more than for
feed grain, thus leading to a substitution of meat for feed grain in trade.
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aggregate level. Most commodity- and product-specific equations had correct signs on the
estimated coefficients and were statistically significant. The coefficients of language similarity, for
example, were almost always positive and statistically significant for most commodities.
Moreover, the results at the detailed level often clarified ambiguous results obtained from the
broad aggregate groups. For example, the estimated border effect was positive for most
processed and consumer-ready products; but the border effect was negative for most bulk
products. This demonstrates that adjacency facilitates trade in high-value products. It also shows
that similarities in arable land endowment reduce trade between neighboring countries in specific
land-intensive bulk commodities. Such offsetting effects can confuse the results when highly
aggregated data are used.
Conclusions
This study represents the first attempt to estimate the effects of distance on U.S. exports of
specific food and agricultural commodities. By using a simple gravity model and pooling cross-
section and time-series data, we found that the impact of distance on U.S. agricultural exports
varies significantly for different products.
Similar to most previous gravity model estimations, we also found almost no statistical evidence
to support a diminishing trend in the effect of distance on aggregate groups of commodities.
Generally speaking, the gravity model performed better using more detailed, disaggregate data.
The specific commodity and product approach enables us to more precisely determine the impact
of technology-induced reductions in transportation costs and the role of distance. For example,
the empirical evidence shows a declining impact of distance on U.S. agricultural exports for
certain perishable and processed products. These findings are contrary to previous studies that
have not found that the distance effect is diminishing. They are also at odds with our more
aggregate results.
Two caveats need to be mentioned. Because of many missing values in the detailed disaggregated
trade data, the sample size for many commodities was reduced. This could lead to possible
estimation bias when using the RCA index as an explanatory variable representing an importing
country’s comparative advantage. To further isolate geographic effects from the impact of
comparative advantage, it may be necessary to exclude Canada from the sample, especially for
bulk commodities. In addition, the robustness of the coefficient estimates need to be further tested
by filling those missing values in the RCA index and applying a similar model to other countries
export data.
There are many factors that explain the differential growth in U.S. bulk versus perishable product
exports. In this paper, we focus on one of the most important determinants, distance. When
technological advances in transportation and logistics dominate, lower transaction costs reduce
the elasticity of distance. However, the distance elasticity may remain unchanged or even increase
over time in response to differential rates of growth in different parts of the world. More research
is needed to better understand this "shift in gravity" phenomenon.
References            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 82
Balassa, B. (1965) Trade Liberalization and Revealed Comparative Advantage. The Manchester
School of Economics and Social Studies, 33: 99-124.
Bergstrand, Jeffrey H. (1989) "The Generalized Gravity Equation, Monopolistic Competition, and
the Factor-Proportions Theory in International Trade." Review of Economics and Statistics, 71,
1:143-53.
Boisso, Dale, and Michael Ferrantino. (1997) "Economic Distance, Cultural Distance, and
Openness in International Trade: Empirical Puzzles." Journal of Economic Integration 4, 12:
456-484.
Deardorff, Alan. (1995) "Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical
World." .NBER Working Paper 5377 (December).
Eichengreen, Barry, and Douglas A. Irwin. (1995) "Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and the
Reorientation of World Trade in the 1930’s." Journal of International Economics 38:1-24.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. (1997)  Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System.  Institute for
International Economics, Washington, DC (October).
Fitzpatrick, G. and M. Modlin. (1986) Direct Line Distances: International Edition. Metuchen,
NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Havrylyshyn, Oleg, and Lant Pritchett. (1991) "European Trade Patterns after the Transition."
Policy, Research, and External Affairs Working Paper Series No. 74 .Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
Hummels, David, and James Levinsohn. (1995) "Monopolistic Competition and International
Trade: Reconsidering the Evidence." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 3: 799-836.
Leamer, Edwards. (1994) "American Regionalism and Global Free Trade." NBER Working Paper
No. 4753. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 83
Linnemann, Hans. (1966) An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Thompson, Robert L. (1981) "A Survey of Recent U.S. Developments in International
Agricultural Trade Models." Bibliographies and Literature of Agriculture No. 21. Washington,
DC: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.            Economic Research Service/USDA          Technological Changes, Transportation Sector/MP-1566 84
Wrap-up Session
MR. ARMBRUSTER: This session focuses on what this workshop is all about, looking at a
research agenda for ERS. We have an excellent panel to help us think about a possible research
agenda for ERS. In addition to ERS Associate Administrator Kelley White, we have Dr. Enrique
Figueroa, who is the administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service, which runs a number of
marketing-related programs in the United States, particularly, and provides assistance for
improving marketing facilities that interface with the transportation system; Shayle Shagam, from
the USDA’s World Agriculture Outlook Board, which provides important information to private-
and public-sector decision makers; and Joedy Cambridge, with the Transportation Research
Board, a nonprofit organization that conducts research related to maritime and intermodal
transportation.
As we said at the outset, the objectives of this workshop were to raise awareness within ERS
about the role of technological and structural change in shipping and its impact on global food and
agricultural markets, and then identify the role of ERS in research to provide policymakers a clear
understanding of the current and future role of shipping innovations.
We have discussed shipping innovations and some of the changes in laws and we haven’t had
much focus on the research implications. It has been pointed out that transportation costs are,
indeed, on a similar level as high tariffs in their impact on competitiveness in trade. Yet, there is
lots of energy and attention focused on reducing trade tariffs, but not nearly so much public
attention on reducing transportation costs. Praveen Dixit did point out that one of the goals of
ERS is to integrate transportation costs into trade analysis.
Our panelists will explore the implications of what we’ve heard the last couple of days for the ERS
research agenda. We will start out with Kelley White, associate administrator of ERS.
MR. WHITE: Thanks, Walt. I feel a little bit constrained by the time dimension of transportation
in trying to draw very many implications for our research program from what I’ve heard the last
day-and-a-half. This has been an extremely interesting and very diverse set of presentations. I sat
down this morning for a few minutes with a cup of coffee to think about what I might say. And I
started out just trying to jot down a few of the interesting issues that have been raised. Let me just
tick off a couple of them.
Why is the United States not a player in ocean transportation? What difference does it make? We
have been told that economies of scale are driving the structure of ocean shipping, which has
implications for the economic viability of the ports, and that we may end up with all of our
agricultural commodities being shipped out of Portland, Oregon. At what point do the
diseconomies of the collection or concentration of commodities at a single port and the
diseconomies of distribution of imports from a single port outweigh the economies of larger
ships?
What are the economic implications of changing transportation technology for the structure of the
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processing, and distribution? What are the implications of changes in transportation technology
and infrastructure for international competitiveness?
What are the implications of what we’re told is the deteriorating and depreciating nature of the
internal U.S. transportation infrastructure at the same time our competitors in Latin America are
investing heavily in modern transportation infrastructure and liberalizing their internal
transportation policy? We have talked almost exclusively in the last day-and-a-half about inter-
country transportation. It may well be that the implications of differences in internal transportation
may be more important than differences in international transportation costs for competitiveness.
And what are the relative trade effects of further deregulation of transportation versus investment
in transportation infrastructure?
What are the opportunities for new transport technology--containers, for example--to provide
cheaper and more effective means for identity preservation of specialized GMO-created varieties
of what in the past have been commodities but now are differentiated products? Is it going to be
possible to load containers with a differentiated type of corn at the farm, seal that container and
transport it to its ultimate end-user without having to have a whole new set of silos? If we go that
direction, what are the implications for where those kinds of differentiated commodities can be
produced? Are small farmers disadvantaged by that kind of technological change?
And finally, we haven’t talked a great deal about the consumer implications of changes in
transportation technology and transportation policy.
Now, all of these are interesting and, I think, researchable economic issues. Which of them should
be part of the ERS research portfolio? I’m not sure I know, but I think there are some criteria that
we want to use in deciding. First of all, is the issue compatible with the ERS mission, which is to
provide economic information to improve public and private decision making with respect to
agriculture and the rural economy. And we really are responsible for providing information to
improve private decision making if there is a large public good dimension to provide that
information; otherwise, the private sector should provide it. In terms of improving public
decisionmaking, we have to ask ourselves if there is a public policy issue associated with these
interesting, researchable economic questions.
Given that the answer to all those questions is “Yes,” that this is something ERS has a legitimate
claim on doing, we have to ask what is it that we stop doing if we’re going to do those things? Or
do we have some excess capacity so that we don’t have to stop doing anything? And given that
we have the capacity to do it, do we have a comparative advantage in doing it?
The pie chart presented this morning showing the percentage of bulk trade that is agricultural
vividly made the point that in many types of transportation services, rendered agriculture is a
relatively minor actor. Which says we probably don’t have a comparative advantage in doing basic
transportation research on the implications of liberalization or changes in technology.
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border variables in our models and analyses, not only in research but also in our situation and
outlook analysis. Especially when making long-term forecasts of changing competitive advantages
of commodities, we need to consider both internal transportation regimes and changing costs of
transportation among countries.
So, let me stop at that.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Thanks, Kelley. I should note that Kelley has the requisite educational
background to talk about this set of research issues, and he has a lot of research experience in the
international agricultural trade arena. And he has experience leading research programs both at
USDA and FAO.
Our next speaker, Enrique Figueroa, spent about 11 years on the faculty at Cornell University
before coming to his administrator’s post in the Agricultural Marketing Service here in USDA in
October 1997. Enrique operates in an area where he hears a lot from producer groups and others
who are affected by marketing programs, including transportation.
MR. FIGUEROA: I am going to take a slightly different approach than Kelley, even though I
concur with a number of the things that he just pointed out. The position that I have at the USDA
has allowed me to have a vantage point on some issues that I think are developing and will
develop in the near-term future that I think is relevant and important for you to consider in
formulating your research agenda.
Kelley already mentioned the issue about the movement of identity preserved products. I think
that the railroad industry is moving toward a model of unit train shipments. As you know, there
are now four Class I railroads. They are very much, in my judgment, oriented for unit trains of
100 plus cars.
On Tuesday, Du Pont announced that they were going to buy out Pioneer Hybrid. Those firms
roughly have patented about 200,000 genes in corn and soybeans. And what they are inferentially
going to do is to design corn or soybeans or something else specific for the end- user.
If the poultry producer wants a certain profile of nutritional content in the corn for chicks for the
first two weeks and another profile in the corn for the next three or four weeks, then they will
provide it. They will do that for pork. They will do that for beef. They will do that for wheat.
General Mills will say, “I want this kind of flour,” and they will develop it and then lease the seed
rights to farmers. And the only way for that approach to be a viable enterprise is for the
companies to control the distribution of the product, which means moving a lot of grain from
point X to point Y with the integrity maintained.
So the issue to me for your research agenda is to what extent the implications of that kind of
development in the technological field of seed manufacturing is compatible with developments in
the U.S. transportation system? How is it that those two forces are going to be reconciled and
hopefully moved in the same direction so they do not disrupt the movement of product internally?
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Some of you may be familiar with the Army Corps of Engineers’ nearly completed $50 million
study of the Upper Mississippi-Illinois water system. They were scheduled to complete it the end
of this year. I think now they’ve changed their date for the end of next year. It has significant
implications for what kind of infrastructure changes are made to those two river systems. I think
Kelley is exactly right in that the reason that we have been players in the international markets in
grain is because we deliver corn to the Gulf ports at a fairly reasonable price and therefore we can
compete in the world markets. If that cost of getting it to port increases (i.e., the infrastructure
costs internally), then we may not be as competitive as we think.
AMS is in the process of developing a long-term transportation study with a number of feed lot
operators in the Imperial Valley of California. They told me, and I have no reason to disbelieve
them, that it costs more to move grain into the Imperial Valley of California from the Midwest
than to move grain from the Midwest into Tokyo. They are now considering importing grain from
the Pacific to feed California cows because it is cheaper to feed China corn in California than to
feed Midwest corn in the Imperial Valley. That has very strong political implications. As you
know, producers stopped a load of imported barley in Stockton. But the economics are pointing
that way.
Are developments in transportation scale neutral for small farmers, medium-sized farmers, and
large farmers? To what extent is the research agenda going to provide answers to that particular
question?. Some of you are probably aware that the farm economy has really gone through very
severe stress. Hog prices hit historical lows in December. Secretary Glickman appointed a Pork
Crisis Task Force. There is severe stress in the farm economy, particularly among small
producers. Congress is interested in maintaining small- and medium-sized operations. To what
extent is the transportation system facilitating, encouraging, supporting, and sustaining that goal?
To what extent is the research agenda going to provide good information for policymakers in the
debate for the 2001 Farm Bill. My guess is that there is going to be more in the Farm Bill that
addresses the issue of different farm sizes than we’ve seen in the past. What is the research
agenda capability to generate good information for policymakers so they can formulate their
positions for this particular Farm Bill?
Last, let me point out that my agency is responsible for developing the organic rule. I was in
Europe a month ago for a conference called BioFac, which is now the largest conference in the
world with regards to organic products. There were about 35,000 attendees. Almost every
country in the world had a booth to display organic products. I met with officials from various EU
countries. The Netherlands has just passed a law requiring that all school lunch programs have a
minimum of 15 percent organic food; 15 percent is not much, but compared to the 1 percent in
this country, that is a very significant amount. And the shipments have to be maintained
separately, not as a commodity, but as a differentiated product.
My guess is that you will see more of this developing in Europe. We need to have research that
addresses this development. What are the implications for the transportation system? My
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particularly because we are going to have standards for livestock and poultry products that
require all the inputs, particularly grain, also be organically certified. The demand for
transportation for these products is going to be changing.
One last thing, to what extent is the infrastructure, both domestically and internally as well as in
international markets, going to be geared to East-West trade versus North-South trade? What
about our port capacities, how the boats and ships and vessels call on ports going North-South
versus East-West? My guess is that you will see much more trade--this is a longer-term issue--
going North-South within the U.S. and with U.S. trading partners than East-West.
So with that, I hope I’ve contributed to your two days of deliberations. Thank you.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Thank you, Enrique. I think you highlight some very real issues that the
commodity groups and processors in the U.S. are going to need to be paying attention to in terms
of future trade. And there are some research issues there that are yet to be looked into.
We’ll now turn to Shayle Shagam, who is the livestock analyst with the World Agriculture
Outlook Board. Prior to his assignment there, he spent a number of years at ERS.
MR. SHAGAM: This has been a very interesting conference. I am glad for the opportunity to
have listened to the discussion and to have learned quite a bit about the impact or the lack of
impact transportation may have on some of the competitive issues. What I would like to talk
about is what the potential impacts may be for an ERS research agenda.
We see the growing trend toward regionalization in international trade among countries bordering
one another. We heard from Professor Frankel yesterday that distance matters. But there are
other things, such as a common border and language, that may matter to as great or to a greater
extent. Two questions come to mind.
The first is, if we look at what is happening in the EU where they have removed border controls,
have we seen any changes in the structure or the cost of transportation? You don’t have to go
through the customs clearance processes. I don’t know if any trucker from any country in the EU
can compete in any other country; in other words, can a French trucker pick up a load and deliver
it somewhere in Italy. But do those kind of questions make a difference in terms of the impact of
distance?
It also has some implications for the United States and NAFTA. If you do away with the cabotage
laws, can a trucker from Mexico pick up a load and deliver it somewhere in the United States?
For livestock, a significant cost is incurred by a Canadian trucker trying to bring a load of live
animals or meat into the U.S. because of the lack of back-haul freight. In other words, if you are
delivering a load of beef from a plant in Calgary to Los Angeles, you must have a load going back
to Vancouver or someplace. You couldn’t pick up a load in Los Angeles and drop it off in
Spokane on your way back. So that, in fact, I was told, increased the cost for a Canadian trucker.
Does that have a potential impact on who can compete and what kind of price and services they
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For example, is it worthwhile to establish a slaughter plant in Mexico; bring in U.S. livestock,
slaughter it in Mexico, and ship the product back to the United States, assuming you can meet the
relevant health and safety issues.
The second point is that I’m very pleased that we have people like Heidi because many years ago
when I was struggling to do a project for the Meat Export Federation on the cost of delivering
meat from various countries into Japan, I called every shipper to try to find the relevant cost of
transportation. We didn’t have an organization like currently exists in AMS to provide one place
for information on a bunch of transportation issues.
But what is the relevant cost of transportation? Do we really know? I had a call one time from a
gentleman who hauled livestock to and from Mexico trying to figure out what the cost of
delivering livestock to Mexico was from U.S. farms or packing plants. He had just had his truck
seized. So do you figure in the cost of that truck in the transportation cost? He was absolutely
positive that I should be figuring in the cost of his truck because he was never going to get the
thing back again. So those are the questions that have to be raised as well as defining the real cost
of the transportation.
The third point is to ask what are the new technologies on the horizon that will alter the cost and
potentially the structure of shipping? We heard about the large-sized container vessels that will
limit the number of ports they can service. Another question is whether some of these
technologies are being pushed forward by industries? As industries consolidate and have sufficient
market power, is it worthwhile for them to develop new methods of transportation of some goods
that they then suggest to the industry, or are they simply going to be the adopters of whatever
technology the industry cares to offer them?
The next question concerns industrial structure. We’ve heard that you’re going to go from a cartel
to an oligopoly. Is firm behavior going to change? It may just be that the three firms that are left
are going to sit around the table in the morning and determine what the freight rates are going to
be for the future. So you’ve got a cartel that simply exists but didn’t have the formal sanction that
a cartel formerly had. Does this have an impact on the transportation of grain or meat?
Currently there is the potential merger of the Illinois Central Railroad and Canadian National
Railroad. And one of the issues that has come up is will there be sufficient competition in some of
the rural areas of Kansas. That is obviously an issue that policymakers have to consider before
they give sanction to mergers.
Finally, I raise an issue because it may hold some interesting questions for ERS in terms of
supporting USDA’s mission. Are we going to see the movement of transportation centers and
delivery points for entering this country at different locations than currently? When I first started
in ERS most imported meat came into Philadelphia. Why Australian meat was delivered all the
way to Philadelphia as opposed to Los Angeles, I don’t know. That was the way it was, I was
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Does ERS have the ability to look at some of these issues about regional delivery of product as a
budgetary issue? Where would you put resources if the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) or the grain inspection service (GIPSA) has to look at building facilities to test
product or to increase inspectors? Are there things we can tell them about where future resources
might be better allocated? I note this question has arisen in the case of livestock, with APHIS
trying to determine if they’re going to hire staff. What are the times they need to have people on
board to look at livestock? Are there specific times of the year when livestock crosses the border
and more staff is needed than other times of the year?
The same question can hold on locational questions as well. If Baltimore is not going to be as
important a delivery point for product, do you take resources away from Baltimore and reallocate
them to Spokane? ERS may be able to answer some of these questions about where imported
product is going to be entering the U.S. market.
Those are the five questions that came to mind as I listened to the workshop discussion. Again, it
was a very useful set of discussions, and I appreciate the opportunity to participate.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Thank you, Shayle, for identifying those questions, which I think have
some real relevance to the ERS research agenda.
Our final presenter is Joedy Cambridge, who is with the Transportation Research Board, which is
a nonprofit organization. Joedy intends to tell us about the organization with which she works.
But suffice it to say that she works on maritime and intermodal research and technology activities
and has extensive experience with that in the industry and in her current position.
MS. CAMBRIDGE: Okay. I know some of you in the room are familiar with TRB because Jim
serves on one of my committees, Bill Hall serves on one of my committees, and others of you, I
know, have participated in some TRB activities.
As Bill mentioned, TRB is the largest unit of the National Research Council. And the National
Research Council, for those of you who are not familiar with it, is really the operating arm of the
National Academies of Science and the National Academy of Engineering. We are under the
authority of the National Academy of Sciences. We serve as an advisor to the Federal
Government.
We are private, nonprofit, independent, and self-governing. And one of the reasons that people
turn to the NRC and the TRB for a lot of their research is because we are independent. We offer
an unbiased look at critical issues. And we do this through study panels that we put together, and
through more than 200 volunteer committees on various topics.
I also have some brochures here that give an overview of TRB and information on getting
involved in TRB committees.
TRB’s activities are sponsored by state DOTs, the administrations of the U.S. Department of
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AMTRAK, as well as a number of industry associations. Sponsors are ex officio members of
TRB’s executive committee, and there is a minimum dollar amount that these organizations
contribute to have a seat on that committee.
We also have a number of affiliates, all of whom have designated representatives as official
liaisons to TRB. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is one of our affiliate members; Eileen
Stommes is the official USDA representative. But we also have a number of other organizational
affiliates from both the private and public sector.
We also have university representatives from all over the country. This is a real advantage because
we have those links directly to all the major research institutions.
Another thing that my division of the TRB does every year is to visit all 50 States. They are
divvied up among our 14 senior program officers and we go out and make what are called
“research correlation service visits.” That means we visit the DOTs, the major transportation
facilities, the major research institutions, major industry associations that relate to transportation,
be it the Asphalt Association or groups like the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Waterways
Experiment Station of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We are out there every year finding out
what research is going on and what research needs have been identified at various locations.
This is all plugged into a research database that we have that States can tap into. Recognizing that
we have limited resources, both in terms of money and manpower, we feel that being a
clearinghouse for research is probably one of the most valuable services that TRB provides.
The mission of TRB is to promote innovation and progress in transportation by stimulating and
conducting research, by facilitating dissemination of information, and encouraging the
implementation of research results. Obviously, this is one of the reasons that Bill called me when
he first started talking about this workshop.
Our specific goals are to foster and contribute significantly to the research, development, and
implementation of new transportation technologies and innovative practices in the United States
to strengthen our activities in the nonhighway modes. TRB first began 75 years ago as the
Highway Research Board, and it was 25 years ago that it became the Transportation Research
Board. And slowly, but surely, we are getting beyond the asphalt and concrete to really focus
more attention on the other modes of transportation. Also, to contribute to decisionmaking on
national transportation policy issues, to improve communication and public awareness of issues in
transportation both here and abroad, and to promote greater participation in our activities by the
private sector.
Our activities range from policy studies, which are part of our division B, Policy Studies and
Information Services, and I have a couple of examples. This is one recent report, “Policy Options
for Intermodal Freight Transportation.” This one was just recently published and issued. And
here’s another one, “Paying Our Way: Estimating the Marginal Social Cost of Freight
Transportation.” We also have one underway right now on freight transportation capacity into
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We hold an annual meeting here in Washington, DC in January. About 8,000 people attend from
all over the world. We have about 450 concurrent sessions that run from Sunday through
Thursday. I strongly encourage you to get information about it off our website and possibly
participate in some future year.
Just as an example, solicited research papers are presented. We also get unsolicited research
papers that are peer-reviewed and many of these are presented at the annual meeting. Some get
published in our Transportation Research Record series. I brought one example that features
ports, waterways, and marine transportation. Most of these papers deal specifically with inland
waterway transportation.
We also have invited presentations. We had an excellent one this year by Tim Gerik of the Iowa
Corn Growers Association who talked about the developments happening outside the United
States that are going to affect the competitiveness of U.S. agricultural exports, specifically some
of the inland waterway developments in South America. As they become capable of transporting
their agricultural commodities more competitively than we can, it is going to have a significant
impact on U.S. agricultural exports. And, of course, the biggest concern is that if they can
develop an inland waterways system that does not require the kind of major infrastructure
investment that our inland waterways system now requires as it gets updated, that is going to have
a significant impact. He also pointed out the issues relating to rail transportation, issues for the
agricultural growers, including the cost and the lack of equipment. So, really, it all just
mushrooms and everything affects everything else.
TRB holds mid-year committee and task force meetings. Every year we have a summer Ports and
Waterways Conference. Last year it was in Seattle, the year before that it was in Gulfport,
Mississippi, and in July 1999, it is going to be in Duluth, Minnesota. So, obviously, we will have a
very heavy emphasis in this program on agricultural and bulk shipping.
We also organize annual specialty conferences on a number of issues. For example, a freight
intermodal conference is coming up in Long Beach in February 2000. We are cosponsors of a
number of other meetings and conferences that are actually put together by other organizations.
TRB has a number of publications, including the Record, which I showed you earlier. We also put
out a bimonthly research magazine. The one for May-June of 1998 focuses on ports and
waterways. It includes an article on the impact of megaships on landside infrastructure and one on
transportation data that you may find of interest. We publish special reports, as I mentioned, and
reprints and CD-ROMs of all the research papers presented.
Study titles that either have already been published or will be published include “Measuring the
Relationships Between Freight Transportation Services and Industry Productivity” and
“Financing and Improving Highway Access to U.S. Intermodal Cargo Hubs,” both relevant to
the workshop topic, as you can see. There is a whole range of things that we get involved in. I
strongly encourage you to build on some of the work that we do and also to suggest research
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groups such as yours.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Thank you, Joedy. I think you can see there’s an opportunity for some
interaction between TRB and the Economic Research Service. As you look at research issues,
there might be some TRB materials and findings to help you further refine your research agenda
related to transportation and trade.
Now, we’ll take any questions from the audience. If you have a question for a specific person,
identify them, otherwise we will throw it open to the whole panel.
MS. BALLENGER: I think if it is directed to anybody, it would probably be best directed to
Joedy. We’ve talked a lot over the last couple of days about technological change in
transportation, and, clearly, there has been an awful lot. But we haven’t talked much, with maybe
the exception of some of Dick Parry’s comments about the ARS work, about where those
innovations are coming from and what is driving them.
There is some good research that we could take a look at to help us better identify the driving
forces behind these innovations and the relative roles of the public versus private sector in
transportation-related innovations. I’m not just talking about the ships themselves, but the whole
set of things that we’ve talked about in terms of cold or supply chain management over the last
couple of days.
MS. CAMBRIDGE: Well, I can’t say that there is any easy way to find this information. We do
compile all of these. We have what is called the Transportation Research Information Service, or
TRIS, database, which is searchable, and it does include things that relate to transportation
technology, as well as transportation economics and transportation planning. So if there is a
particular topic that you are interested in, that is a good place to start. We work jointly with the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics to compile materials that get entered into TRIS, which ranges
from journal articles, to technical studies, to policy studies.
TRIS has been around for a number of years. Just about anything that is going on in
transportation research gets submitted and entered into the TRIS database.
We also coordinate with groups such as SNAME, the Society of Naval Architects and Marine
Engineers. In May, we will be hosting one of their committee meetings at TRB. So we keep our
contacts and we have liaisons with all these other industry groups. There is also the American
Society of Civil Engineers. And, again, we cosponsor things that go on with these other
organizations. But we are the central clearinghouse for all of the stuff that is going on out there.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Another question?
MS. GLASER: Lewrene Glaser, ERS. Joedy, what kind of air transportation information is in the
database?
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issues, aviation technology, and public policy issues such as noise. I know one of the points
someone made this morning was that U.S. airports never prevent old airplanes from landing at
U.S. airports. Not quite true. It depends on how much noise that old aircraft makes. But yes,
there is a senior program officer who is an aviation specialist who can certainly help you and refer
you to some information.
But on the cargo side, I would also encourage you to touch base with the Cargo Airline
Association, which is based here in Washington, DC.  Steve Alterman is the executive director.
I’ve only been at TRB for two-and-a-half years and prior to that I spent about 20 Years in
consulting and did a combination of aviation and maritime work. And we did a very
comprehensive study on the economic impact of the all-cargo airline industry on the U.S.
economy and gathered a lot of proprietary data and information that was then aggregated in the
final report that was published. But that was prepared for the purpose of going up on the Hill on
behalf of the air cargo industry.
So there is some information out there but it certainly is a little harder to get hold of than it is for
some of the other modes. But I would encourage you to contact CAA because they do have a lot
of information available.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Is there another question from the audience?
PARTICIPANT: How do shipping rates differ by commodity breakdown?
MS. REICHERT: For high-value products, there are three different ways: by weight, which
would be in metric ton for some commodities such as poultry, beef, cotton; for other
commodities, especially fruit, it is on a per-package basis, such as $3 per package; or per each 20-
or 40-foot container. So it depends mostly on commodity and then also by trade route. Does that
help you?
MR. ARMBRUSTER: The point is the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has some data
available on this. I think one of the things we have found through interaction with AMS
colleagues the last several days is there is potentially a lot of opportunity to interact on your
research agenda with AMS. Enrique identified the need for some information to answer questions
that are coming forward in their programs. They have some data sources and people working on
transportation. So ongoing interaction seems to be a real need and opportunity as you develop
your research agenda further, as well as with the TRB people, obviously.
MR. ARMBRUSTER: Now I would like to turn it over to Bill for closing comments. But first, I
think we should thank Bill and Nicole and whomever really did the work behind the scenes
putting this program together. It has been a good focus on transportation-related issues that will
have an impact on the competitiveness of trade from the U.S. viewpoint in the future. Also, let’s
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